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Abstract 
 
The goal of this thesis is, as the title affirms, to understand the military reforms of 
Gaius Marius in their broader societal context. In this thesis, after a brief introduction 
(Chap. I), Chap. II analyzes the Roman manipular army, its formation, policies, and 
armament. Chapter III examines Roman society, politics, and economics during the 
second century B.C.E., with emphasis on the concentration of power and wealth, the 
legislative programs of Ti. And C. Gracchus, and the Italian allies’ growing demand for 
citizenship. Chap. IV discusses Roman military expansion from the Second Punic War 
down to 100 B.C.E., focusing on Roman military and foreign policy blunders, missteps, 
and mistakes in Celtiberian Spain, along with Rome’s servile wars and the problem of the 
Cimbri and Teutones. Chap. V then contextualizes the life of Gaius Marius and his sense 
of military strategy, while Chap VI assesses Marius’s military reforms in his lifetime and 
their immediate aftermath in the time of Sulla. There are four appendices on the ancient 
literary sources (App. I), Marian consequences in the Late Republic (App. II), the 
significance of the legionary eagle standard as shown during the early principate (App. 
III), and a listing of the consular Caecilii Metelli in the second and early first centuries 
B.C.E. (App. IV). 
 
 
The Marian military reforms changed the army from a semi-professional citizen 
militia into a more professionalized army made up of extensively trained recruits who 
served for longer consecutive terms and were personally bound to their commanders. In 
this way these reforms created an army which could be used against other Roman 
commanders or the city itself. Military eligibility was no longer exclusive to landowners, 
and the capite censi had new opportunities for spoils and social and political 
advancement.  
Marius’ reforms were not completely novel, but the practices that he introduced 
he also cause to be established as standard operating procedure. He implemented these 
reforms in a time of crisis, and subsequently the extraordinary military careers of both 
Marius and Sulla acted to preserve his measures and to move the army far down the road 
of professionalization. What I have shown in this thesis is the larger economic, social, 
and political context which formed the background and provided the incubator in which 
Marius’ reforms were generated and developed. Once Marius crystalized his ideas and 
put them in place, the stage was set for Sulla and the new kind of military action that 
would seal the fate of the Republic. 
  
 
 
 
  
 
 
The Military Reforms of Gaius Marius in their Social, Economic, and Political Context 
 
 
 
A Thesis 
 
Presented to the Faculty of the Department of History 
 
East Carolina University 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
In Partial Fulfillment of the Requirements for the Degree of  
 
Masters of Arts in History 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
By 
 
Michael C. Gambino 
 
August, 2015 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
© 2015 Michael Gambino 
 
 
 
 
The Military Reforms of Gaius Marius in their Social, Economic, and Political Context 
 
By  
 
Michael C. Gambino 
 
Approved By: 
 
Thesis Director:_________________________________________________________________ 
F.E. Romer Ph.D. 
 
 
 
 
Committee Member:_____________________________________________________________  
Anthony Papalas Ph.D. 
 
 
 
 
Committee Member:_____________________________________________________________ 
M. Todd Bennett Ph.D. 
 
 
 
 
Committee Member:_____________________________________________________________ 
John Stevens Ph.D. 
 
 
 
 
Chair of the Department of History:_________________________________________________ 
Gerald  J. Prokopowicz Ph.D. 
 
 
 
 
 
Dean of the Graduate School:______________________________________________________ 
Paul J. Gemperline Ph.D. 
 
 
 
 
 
Table of Contents 
 
List of Tables…………………………………………...…………………………….….v  
 
List of Figures…………………………………………...…………………………....…vi 
 
Preface……………………………………………...………………………………..….vii 
Chapter I. Introduction……………………………………………………………….....1 
Chapter II. The Roman Manipular Army ...……………………………………….…19 
Chapter III. Roman Society, Politics, and Economics during the 2
nd
 Century……..41 
Chapter IV.  Roman Military Expansion from 2
nd
 Punic until 100BC  .....................64 
Chapter V.  Biography of Gaius Marius ........................................................................81 
Chapter VI. Marian Military Reforms ........................................................................101 
Works Cited ……………………………………………………………………...…....136 
Appendix I: Marian Consequences in the Late Republic………….…………….....140 
Appendix II: The Legionary Eagle Standard during the Principate……………....142 
Appendix III: The Caecilii Metelli in the Second and Early First Centuries...…....144  
  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
List of Tables 
Table 3.1 …………………………………………….......……………………………... 51 
  
 
 
 
List of Figures  
 
Figure 2.1 ………………………………………………………..……………………... 28 
 
Figure 2.2 ………………………………………………………..………………………29 
 
Figure 2.3 ………………………………………………………..……………………... 29 
 
Figure 2.4 ……………………………………………..………………………………... 34 
 
Figure 6.1………………………………………...……………………………….….... 117 
 
 
 
 
 Preface 
  
   Textual evidence from the Roman period describes the armies of both the 
preceding and following periods in great detail. The manipular army of the Middle 
Republic (c. 164) is chronicled by the Greek historian Polybius, whose close association 
with the commander Scipio Aemilianus helped to grant him crucial insight into his 
contemporary Roman military practices. The army of Julius Caesar in the Late Republic 
(c.54) is described in meticulous detail by the general himself in his accounts of both the 
Gallic and the Civil wars. Between these two accounts of the army, the famous Roman 
general Gaius Marius is credited with enacting major army reforms between 107 and 101, 
changing the formation, tactics, and policies of his legions. The exact nature of Marius’ 
reforms and their role in the professionalization of the army is still unclear because of the 
patchwork coverage of ancient sources. As a result, all major military changes that 
occurred in the intermediary period (ca.150- ca.60) are generally attributed to Marius. 
This thesis will examine and determine the specific reforms and the historical evidence 
which ties Marius to them so as to determine whether each reform is Marian or not.  
This thesis explores the military social, economic, and political contexts in which 
Gaius Marius came to power and enacted his reforms. It analyzes the second century 
developmental context that spurred on radical army reforms. For both consistency and 
convenience, I use the Loeb English for Latin and Greek, in addition to preventing any 
personal biases or interpretations of my own from the evidence or prejudicing the 
translation.  
 This thesis would not have been possible without the unwavering support of my 
parents, who never failed to encourage and motivate me; and the understanding and love 
 
 
of my best friend and partner, Rosie, who helped and accommodated me during graduate 
school and the research and writing of this project. And a special thank you to the faculty 
at East Carolina University’s Classics and History departments, most of all Professor 
Frank Romer, whose endless patience, wisdom, and guidance has led me through the long 
process of completing this project, and whose mentoring has developed me into a better 
historian, writer, and person
 
 
Chapter I: Introduction 
 
During the final decade of the second century BCE,
1
 the Roman army underwent 
a series of major military reforms enacted by the seven-time consul, Gaius Marius. These 
reforms were aimed at reorganizing the legions in order to increase their flexibility and 
mobility, as well as to increase the overall number of their fighting force. Marius had 
instituted these reforms because Rome’s changing military needs at the end of the second 
century. Throughout the third and second centuries, Rome had come into conflict with 
several major overseas powers, namely, Carthage and various Greek entities. After 
several long campaigns the Romans resolved these conflicts through conquest. These 
victories expanded Rome’s dominion in the Mediterranean, and removed its most 
aggressive military rivals; in addition these conquests flooded Rome with the spoils of 
war. However, the Romans also found themselves in control of an overseas empire with 
all its inherent responsibilities like border security, maintaining order, and suppressing 
revolts. For the Romans to be able to maintain control over their newly acquired 
territories, they needed the ability to deal quickly and effectively with threats along their 
new borders, especially in North Africa and Spain. Also during this period, large armies 
of new northern invaders, namely, the Teutones and Cimbri, had begun to encroach on 
Roman territories from the north.  
 Marius’ reforms did not occur in a vacuum. External pressures on the Roman 
army made reforms desirable, but internal social pressures motivated these changes as 
well. Marius was a major figure in the emblematic aristocratic conflict between the 
optimates and populares at Rome for influence and power. Not only was Marius a novus 
                                                        
1 All dates in this thesis are BCE unless otherwise specified. 
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homo, or “new man,” which indicated that he was not born into one of the powerful 
consular families and that he was the first person in his family to achieve the consulship, 
and he also was born into a family near Arpinum, a town in Latium. Marius had risen to 
success by his martial ability and the power of his personality. As a result, through a 
variety of events Marius became champion of the plebs, who in turn elevated him to the 
consulship. As a leading popularis, he benefitted the plebs, who were the base of support 
for all populares politicians. He used the people’s general displeasure with the senatorial 
elite as a means of securing power. Marius even went as far as to make his former patron, 
Caecilius Metellus, into an enemy to ingratiate himself with his new political base, and to 
satisfy his growing ambition for power. 
Despite being regarded as a champion of the plebs, Marius typically catered to 
equestrian interests when he served in Africa. The equites were the wealthier class of 
propertied businessmen at Rome, and he avoided the more radical measures of a hardline 
popularis. Marius also shared strong personal, political, and familial ties with several 
prominent populares, as well as optimates, men like Scipio Aemilianus, Tiberius and 
Gaius Gracchus, and Julius Caesar. (His son, C. Marius Minor, was also an acquaintance 
of M. Tullius Cicero, also a native of Arpinum.) Throughout Marius’s career the clash 
between the populares and optimates motivated many of his actions and reforms, military 
or otherwise, directly and indirectly. The historical background of political, military, and 
economic developments before Marius’ day is necessary to understand the nature of 
Marius’ accomplishments. 
The aim of this thesis is to broaden the social, economic, political, and military 
context in which the military reforms of Gaius Marius were developed and implemented, 
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so as to better understand his reasons for reforming the army, the major second century 
motivations that both the senatorial aristocracy and the general Roman population had for 
ratifying and later perpetuating his measures, and the reform’s long-term consequences in 
the first century. Marius’ contemporary motivations and influences led to his military 
reforms during the final decade of the second century. His second-century perspective 
guides us in analyzing his reforms and their impact on events of the early first century, 
especially the outbreak of the civil wars that led to the fall of the republic.  
In antiquity many writers mentioned Marius in histories or their military manuals, 
but only a handful of texts that detail his life and career have survived. Three ancient 
authors provide the most insight into Marius’ life and career: Sallust, Appian, and 
Plutarch; however, their works are not ideal histories. Sallust’s monograph, Bellum 
Jugurthinum, developed Marius’ career along partisan lines highlighting the struggles 
between Marius as a popularis and the senatorial optimates. Appian’s Bella Civilia 
addresses Marius as a figure within the context of the Roman civil wars. He shows the 
political landscape at Rome and in Italy as a battleground between the wealthy minority 
and the large majority of poor. As a biographer, in his Life of Gaius Marius, Plutarch 
both romanticizes and vilifies Marius while interweaving moral and religious judgments 
on his character. 
 
Sallust  
Gaius Sallustius Crispus lived from 86 to 35 BC, was a senator, political ally of 
Julius Caesar, and a widely read author even in antiquity. He was expelled from the 
senate for moral turpitude, and spent the rest of his life writing history. Sallust’s second 
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work Bellum Jugurthinum chronicles the events of the Jugurthine War, which lasted from 
111 until 105, between the Romans and a Numidian king named Jugurtha. One of the 
main focuses of his work is to show the rise of Gaius Marius as the ultimate commander 
of the war and as a rising figure in Roman politics.
2
  
Sallust details army movements, maneuvers, logistics, and all the battles of the 
war, which may reflect the author’s experience as a military commander and governor of 
Africa. However, the true strength of the work is the intimate details of Marius’ initial 
climb as a novus homo to the highest office in Rome. Sallust also follows the model of 
the great Greek historian Thucydides who recorded the History of the Peloponnesian War 
in eight books. Both men used speeches, at least partially recreated, in order to 
characterize the major figures of their respective narratives. Sallust includes a speech 
Marius is supposed to have delivered before the consular election of 107, in which 
Marius provides a self-portrait as humble, modest, and soldierly, that is, as raised in 
venerable Roman tradition. Later in the same speech he contrasts himself with the current 
commander of the campaign, Metellus, and the rest of the senatorial elite whom he 
accuses of corruption from wealth, luxury, and over-exposure to Greek culture.
3
  
Sallust describes Marius strongly opposing the luxurious, excesses and greed of 
the senatorial elite who monopolized and abused power at Rome. He focuses on the 
hostile relationships, first, between Marius and Metellus and, then, between Marius and 
Sulla. Both Metellus and Sulla being committed optimates, while Marius was a 
popularis. The work also covers the election for 107 and Marius’ military campaign in 
North Africa, Sallust introduced several of Marius’ most important military reforms: 
                                                        
2 Marius’ early career: Sall. BJ. 84.2, 86. 
3 On Speeches; Thuc 2.23, Sall. BJ. 85.31-35. 
5 
 
enrollment of the capite censi, the reduction of the baggage train and the creation of 
“Marius’ Mules,” and various other disciplinary improvements.4  
The account ends with Marius’ second election to the consulship, this time in 
absentia, for 104, after which he celebrated his formal triumph over Numidia, 
replenished his troops, and headed for Gaul to combat the combined threat of the 
Teutones and the Cimbri. Sallust’s portrayal of Marius the general shows him as 
concerned with the fate of the people of Rome and trying to wrest power away from the 
established aristocracy. Marius comments on the elite’s Hellenized lifestyles and general 
disconnect from the rest of the Roman people. Sallust highlights Marius’ advocacy of 
Roman traditions and “power to the people” as he combated the establishment. 
 
Appian 
Appian was an historian, who originally lived in Alexandria and wrote in Greek 
during the second century AD. Appian unlike writers like Sallust, Cassius Dio, and 
Velleius Paterculus, was never a senator of Rome. He had only reached the 
procuratorship, which was an equestrian or middle-rank position. Appian’s more humble 
roots probably helped to shape his perspective of Marius. Besides the Bella Civilia, 
which we are concerned with, Appian wrote several other works on Rome’s republican 
foreign wars.   
His Bella Civilia, focused on the growing social and economic disparity between 
the common people and the decreasing number of wealthy citizens, who had consolidated 
enormous amounts of money, land, and slaves. Appian was concerned with the causes of 
the century-long period (133-31 B.C.) of civil violence at Rome, which eventually ended 
                                                        
4Sall. BJ. 84.1. 
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the republic and gave birth to the empire. The primary purpose of the Bella Civilia was to 
demonstrate that Roman civil instability was the result of partisan conflicts fueled by 
economic and political inequality. He even provides demographic figures to show the 
increased concentration of wealth. Appian puts Marius into this context as a rising star of 
the populares, fighting against the senatorial faction.  
 Appian does not provide us with a complete picture of Marius’ life and career, but 
limits himself to the latter half. Marius does not play a major role in his work until his 
second consulship in 104 to which Appian says Marius was elected in absentia and given 
Gaul as a responsibility. Appian chronicles the rest of Marius’ career in detail, 
highlighting the enrollment of the capite censi into the army, the alterations to military 
training and equipment, and improved tactics. He gives accounts of the battles of Aquae 
Sextiae, Vercellae, and Triboli River, and both engagements at the gates when first 
Marius and then Sulla forced their way into Rome. 
 Appian portrayed Marius as a the leading popularis at Rome during this period, 
fighting against the wealthy and powerful who had already resorted to civil violence on 
several occasions to maintain the status quo. The strength of Appian’s Bella Civilia is 
that he coherently connects the socio-economic, military, and political problems Rome 
faced going into the civil war period with the emergence of the latifundia, or large 
plantations, in Italy. 
 Compared to other Roman sources, Appian’s treatment of the three occupations of 
Rome in 88, 87, 86 by Sulla, Marius and Cinna, and Sulla respectively, is less extreme. 
His account does indeed chronicle a period of proscriptions, mob violence, murder, 
confiscation of property, and a large number of banishments, but it lacks the malicious 
7 
 
and evil character developed in works like those of Plutarch and Velleius, who likely 
used Sulla’s memoirs as a source. His lack of vitriol may be a product of Appian’s 
apparent sympathy for the plight of the people. 
 
Plutarch 
Plutarch, a priest at Delphi, was a Greek biographer and philosopher who lived 
from 46 to 120 A.D. He wrote parallel biographies of the most famous and influential 
Greeks and Romans throughout ancient history, in addition to a large number of moral 
essays. The Life of Gaius Marius is not a strictly historical piece, but a biography. As 
such, Plutarch endeavored to show Marius as a champion of the people, who rose from 
rags to riches, from outsider and novus homo to the first Roman to hold seven 
consulships, most of them contrary to custom and law, and who was lauded as the third 
founder of Rome, after Romulus and Camillus. Far from pandering to the memory of 
Marius, Plutarch relied on Sulla’s memoirs as the primary source for the second half of 
his work and, as a result, he draws attention to the corruption and vile actions of Marius 
in his old age when he became ever greedier for power.
5
   
Plutarch regularly employed legend, prophecy, and hyperbole to characterize and 
moralize his subjects, which muddles the facts and details for modern readers. Even 
though modern readers must be careful to separate the fact from fiction, Plutarch was the 
most prolific ancient author whose works have survived, and his biographies still stand as 
essential sources for scholars even today, suppling us with a coherent and detailed 
account of Marius’ life, career, and legend. He details the battles, reforms, political 
                                                        
5 Plut. Mar. 35: “But Sulla himself, in his memoirs, say he did not fly for the refuge to the house of 
Marius, but withdrew thither in order to consult with Marius about the step which Sulpicius was 
trying to force him to take…” 
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career, and personal life and is corroborated by Appian’s and Sallust’s accounts, which 
adds to his credibility as a historical source. 
He claimed that Marius was born to a family of poor laborers, which modern 
scholars find is extremely unlikely. Plutarch briefly describes Marius’ military service 
under Scipio Aemilianus in the Numantine campaign of 134. He then details his 
subsequent rise through the ranks of the Roman state over the next twenty years: as a 
tribune, a praetor, and propraetor, or provincial governor, of Further Spain.
6
  
According to Plutarch, Marius then continued his career as a legatus, a lieutenant-
general, earning fame and money as a subordinate legionary commander. So, several 
years later in 109 he accompanied the consul Caecilius Metellus to Numidia for the war 
against Jugurtha. After serving loyally for two years, Marius left to run for the consulship 
of 107, which he won. He subsequently was awarded Metellus’ command. Plutarch 
records Marius’ enrollment of the capite censi in 107. His coverage of the Jugurthine 
War and Marius’ first consular campaign are not as detailed as Sallust’s account.  
Plutarch chronicled Marius’ victory in Numidia, his five consecutive elections as 
consul (104 to 100), and his campaigns against the Teutones and Cimbri. It was during 
this war that Plutarch discussed Marius’ modification to the javelin and his military 
activities in Gaul. Though not great military accounts, they at least illuminate some of 
Marius’ military reforms. Plutarch points out that during his sixth consulship (100 BC), 
Marius conspired with a radical tribune, Saturninus, and a radical praetor, Glaucia to 
force through controversial legislation, an attempt which turned into a failed coup. 
Marius backed out and helped the senate to put down the insurrection with his own 
veterans. As a result, Marius lost face with both political factions and was forced to leave 
                                                        
6 Plut. Mar. 4-6. 
9 
 
the city until the outbreak of the Social War in late 91, which facilitated his return to 
command.  
The rest of Plutarch’s biography attempts to show that Marius was corrupted by 
his power. The portrayal of Marius in his old age during the second half of the account 
clearly emphasizes that he was a vile and contemptuous man. Plutarch goes as far as to 
blame him for causing Sulla to march on the city in 88, when Marius was given 
command over the campaign in the East, which had previously been given to Sulla. Here 
Plutarch begins to rely on Sulla’s memoirs, and as a result he portrays Marius as a 
merciless killer who stood as an oppressive and murderous thug supporting Cinna. He 
even includes several anecdotes about Marius’ reign of terror. Plutarch’s moralizing is at 
times disruptive to modern readers. However, despite the biases and moralizing, Plutarch 
stands as an essential source for anyone studying the life and accomplishments of Gaius 
Marius.  
 
Velleius Paterculus 
Velleius Paterculus was well placed in the military and is the only surviving 
eyewitness, besides Augustus, to important events involving various members of the 
imperial family. He published his to books of Historiae in Latin ca. 31 CE. It covered 
everything from the Trojan War until 29 CE. He published his work in the time of 
Tiberius, but it was a clear attempt at flattery, shown by the starry-eyed description of 
Augustus’ career. Marius was the uncle of Julius Caesar, and Caesar who was the great 
uncle and adoptive father of Augustus; despite these family connections, Velleius 
provides an unsympathetic view of Marius, focusing on the civil bloodshed he wrought at 
10 
 
the end of his career, but at the same time downplaying Sulla’s similar behavior. Velleius 
had grown up in the period immediately following more than a century of civil violence 
and factional warfare. The security of the early empire, or principate, combined with 
imperial ideology, produced of a widespread negative view of any popular leader who 
rose to power at the expense of the old established authority, now that the established 
authority was the emperor and a proxy senate.  
In book II, Velleius describes Marius as overly ambitious, selfish, disruptive, and 
an enemy of peace. He even cast a dubious light on Marius’ first consular election, 
claiming that he used sordid tax-collectors to spread rumors among the Romans to sway 
public opinion his way. Moreover, Plutarch argues that Marius’ victory in Numidia was 
ill-desired and had less to do with his efforts than the work of Metellus and Sulla. His 
assessment, however, is unfair and inaccurate.
7
 
Even though Velleius adopted a skeptical view of Marius and his actions, his 
review of Marius’ later career and participation in the civil war is much less severe than 
Plutarch’s. Rather than highlighting groups of freed slaves under Marius’ orders hacking 
up citizens in the street, as Plutarch did, Velleius focuses his rebuke on the deaths of 
several senators, whose deaths Appian and Plutarch also attributed to Marius and Cinna.
8
 
It should be said that Velleius used Sallust, Sulla’s memoirs, and other materials that 
have not survived. 
 
 
 
                                                        
7 Vell. 2.11.1. 
8 Vell. 2.22. 
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Cassius Dio 
Cassius Dio lived from 155 to 235 CE. A senator, consul, and historian; he wrote 
an 80-volume history of Rome in Greek, which covered everything from the legendary 
landing of Aeneas in Italy forward. His discussion of Marius is not particularly detailed, 
but his condemnation of Marius is evident. For example, Dio shows no restraint in 
denouncing Marius’ occupation of the city, and he provided a list of horrible violence and 
murder supposedly carried out by Marius or at his request. Dio then immediately shielded 
Sulla by claiming that many horrible acts during his occupation of the city were outside 
of his control and not ordered by him.
9
 
Throughout the ancient and modern periods, Marius and Sulla have shared a 
linked history, and because of their conflicts are regarded as extreme opposites 
politically. They have come to represent the clash between optimates and populares. In 
antiquity earlier writers had a more sympathetic view of Marius while later authors 
writing in the imperial period, saw him as a troublemaker, who undermined the general 
peace. Over time, as the republican civil wars faded into the past, imperial writers, like 
Plutarch and Cassius Dio, adopted either a pro-Sullan view or at least an unsympathetic 
view of overly ambitious generals and mob power. Moreover, Marius was depicted as 
more violent the later that the source was written, which suggests a shift to an ideology 
that places security and safety above freedom and political expression. 
Finally, like Velleius, Dio used Sallust, Sulla’s memoirs, and other materials that 
have not survived. Dio also reached the consulship twice. Dio was highly placed in the 
governmental circles and had a keen sense of how government worked, but he was more 
attuned to the empire. 
                                                        
9 Dio. Frag C.5. 
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The very nature of these ancient works makes it necessary to cross-reference them 
with other literary, archaeological, and epigraphic evidence when it is available.  
 
The Status of the Marian Question Today 
 The wide scope of this thesis limited me from reading every pertinent modern 
work in each subfield, and as a result it was necessary for me to rely on a fewer number 
of modern authors, than I was initially inclined. 
 For much of the political history, Emilio Gabba’s 1976 book, Republican Rome: 
the Army and its Allies, was enormously useful. It chronicled and analyzed Rome’s 
relationship with its Italian allies both before and after the Social War. Gabba in his first 
chapter on the professionalization of the Roman army discussed the military reforms of 
Gaius Marius. He dismissed the notion that Marius, in professionalizing the army, was 
acting politically along factional lines. He argues further that Marius was actually acting 
in the interests of the optimates with his enrollment of the capite censi and his other 
various reforms. However, his explanation was unconvincing because he believed that 
the upper class would benefit from no longer being required to serve in the army, but he 
did not take into account the prestige and honor associated with military service in 
ancient Rome. 
 Gabba like many others have attempted to strip away the popular motivation for 
Marius’ actions and instead see him as an opportunistic independent, who sided with 
whomever he could benefit the most from. Gabba’s view of Marius was limited by his 
topic, which was the socii, or the Italian allies. However, not many have taken the 
position like Gabba that Marius’ actions benefitted the upper class, which was, and is, a 
13 
 
dubious position to defend. The Romans had a troubled relationship with their allies, a 
problem that many populares had attempted to solve, but everyone who had tried was 
murdered by the senatorial elite, i.e. C. Gracchus, Fulvius Flaccus, Saturninus, and Livius 
Drusus. His book was an attempt to analyze Rome’s relationship with its allies both 
before and after the Social War, a time period steeped in Marian activity; however Gabba 
does not add anything new to the discussion of Marius or his military reforms. 
 In 1987 De Bois came out with his The Roman Army and Politics in the First 
Century B.C. in which he explored the political effects of the professionalization of 
Rome’s army. He discussed Marius in a single chapter where he examined his military 
reforms. He was only interested in showing Marius’ reforms as the measures, which 
professionalized Rome’s army, ironic considering the title of the book. His overarching 
argument was that by professionalizing the Roman army he upset the balance of power 
between the social orders. It gave individual military commanders too much influence on 
the hearts and minds of their armies, because by enlisting men from the lower order who 
joined the army and stayed in the field for longer periods of time, commanders could 
strengthen the bonds between themselves and their men by bringing to them money, 
slaves, land, and/or glory. Individual commanders could even order their armies to march 
on the capital city as Sulla did in 88 BC.   
 For the socio-economic background of the Marian reforms, Brunt and Boren 
provided the backbone of my argument. Brunt’s 1971 Italian Manpower 225 B.C.-A.D. 
14, which has been cited by almost every scholar writing on the subject since, provides us 
with a coherent and comprehensive look at the demographics of the Roman republic. 
Most notably, Brunt tackles the grain supply, the latifundia, and the problem of 
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consolidation of the ager publicus in methodical detail. He argues that the second century 
dwindling of the landed middle-classes in Roman society was caused by the increased 
popularity of large cattle herds in Italy rather than the rise of large plantations as the 
ancient sources reported. 
In his 1992 Roman Society, Boren provides modern readers with a purely 
economic analysis of the problems of the late second and early first centuries. He 
attempts to explain the problems of the latifundia, cattle ranchers, and large mining 
operations in terms that anyone studying material culture would easily recognize. In 
doing so he makes several points about the Roman grain supply, both provincial and 
local, which are particularly useful.  
Lawrence Keppie’s 1984 The Making of the Roman Army: From Republic to 
Empire, was utterly invaluable. It was, and is, a widely successful book still used in 
college classes today. Keppie’s aim was to show the transition of Rome’s army 
throughout time, satisfactorily explaining the transition over two centuries from a 
manipular army to the legions of the early empire. Most of these changes are directly 
connected in one way or another to the Marian reforms, but Keppie only dedicated a 
single chapter to Marius. 
 Keppie’s work is military in nature and as such is disinterested in the political 
motivations or byproducts of Marius’ career, but instead is only concerned with his 
alterations to the legion. Keppie highlights the changes to the legionary formation, 
transition towards a cohortal organization, the changes to the javelins, the enrollment of 
the capite censi, and the reduction of the baggage train. He also includes archaeological 
evidence on the javelins and the Roman camp which is particularly useful. However, 
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aside from disassociating the man from his military achievements, there was little new 
about his section on Marius.  
 Jonathan Roth (1999, 2009) and Adrian Goldsworthy (1996, 2000) both deal with 
Marius in a similar fashion, addressing his reforms in a single section or chapter, and 
although providing interesting presentations of the information, add little new to the 
conversation. However, both authors make many other points about the evolution of the 
Roman army and its practices that were important to this thesis and the general 
understanding of the Roman army both in battle and on the march.  
 In more recent years historians have begun giving the Marian reforms the 
attention they, and the man responsible, warrant. Rather than using Marius and his army 
as a transitory period, often overlooked, historians have begun to recognize the 
significant influence of these reforms on the next century of Roman history. However, 
much of the modern debate had been centered on Marius’ military reforms in particular. 
As more archaeological evidence has been uncovered in recent years, some scholars have 
come to doubt that Marius was even responsible for many of the reforms he is credited 
with. Some scholars are reluctant to assign him particular reforms while others have no 
such qualms.  
In an attempt to settle the debate once and for all Christopher Anthony Matthew 
published the authoritative analysis of the Marian reforms in 2010, On the Wings of 
Eagles. Matthew goes through each piece of ancient literary evidence and modern 
archaeological findings to support his arguments, as he evaluates each reform on its 
merits, and argues that several of the reforms were actually tied together out of necessity. 
In doing so, Matthew cements the timeline of these reforms. However, because of the 
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dubious nature of some of the evidence, there will continue to be renewed debate over 
which reforms actually are Marian.  
 Matthew did just as Keppie and Roth did; he removed the political components of 
Marius’ career, in order to give the reforms themselves ample attention. However, 
Matthew’s monograph does a far better job in examining the reforms. By examining each 
reform in its own case study he was able to produce a much more detailed picture of the 
nature and chronology of the Marian reforms. The goal of his work was to analyze the 
reforms of Gaius Marius and determine if they were in fact responsible for the creation of 
the fully professionalized Roman army of the Late Republic. Matthew debunks several 
common misconceptions in this book. First, he argues that the manipular army was never 
drawn up in a checkerboard formation, which was simply a misunderstanding of several 
lines of Latin which actually describe the layout of city fortifications; second, he argues 
that the alterations of the javelin were different from what the ancient sources have 
conveyed, as revealed by battlefield archaeology; and finally, that the change in oaths to 
military commanders was a myth and would have had little psychological effect on the 
soldiery.   
 This work’s greatest strength was Matthew’s reasoning for the elimination of 
soldier classes and the adoption of the cohort as immediately following the enrollment of 
the capite censi. This change could not have been delayed very long because the 
enrollment of these citizens had fundamentally altered the nature of the army forever. He 
argues that if the capite censi were taken into the army and the classes were not abolished 
then the legions would be flooded with velites, light-armed skirmishers who were of little 
use to the Roman army. He also argues that the cohortal organization helped maintain 
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discipline among legions of inexperienced proletarii by increasing the size of the primary 
units of the legion. An expansion of this work to include the long terms effects of these 
changes would be a very useful and ambitious project. 
Many historians who have written about Marius over the ages have simply recited 
cleaned-up versions of Appian, Sallust, and Plutarch, and therefore were not included in 
this list, which represents the slow process towards objectively analyzing the 
achievements of one of the most controversial figures in Roman history and ascertaining 
the impact that he had on society as a whole. Unfortunately, some modern historians have 
missed the mark, both reciting without any new interpretation and disassociating his 
achievements from his political motivations in an attempt to find objectivity. Marius’ 
decisions, including his military reforms, were motivated by politics, albeit in a more 
subtle way that what was suggested by the ancient sources. Marius did not act in a 
vacuum nor did the army.  
Matthew’s study shows the progress made in the subject, and it is the closest thing 
to an objective analysis of Marius’ reforms, barring some major revealing archaeological 
find. The next stage in Marian studies will be when scholars fully connect his actions as a 
military reformer to the collapse of the republic through the establishment of dangerous 
precedents, legal or otherwise. 
This thesis will discuss Marius’ motivations and the causes for his military 
reforms, explore the nature and specifics of each reform, and attempt to illuminate their 
impact on the early events of the following century. I explore the military, social and 
political, and economic conditions at Rome, so as to understand the internal pressures 
pushing for reform of the army. The third section deals with the external pressures for 
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change, specifically the wars of the third and the foreign conquests of the second 
centuries and their ramifications, followed by the contextualization of Marius’ career. 
And finally, I will investigate the role of his military reforms and their consequences in 
the early first century.  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Chapter II: The Roman Manipular Army 
 
 The third century had witnessed the Romans waging a series of wars, most of 
which were defensive in nature and fought in Italy: a Greek invasion of southern Italy 
under Pyrrhus (281-272), the First and Second Punic Wars (264-241 and 218-201), the 
Third Samnite War (298-290), and a couple of Gallic invasions (283, 225).
10
 Through 
these conflicts Rome’s resilience proved more than a match for the invaders from Greece, 
Gaul, and North Africa, while paving the way for Rome’s conquests of the second 
century. The Romans had defeated the Carthaginians, their greatest rivals for power in 
the Mediterranean, by attacking North Africa directly rather than fighting the war to the 
finish in Italy. After the decisive Roman victory at Zama in 202, the Romans began a 
period of rapid territorial expansion through a chain of successful conquests. By the end 
of the second century Rome grew from a state that included most of the Italian peninsula, 
and after acquiring Sicily, Corsica, and Sardinia, turned into an empire, which spanned 
from Asia Minor in the east to Spain in the west and from North Africa in the south to 
Gaul in the north.  
Rome’s successful defense of its homeland during the third century and its 
overseas expansion during the second can be directly attributed to several key military 
innovations and adaptations implemented in the fourth century. These innovations had 
transformed the hoplite legion of the Regal and Early Republican Periods into what 
modern scholars refer to as its manipular army through the alteration of equipment, 
formations, organization, tactics, and strategy. The hoplite phalanx was a tightly packed 
army formation first developed in 7
th
 century Greece before it spread across the ancient 
                                                        
10 Dates for these wars from Boughtwright et al. (2004) passim.  
20 
 
Mediterranean. The phalanx was made up of hoplites, heavily armored infantrymen who 
wielded eight-foot long spears and protected themselves with large round shield 
(typically about a yard in diameter) called an aspis. With these shields, hoplites formed 
an unbroken shield wall along the formation’s front and lined up eight ranks deep. 
The manipular army was developed several centuries later in Italy, evolving from 
the Italian hoplite phalanxes which preceded it. The manipular army, like the hoplite 
phalanx, used heavy infantrymen as the backbone of the formation, although, soldiers 
made use of different equipment, tactics, and organization. Instead of a single unbroken 
battle-line, the manipular legion was deployed with gaps between groups of soldiers, both 
to the front and to the sides. These gaps extended the line and increased the depth of the 
legion, and led to a series of tactical developments. 
The transition towards a manipular army altered the equipment that the Romans 
carried into battle. The Romans changed their soldiers’ equipment from several variations 
of the hoplite panoply: greaves to protect the lower body, a helmet or cassis to protect the 
head, the muscled cuirass or less expensive corslets to protect the body, a large round 
shield (aspis in Greek and clipeus in Latin), and a thrusting spear, the doru or hasta, as a 
primary weapon, all became more standardized and therefore are a somewhat more 
recognizable as a legionnaire’s kit. The clipeus was replaced by the Italic tower shield or 
scutum; the cuirass was generally replaced by the lorica hamata, that is, chainmail or 
chest plate armor; and finally the ensis or gladius, the Roman short sword were 
introduced, with the pilum, the javelin, replaced the thrusting spear (hasta) as weapons. 
The Romans had begun to rely more heavily on close combat melee tactics rather than 
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middle-ranged spear combat, taking advantage of their large tower shields and short 
swords.
11
  
The Romans initially organized their army into units of 96 men called centuriae, 
arranged 12 men across and 8 men deep. Sixty of these centuries made up a single legion 
with a full fighting force of just under 6000 men.
12
 They fought as hoplites in a phalanx 
formation, similar to many other of the Mediterranean cities, such as Athens and Sparta at 
this time. The Romans were heavily influenced by the Greeks, as evident by their 
adoption of the hoplite panoply and phalanx in the sixth century and by the Servian 
reforms of the same century. The Servian reforms, named for the legendary king Servius 
Tullius (traditionally 578-535), who was said to have implemented them, were a clear 
imitation of the reforms of Solon at Athens dated to the sixth century; both reorganized 
their city’s social divisions to reflect economic status and an individual’s ability to serve 
as a citizen soldier within the phalanx.
13
 Soldiers in the post-phalanx manipular legion 
continued to be propertied citizens of varying degrees of wealth, who were conscripted 
by the consuls through the dilectus, the conscription process by which consuls levied 
their legions. The transition away from phalanx and hoplite tactics and equipment 
towards those of the manipular army did not alter the overall social structure of the army, 
but rather perpetuated it.
14
  
After the Romans abandoned the phalanx, in favor of the manipular arrangement, 
the existing Servian socio-military classes were transformed over time into a graduated 
legion with several different soldier classes based on their personal wealth, political 
                                                        
11 Livy 8.8.3-14. 
12 Roth, (2009) p. 11. 
13 Servian reforms: Liv.1.42-44, Roth (2009) pp. 10-11, Keppie (1984) pp. 16-7.  
14 Dilectus: Polyb. 6.19.5-6.21.4, Keppie (1984) pp. 33-34.  
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influence, seniority, and military experience. The Servian soldier classes were 
transformed into the hastati, principes, triarii, velites, and the equites.
15
 These classes 
represent skirmishers (velites), three degrees of heavy infantrymen (hastati, principes, 
triarii), and the cavalry (equites).  
Livy and Polybius both provide descriptions of the Roman manipular legion, its 
units, and equipment. They both describe the hastati as the front line fighters, equipped 
with javelins (pila), a scutum, and a gladius, and also protected by a chest plate and a 
helmet. Those soldiers who were worth a substantial sum were equipped with the lorica 
hamata, or chainmail. They were supported by principes in the second line, who were 
armed in a similar fashion, and behind them were the triarii, who were equipped with 
sword and shield, but were also outfitted with a hasta or thrusting spear.
 16
  The sources 
also discuss the velites as light-armed soldiers, who carried the parma, a round shield as 
big as a Greek aspis, and fought as skirmishers out in front of the hastati, until they were 
overcome by the enemy and retreated through the gaps between maniples.
17
 
Livy’s and Polybius’ accounts differ slightly in that Livy describes an army that 
used the accensi and the rorarii, while Polybius describes the velites as the lower order 
skirmishers. This terminology may reflect a change in structure of the army over time or 
simply may have been a historian’s error. Polybius appears to have been the more reliable 
source because of his close proximity in time to the events and his close association with 
Cornelius Scipio Aemilianus during his military career, in addition to the fact that he was 
said to have been present during the sack of Corinth by Mummius in 146. Polybius’ 
                                                        
15 Polyb. 6.11, 6.19-21. 
16 Liv. 8.8, Polyb. 6.21-4.  
17 Keppie (1984) p. 35. 
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description of the manipular legion indicates the state of the army during the second half 
of the second century.
18
  
The process by which the Roman consul selected and drafted the men who would 
compose his army was called the dilectus. In effect this levy was a compulsory 
conscription drawn from the eligible male citizen population, men of Roman birth and 
property. The consul, after being given his assignments from the senate, conducted the 
dilectus in the city of Rome itself, selecting those he desired for his forces and sent his 
officers abroad, either to the allies in Italy or the provinces, to raise a prescribed number 
of men from each to make up the allied wings or alae sociorum. Once the army was 
assembled and properly outfitted and supplied, they marched off to war.
19
  
 Once legions went into the field, the state assumed only some responsibility for 
provisioning the army, while many of the costs were left to individual soldiers. The 
senate provided to the legions pay for basic provisions and for time spent in the field 
through a stipendium or stipend.
20
 Initially, that’s all it covered; however; over time the 
stipendium began to incorporate more expenses and as a result eventually became a 
system of providing wages to soldiers. It was paid for by a graduated property tax among 
the Romans themselves and tributum collected from Rome’s allies and provinces.21 
Livy records that the stipendium was first instituted during the preparations for the 
siege of Veii (c. 400), which the Romans claimed took ten years (likely a forced Roman 
literary parallel to the Trojan War, which also took ten years). Undoubtedly, the war 
against Veii took longer than a single campaigning season (spring-summer), probably 
                                                        
18 Liv. 8.8, Polyb. 6.24.  
19 Keppie (1984) pp. 19, 32, Roth (2009) pp. 26-28. 
20 Stipendium: Polyb. 6.39.12-15, Liv. 4.59-60, Diod. 14.16.5. 
21 Tributum: Diod. 14.16.5. 
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only three or so consecutive years.
22
Although several years was certainly a long enough 
period of time to warrant compensation for keeping soldiers from their farms. The 
practice of paying soldiers must have been in use by the time of the Latin War (341-338) 
of the fourth century, when the Roman army was compelled to fight its allies in Latium 
and, more importantly, to station garrisons away from Rome for a time. The Romans 
needed to pay their soldiers some sort of wage in order to enable them to garrison 
neighboring cities and forts in Latium for extended periods of time. The security of the 
Roman state depended on its army’s ability and willingness to rapidly respond to Latin 
uprisings by means of these garrisons. It became a vital concern of the senate to ensure 
the willingness of Rome’s citizen-soldier population to participate in warfare despite 
longer terms of service and increased obligations, which they decided was best done 
through financial compensation.
23
 
The early Roman legion experienced some success with their hoplite phalanx 
against the Etruscans and the Latins by conquering the Alban hills and lower Tiber 
Valley, but when they came into conflict with the Samnites and Gauls, the limitations of 
the hoplite phalanx as a fighting system were exposed.
24
 The Gallic victory on the field at 
Allia River and the subsequent sack of Rome in 390 (or 387) revealed that the Roman 
army was unprepared to fight as dynamic and ferocious an enemy as the Gauls.  
The Gallic army had used volleys of javelins to break up the Roman phalanx prior 
to charging and routing the defenders. The Roman phalanx was said to have broken 
                                                        
22 Siege of Veii: Liv. 5.1.1-28.8, Roth (2009) p. 11.  
23 Keppie (1984) p. 18, Roth (2009) p. 18. 
24 Nagle (2012) pp. 80-81, lists five major limitations of the Greek phalanx: 1) First, an entire 
generation of warriors could be destroyed in a single battle; 2) it depended on individuals to provide 
their own equipment; 3) the phalanx requires significant training in order to function properly; 4) it 
had a limited distance and duration of campaigns because of the expense of the supply train; 5) it had 
trouble functioning on hills or broken terrain. 
25 
 
before the enemy had even made contact with its lines, which shows the devastating 
effect of the Gallic javelin volley on the Roman front ranks. The Roman historian 
Diodorus Siculus made special note of the large variety and number of the enemy javelins 
on this particular occasion, which reflects their importance in the engagement.
25
 The 
defeat of the Romans at Allia River was so demoralizing that the Romans nearly quit 
their mother city forever, if it was not for the leadership of Camillus, who convinced 
them to remain at Rome and fight. The Romans rallied, retook their city, lauded Camillus 
as the second founder of Rome, and began to repair their lives.  The events of 390 (or 
387) had profound and long lasting effects on the Roman psyche.
26
 
Rome’s wars against the Samnites forced the Romans, who were still fighting as 
hoplites, to fight a war in rough and mountainous terrain. The mountainous Oscan 
territory in central and southern Italy was disadvantageous ground for phalanx warfare. 
The Samnites, by taking full advantage of the uneven terrain, narrow mountain passes, 
and their own ambush tactics, clearly demonstrated to the Romans the limitations of the 
phalanx through a series of frustrating victories. Rome’s humiliating defeat at the 
Caudine Forks (321), where the entire Roman army was ambushed, surrendered, and was 
famously forced to walk under the yoke, compelled the Romans to adapt and evolve their 
tactics. The Samnite wars further exposed the Romans to the scutum, the large 
rectangular or oval tower shields which the Romans adopted wholesale into their army, 
and reiterated the necessity for a more fluid formation.
27
 This period appears to be the 
time when the Romans also reorganized their army into maniples and adopted a more 
open and much less rigid fighting formation. 
                                                        
25 Diod. 14.113-117. 
26 Battle of Allia River: Liv. 5.38, Diod. 14.114. 
27 Battle of Caudine Forks: Liv. 9.1.1-6.9. 
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The Romans learned first-hand the numerous limitations and disadvantages of 
their phalanx legion. Their experiences fighting against Gauls and Samnites not only 
exposed the Romans to new tactics but also to new weapons and armament. The Romans 
were very open to military adaptation and to the adoption of enemy weapons or tactics 
which they ascertained to be beneficial. Diodorus describes the Romans as having 
adopted the round clipeus after fighting against the Etruscans who fought in phalanxes.
28
 
Later, the Romans adopted the rectangular scutum to replace the round clipeus after 
fighting against the Samnites, and javelins were given a new significance after their 
defeat at Allia River against the Gauls.  
Tactically, the Romans implemented javelin volleys and changed their battle 
formation to better perform in mountainous and uneven ground and avoid the obstacles of 
the Samnite war. The battle of Allia River taught the Romans that javelin volleys were 
excellent for breaking up the front ranks of a phalanx, “softening” the line prior to a 
charge.
29
 The Romans had also begun to alter their overall wartime strategy beginning 
with the second Samnite War. Strategically, the Romans began to support their legions by 
using their Latin allies in the ala sociorum or allied wing, which came to constitute 
roughly half of Rome’s army, drastically increasing the army’s manpower and fighting 
strength. Moreover, the Romans developed a system of forts and outposts at key 
mountain passes and choke points in order to control the movement of Samnite forces. 
This strategy was used over and over again throughout later Roman history: the Romans 
                                                        
28 Diod. 23.3.1: “The Romans as pupils always surpassed their teachers. In ancient times they used 
rectangular shields. The Etruscans who fought in a phalanx with round bronze shields forced the 
Romans to adopt their equipment and as a consequence were defeated by them. Later again, peoples 
using the same shields as the Romans now do and fighting in maniples were conquered by those 
same Romans who had imitated these excellent methods of fighting and of arming themselves.” 
29 Diod. 14.114. 
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focus the majority of their attention on securing key locations and maintaining logistical 
integrity, while at the same time actively denying the same to their enemy.
30
  
It is vital to note that Roman successes in the third and second centuries were 
supported by enormous reserves of available manpower in Italy. The Romans had 
initially incorporated many of their neighbors in Latium as Roman citizens, such as those 
at Antium and Tusculum, who were granted citizenship and incorporated into the ager 
Romanus, although by the time of the Latin War (341-338) the Romans had adopted the 
practice of making the conquered peoples of Italy their subjects, not their equals. Most of 
the Latins and all Italians outside of Latium were given varying degrees of Latin rights, 
pertaining to free movement (migratio), intermarriage (conubium), and trade 
(commercium), but were denied access to the Roman legion and thus to Roman political 
power. Instead, the allies were summoned in ten cohorts, making up the ala sociorum. 
Each legion was accompanied by an equal-sized allied counterpart, effectively doubling 
the size of consular armies.
31
 
  Their practice of incorporating these allies as subjects created a primitive imperial 
structure, which not only provided Rome with soldiers for its armies, but also a source of 
annual tax revenue in the form of tributum. The socii (allies) came to make up a large 
proportion of Roman military forces, usually around half, sometimes higher in times of 
emergency. Rome’s primitive imperial structure gave it access to enormous reserves of 
manpower drawn from across the Italian peninsula, which were vital in the third century 
when the Roman army experienced several devastating defeats on the field, each with a 
tremendous loss of life. Two battles in the Second Punic War make the list: at Lake 
                                                        
30 System of fortifications and outposts to defeat the Samnites: Roth (2009) p. 28, Keppie (1984) pp. 
20-21. 
31 Ala sociorum after the Latin War: Roth (2009) p. 27, Keppie (1984) pp. 33-34. 
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Trasimene in 217 where more than half of a 30,000 man Roman army was destroyed and 
a year later at Cannae in 216 Hannibal’s army enveloped the Roman army and reportedly 
slaughtered as many as 80,000 men in a single day. After both battles, the Romans levied 
additional forces and continued the war effort with strong determination. This is not to 
say that extraordinary measures were not taken. Freedmen, poor citizens, and even slaves 
were enrolled in the legion to raise Roman soldiers in times of crisis. However, during 
the middle Republic Rome consistently raised additional armies after major defeats 
because of its relationship with its Italian subject states and access to their eligible 
fighting-men.
32
  
The development of the manipular legion went side by side with a change in the 
equipment and tactics of the Roman army during the Middle Republic. These changes 
were accompanied by organizational and formation changes to better suit new tactics and 
to combat enemy formations. The largest and most noticeable change is that rather than 
fighting in a large inflexible single-unit phalanx, supported on its flanks by light armed 
soldiers and cavalry contingents, the Romans now arranged themselves into legions made 
up of 40 spread out maniples. The Roman manipular legion was organized into ten cohorts, 
each made up of four maniples of two 60-man “centuries” with their own centurions. Each 
maniple was made up of 120 men in various soldier classes: velites, hastati, principes, and triarii
                                                        
32 Battle of Trasimene: Liv. 22.7; Battle of Cannae: Liv. 22.35.1-49.18.  
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Figure 2.1: Middle Republic maniple 
See Polyb. 6.21 
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Many of Rome’s enemies outside 
of Latium still employed the phalanx 
formation. The resulting manipular 
legion was designed especially with 
these phalanxes in mind, that is, to take 
full advantage of the inherent 
weaknesses of the phalanx formation. 
The most significant limitations of the 
phalanx were its inability to attack or 
defend effectively in any other direction 
than straight forward, and its necessity to 
maintain an unbroken battle line without 
any gaps.  
 
*See Polyb. 6.21 
 
  
Figure 2.2: Manipular Cohort
               
Figure 2.3: Manipular Legion  
The Roman army’s formation had changed significantly, utilizing strategic gaps between 
maniples, thus widening and deepening the formation. The manipular legion was arranged with 
maniple-sized gaps between the ten cohorts of the legion. Not only were there maniple-sized 
gaps between the cohorts across the front of the legion, but these gaps also dramatically 
Triarii 
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increased the depth of their formation by leaving spaces between the velites, hastati, principes, 
and triarii. These gaps maximized the width and depth of the Roman lines without undermining 
its integrity.  
Depending on the depth of the legion’s maniples, those in maniples could be arranged at 
4 men deep to achieve a 30-man front, or 8 men deep for a 15-man front. Roth argues that they 
employed six-man deep maniples with 20-men wide.
33
 According to the spacing suggested by 
Polybius and the size of the Roman shield, the changing of the maniple depth can be the 
difference between maniples 60 or 120 feet across. Changing the depth could be used to double 
the depth of a legion or double its width, which gave Roman commanders increased versatility 
on the battlefield, versatility they put to judicious use.  
The traditional hoplite and Macedonian phalanxes were typically eight ranks deep during 
the classical period, when the hoplite phalanxes were shallowest. More importantly, the hoplite 
and Macedonian phalanxes both required that units maintain virtually no space between them, 
unlike the Roman manipular battle line which had a length of empty space equal to the space 
occupied by soldiers. The wider manipular battle line compelled opposing phalanxes to spread 
their forces out, thus thinning their lines, or else to be left vulnerable along their flanks. 
Goldsworthy argues that armies drawn up in shallower formations indicated a higher degree of 
discipline, which may have been a factor when Roman commanders determined the depth to 
draw up their army in.
34
 
The smaller maniples, as compared to the size of a phalanx or later Roman cohorts, of 
only 120 men left units relatively vulnerable and exposed on the field, which, on occasion, had 
caused enough fear and panic that soldiers fled. Although the way the maniples were arranged 
                                                        
33 Roth (2009) p. 52. 
34 Goldsworthy (1996) p. 176. 
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meant that when a forward maniple of hastati was under enough pressure to break and run, they 
could fall back behind the line of principes which supported them, and they behind the final line 
of triarii. In doing so, it became possible for the Roman army to recycle frightened and tired 
soldiers in a way that was previously impractical. It also kept the army from being routed once a 
single point in the line was broken, because there were now at least three lines of soldiers who 
could be involved in the fighting. This “safety net” of having multiple lines meant that the 
Roman army could withstand particularly grueling and brutal combat for a longer period of time 
without being routed.
35
 
The battle formation of the hoplite and Macedonian phalanxes was, by necessity, a 
continuous and unbroken front because both phalanxes were only offensively and defensively 
effective in one direction: forward. It was difficult for soldiers to combat threats on the 
formation’s flanks. For the hoplite phalanx, their 8 or 9 foot lances were difficult to maneuver, 
and more importantly, in the fighting and pushing the original battle line became distorted and 
made both flanks vulnerable. The longer spears of the Macedonian phalanx required two hands 
to hold. Their long spears were all pointed forward, creating several layers of lances in a single 
forward direction. Thus, the Macedonian phalanx was as vulnerable on its flanks and rear as it 
was imposing and formidable along its front. 
The largest drawback of both the hoplite and Macedonian phalanxes was their lack of 
mobility, and their great vulnerability on the flanks due to the nature of the phalanx formation 
required the close proximity of shielded spearmen to effect a strong offensive and defensive 
front. The hoplite phalanx would have appeared from the front as a wall of shields, while its 
Macedonian counterpart, with its protruding spear-points, would have looked more like the rear 
end of an enormous porcupine. The phalanx formation was slow moving and did not maneuver 
                                                        
35 Manipular legionary battle tactics: Roth (2009) p. 53; Keppie (1984) pp. 38-9. 
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easily compared to other formations. This is the reason that the Macedonian phalanx was 
regularly deployed as the army’s center, supported on the flanks by lighted-armed infantry and 
cavalry divisions, which moved far more swiftly than the phalanx.
36
 
The Romans regularly used a variety of javelins thrown in volleys by the velites and 
heavy infantry (hastati, principes, and triarii), in order to break up the enemy line and defenses 
prior to closing the gap between armies and engaging. This technique was especially effective 
against hoplite and Macedonian phalanxes because of how tightly packed they were and their 
lack of projectile weapons to defend themselves. Furthermore, volleys of javelins sometimes 
softened the enemy line enough to cause the formation to be temporarily disturbed, creating 
weak spots which could be exploited. A javelin volley was also an excellent way in which to 
predicate a charge and melee. So as to capitalize on their new equipment and tactics, the Roman 
legions had developed skills in hand-to-hand combat. Their close-quarters melee was different 
than much of the spear combat that had dominated the seventh to fourth centuries. 
Because of the scutum’s single hand grip, which allowed for much more freedom in 
moving the shield, the Romans were able to use them for offensive purposes as well, and the 
Roman soldier’s reliance on short swords developed the legionaries into very close combat 
melee experts. The best example of this was at the battle of Mevania (308), where the Romans 
punched, shoved, and pushed with their shields to corral and capture a large number of their 
Umbrian enemies before they surrendered.
37
 This tactic of aggressively punching with the 
scutum is also evident in Livy’s account of Titus Manlius’s duel with the Gallic champion. 
Manlius approached his adversary and then punched up with his shield, hitting the Gaul’s shield 
                                                        
36 Keppie (1984) p. 17. 
37 Battle of Mevania: Liv. 9.41: “They did their work more with shields than with swords, swinging them from 
the shoulder and knocking down their enemies with the bosses. The slain were outnumbered by the 
prisoners, and all along the battle line one cry was heard: that they should lay down their arms. And so, while 
the battle was still going on, the surrender was made, by the men who had first advocated war.” 
33 
 
 
upward and exposing a gap in his protection. He exploited the gap with several quick stabs with 
his short sword, killing the Gallic warrior, and ended the duel. Both of these accounts 
demonstrate the development of Roman tactics away from spear fighting and towards the use of 
the scuta and short swords.
38
 
The gaps between maniples functioned as more than a means of extending the width and 
depth of the Roman lines; they functioned as potential traps against formations like the phalanx 
which required a continuous, unbroken battle line. These manipular gaps were traps so that if 
portions of the enemy line were to advance into the gaps between the Roman maniples, they 
would be cut off from the rest of the phalanx and exposed to attack from the Romans on three 
fronts: front, left, and right. So enemy armies in the phalanx formation needed to exhibit 
excellent discipline from commanders and soldiers, or risk a harsh reversal of fortunes on the 
battlefield by the Romans. 
Perhaps even more important than the presence of potential kill zones in the gaps 
between the maniples was the fact that these gaps also allowed the Romans to engage the enemy 
with a reduced proportion of its army at any given time. Because of the four-maniple depth of the 
line, only the units of 1200 men would be in direct combat at any given moment, while the 
enemy phalanx or army generally had its entire line engaged. By fighting with around 30% of the 
legion’s fighting force, and with the rest in reserve, Roman commanders gained an 
unprecedented amount of maneuverability, allowing their units to be redeployed somewhere else 
on the battlefield, if all was going well along the frontline. The gaps in the line also allowed the 
Romans to apply pressure to the enemy line in select locations, attempting to break through and 
cause a rout, without engaging an unnecessarily large number of soldiers, tiring themselves out 
or risking defeat. 
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Figure 2.4: (left) Roman manipular formation prior to engagement with a phalanx, (right) melee between phalanx 
and manipular formation. Important to note, between the Roman cohorts, the enemy hoplites are surrounded on 
three sides. 
 
There are several examples in Greek warfare that demonstrate clearly that having large 
gaps between units within a phalanx was a recipe for disaster. First, there is the battle of 
Paraetacene in 317 between Antigonus and Eumenes. Both generals deployed Macedonian-style 
phalanxes as their centers, supported by elephants, cavalry, and light-armed troops on their 
flanks. The battle was decided when Antigonus noticed that Eumenes’ phalanx had created a gap 
between infantry divisions as they advanced, and so ordered his cavalry to charge the gap. The 
cavalry rushed through the gap in the line, and passed all the way through the enemy ranks.  
Before Eumenes’ phalanx could turn to defend its rear, the cavalry wheeled around and crashed 
into the unit’s rear and flanks, which routed Eumenes and his men.39  
More than a century later during the Second Macedonian War (200-197), the Romans and 
Macedonians fought a major pitched battle at Cynoscephalae in 197. During this battle the 
Romans initially repelled the large Macedonian phalanx, which was advancing against them 
from an uphill position. The Romans were compelled to give ground, drawing the Macedonians 
forward, which led the Roman legatus L. Quinctius Flamininus to order 20 maniples, half of a 
legion, to wheel around and attack the Macedonian phalanx’s unprotected and exposed flank. 
Flamininus had noticed that as the phalanx advanced down the slope, it was eventually hemming 
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itself in because a rearward retreat up the slope would be extremely difficult. He also noticed 
that, as the phalanx advanced, it outran many of the light-armed troops and cavalry that made up 
its wings and so exposed the phalanx’s flanks. Once the Romans executed Flamininus’ 
maneuver, chaos ensued along the Macedonian line; the front folded and the men began to flee.
40
 
The Macedonian phalanx’s most distinguishing feature, the devastating spear wall, was 
revealed as its greatest weakness. The reason that the Macedonian phalanx was particularly 
vulnerable along its flanks is the nearly 20 foot-long pikes, or sarissai, which the Macedonians 
had used in their phalanx since the time of Philip II. As a result of these long spears, the 
Macedonian soldiers were unable to turn the long sarissai to meet the 20 maniples of Romans 
rushing towards them in a way that was not straight on. Once the Romans closed the gap 
between themselves and the Macedonians, their superior close quarter combat skills gave them a 
considerable advantage. Since the third century, Roman infantry had used short swords, gladii, 
after adopting the sword upon first encountering it in Hispaniae, and tower shields, scuta, after 
the First Samnite War (343- 341). Their equipment was ideal protection for close quarter combat, 
while the Macedonians were armed with small shields and very long lances, which needless to 
say were not.
41
 
At Paraetacene, Eumenes’ phalanx was routed because his men did not maintain proper 
spacing as they marched. In doing so, they opened up a gap which the enemy cavalry could 
exploit. The Roman victory at Cynoscephalae was the result of a similar phenomenon: as the 
Greek phalanx pressed forward and the Romans gave ground, it outran its wings and opened the 
center’s flanks to attack. The mixed cavalry and light-armed wings were not the equal of the 
heavy infantry of either the Roman manipular legionaries or the ala sociorum, which defended 
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41 Polyb. 18.29.2. 
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their flanks. The portion of the Roman battle line which was composed of heavy infantry was a 
much higher proportion of the overall length of the line than their Macedonian counterpart’s. So, 
as a result the Romans were able to divert 20 maniples, approximately 2100 men, to the attack on 
the Macedonian center’s exposed side, and ensure victory. 
 
Metamorphosis of Military Offices 
 As Rome’s military obligations rapidly expanded during the course of the third and 
second centuries, the army was compelled to respond by changing and evolving the roles of 
certain political and military positions. Offices like praetor and legatus were created, other like 
consul and military tribune were altered fundamentally. The changes to Roman’s highest 
political and military offices were necessary for Rome’s continued expansion. As more armies 
were deployed annually, the need for military leadership, especially commanders with lesser or 
superior imperium, drove the Romans to create not only new positions, but more offices so that 
by the time men served as consuls, they already would have some military experience. In the 
process the roles of the offices of praetor, consul, military tribune, and legatus were altered 
forever.  
First, the office of praetor changed drastically since its recreation in the fourth century. 
Initially, the Romans had elected annually only a single praetor, who was very often a patrician, 
in order to take care of administrative and judicial duties at Rome (domi praetor), while the 
consuls were campaigning elsewhere. The addition of the militiae praetor allowed both consuls, 
instead of just one, to remain in the field for their entire term while their urban duties were 
attended to. As Michael Sage points out, the fact that initially there was only a single praetor in 
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office suggests his function was to fulfill the consular judiciary and administrative duties.
42
 
Praetors were also granted lesser imperium, which enabled the praetor to command an army and 
serve as a subordinate general in the field. The prospect of commanding legions was the ultimate 
ambition for early Roman politicians. Imperium was the most prestigious power of the consul, 
and would not have been parceled out to lesser officials without necessity. 
By the beginning of the first century, the responsibilities of the praetorship had greatly 
expanded. The number of annual praetorships had been increased to six when Sulla added two 
more during his dictatorship. Praetors had acquired more military responsibilities, leading armies 
in the provinces and serving as provincial governors when needed. It later became regular 
practice for praetors to be granted a provincial command as propraetorial governors, which 
indicates that the increase in the number of provinces necessitated an increase in the number of 
praetors. 
 The position of proconsul was initially implemented in order to extend Quintus Publilius 
Philo’s authority over his campaign in Campania (315). He was besieging Naples and could not 
return to Rome for the consular election, so the senate moved to extend his authority by granting 
his imperium through the proconsulship. Even later, in the first century, the practice of electing a 
consul in absentia was avoided at all reasonable costs – and then some as Caesar later found out- 
and was only used in extraordinary circumstances. So a mechanism like prorogation was an 
important tool for ensuring continuity in command.
43
 After Publilius, prorogation of consular 
imperium on an ad hoc basis allowed the senate to exert some control over the commanders in 
the field through its option of renewing command or not. Also, whenever the senate found it 
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necessary to renew a commander’s authority, prorogation was preferable to reoccurring 
consulships or election in absentia. 
 The increased number of praetors and both consular and praetorian prorogations are 
indicative of increasingly frequent wars, campaigns, and rebellions, as well as provincial 
governorships. The Romans also began to send larger armies abroad, which meant that they 
required more subordinate commanders and officers to maintain control of the army and to 
execute strategies which involved the division of the army into smaller independent forces. A 
praetor could have been sent to assist a consul; however the Romans typically spread out their 
consuls and praetors throughout the provinces, so as to keep a commander with imperium in all 
areas of the empire. Even though they had increased the number of commanders with imperium 
by using propraetors and proconsuls, and increasing the number of annual praetors over time, the 
growing number of campaigns and provinces required additional officers and generals. So, Rome 
began to use legates and military tribunes as subordinate commanders and middle officers.  
As Rome engaged in its foreign wars of the second century, legates (legati) were used 
more often as second-in-commands to generals with imperium. Simultaneously the power and 
influence of the military tribune (tribunus militiae) diminished significantly from what it had 
been in the preceding centuries. By the second century, the military tribunes were low level army 
officers, usually influential men in their 20’s from the senatorial and equestrian orders. The 
military tribunate was used as a first step in the military command structure and the political 
advancement that was intimately and inseparably attached to it. The position of legatus was the 
senior office, held by men who were often of consular rank. Before the first century these 
officers were used exclusively in the provinces as commanders in their own right or as 
commanders subordinate to consuls or proconsuls. They were also being used with increasingly 
39 
 
 
higher frequencies as lieutenant-commanders, or deputy commanders, while accompanying 
proconsular generals in the field. Legates also helped to maintain continuity in provincial 
commands, because their terms of service were not necessarily the same as consuls or praetors: 
for example, Rutilius Rufus was a legate under both Caecilius Metellus (109-108) and Gaius 
Marius (107-106) in North Africa for a period of three years.
44
 
 Although the Romans altered their military command structure through the regularization 
of prorogation, increased number of annual praetorships, and wider usage of seasoned legati, 
they still experienced problems throughout their overseas expansion, problems which stemmed 
from inconsistencies in command, dubious and unsanctioned conduct abroad, and strong-handed 
foreign policy in the senate. So, as Roman armies conquered more territories and peoples, they 
sometimes suffered devastating defeats in the field and made disastrous diplomatic decisions, 
extending and intensifying several conflicts and adding to general discontent.  
 
Conclusion 
The fourth century development of the Roman manipular army had given Rome the 
critical advantage on the battlefield for centuries. In the third century, even though the Romans 
sustained heavy casualties, they resisted the invasions of both Pyrrhus and Hannibal and 
protected the authority and stability of the Roman state. However, the rapid territorial expansion 
through an increasing frequency of conquests throughout the second century forced the Romans 
to consider further reforms to their army as the obligations and responsibilities of their growing 
empire began to put enormous stress on the soldier classes at Rome. The Romans were 
compelled to field more and more legions each year in order to maintain peace and stability in 
their provinces and to deal with enemies abroad. Roman commanders and the Roman senate 
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were also responsible for a large numbers of blunders best attributed to inconsistent command of 
wars and bad foreign policy decisions, mistakes which only exacerbated circumstances and 
required more Roman military action, as the next chapter will show. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Chapter III:  
Roman Society, Politics, and Economics during the 2
nd
 Century. 
 
 
 
 As discussed in the previous chapter, the second century was a period of great change at 
Rome. Their new and growing empire had radically expanded, and their role in the 
Mediterranean had evolved from a major power into the regional hegemon. As a result of various 
military successes, the balance of power and resources at Rome itself and between Rome and its 
allies were significantly altered. By the middle of the second century, a long process of 
consolidation of the Italian farmland by a relatively small number of wealthy Roman citizens had 
begun to manifest serious socioeconomic, political, and even military consequences. 
Simultaneously, the number of both aristocratic patrician and ordinary plebeian farm families in 
Roman society had been decreasing overtime, further concentrating wealth, and more 
importantly political influence, in the hands of fewer and fewer men.
45
 It is worth mentioning 
that the number of patrician families, who could trace their lineage back to the founding families 
of the city, was sharply declining, while plebeian noble families rose to fill the gap. But even 
though there were a greater number of plebeian aristocratic families than patrician ones, at 
Rome, the number of families with considerable wealth and resources was also on a downward 
trend.
46
 
These conditions greatly contributed to the political discontent which allowed men such 
as Tiberius and Gaius Gracchus to be elected to the office of plebeian tribune and to benefit from 
enormous popular support by pursuing significant reforms. Both brothers met civic violence 
                                                        
45 Mousourakis (2007) p.44: “a major cause of the crisis was the decline of the free peasantry and the 
deepening schism between the growing urban and rural proletariat on the other hand, and the landowning 
senatorial aristocracy on the other. A connected element was the growing inability of the state to recruit 
enough yeoman legionaries to fight its wars.”cp. Harris  (1979) p.101. 
46 The decline of the numbers of patrician families: Boren (1992) pp.105-110.  
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amounting to war and murder for the two of them and others as well. Marius had grown up 
during this time period, which undoubtedly would have led him to form his own opinions on 
what needed to change at Rome. 
 
The Latifundia  
Plutarch, Appian, and Livy all refer to or describe the latifundia and their increase in size 
and number as the primary cause for much of the socioeconomic and political dysfunction 
experienced at Rome during the latter half of the second century. They describe the latifundia as 
large plantation-like farms, which had swollen in size through the acquisition of adjacent plots 
and the violation of the restriction on land holdings from the ager publicus.
47
 The rise of 
latifundia and other large agricultural operations led to a consolidation of land, other resources, 
and work which, in turn, led to nearly a century of rampant unemployment in the countryside. As 
a result large migrations of displaced poor and jobless citizens converged on the city of Rome in 
search of work and opportunity.
48
 
Most importantly, the wealthy bought up lands which were designated ager publicus, that 
is, the portion of conquered territory Rome parceled out to its citizens for low rent. The ager 
publicus was initially intended to help maintain a large population of middle-class Roman 
citizens who by virtue of owning property were eligible for military service and political 
appointment.
49
 In order to preserve these allotments and make sure that there were enough to 
serve the needs of the many Romans at lower economic levels, there had been laws saying that 
no man could rent more than 300 jugera, about 500 acres, of this land, and that these allotments 
were not to be sold. Over time these laws became unobserved and the land had since become 
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48 Development of Latifundia caused the decline of small farmers: Boren (1992) p. 70.  
49 Plut. TG 8.1-2. 
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consolidated by wealthy landowners who built latifundia.
50
 The negative effects on employment 
caused by this process of land consolidation were further intensified by the large upswing in 
slave labor, which was almost exclusively used on latifundia, ranches, and orchards, and in 
mines, rather than offering wages to free laborers. 
The consolidation of the ager publicus in the hands of the wealthy few was initially seen 
as the root of many problems at Rome. First, it reduced the number of men from the middle-
classes who were eligible for service as heavy infantry, because a relatively few wealthy 
individuals had purchased much of the available farmland in Italy and driven off the 
smallholders who were then no longer liable for military service.
51
 Second, the latifundia used 
foreign slaves as their labor force and as a result did not hire free laborers, which further 
contributed to growth in urban and rural unemployment. Third, the latifundia represented a trend 
of wealth disparity among the Roman people, and as the wealth of the few increased, the 
population of urban poor did the same. This disparity caused a massive increase in the power of 
the burgeoning popularis faction. The Romans faced a major problem in the growing number of 
citizens who had previously qualified for military service but had now fallen below the property 
qualification and were now only eligible as velites, and not as the heavy infantry (hastati, 
principes, or triarii) which made up the core of the legion.
52
 
 Rome’s military obligations and responsibilities had expanded over the last two centuries. 
However, the means of levying soldiers for campaigns had remained relatively unchanged. As 
more and more Roman citizens were called into the field for longer periods of time, the need to 
maintain economically healthy middle-classes of propertied citizens, as an appropriate 
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 Harris (1979) p. 82: “we know that by 173 the tendency of landowners to engross excessive quantities of the 
ager publicus was clearly perceived, and at the same date probably not before 167 a lex de modo agrorum was 
instituted or revived to prevent such practices.”  
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proportion of the population, increased drastically, although its middle-class population actually 
had been progressively decreasing over the course of the century.
53
 The propertied citizens who 
were still eligible to serve were effectively overtaxed through frequent service in unpopular and 
unprofitable campaigns like those in Hispaniae.
54
 Also, the increasing campaigns abroad dragged 
citizen-soldiers away from their lands long enough that many found themselves compelled to sell 
their land because it had fallen into relative neglect during the owner’s absence, suffered from 
mismanagement, or simply fallen into disuse, thereby costing money with little to no output. 
Wealthy landowners seized the opportunity to buy up property from financially ruined farmers.
55
 
Returning to their lands with too much accumulated debt would have encouraged many to sell 
their lands to larger landowners. Rural citizens, or agrestes, were the backbone of the Roman 
army and provided far more soldiers to the army than the city. With the decline in the number of 
property-owners in the countryside, the number of available citizen soldiers also contracted.
56
 
Part of the reason that latifundia were so successful in Italy was their access to cheap 
slave labor to work them. Most slave laborers employed on the latifundia were captured during 
one of the many Roman conquests of the second century. Plutarch mentions that Tiberius was 
inspired to enact his agrarian law when he was travelling through Tuscany on his way to join the 
war in Hispaniae. He observed a startling number of “barbarian” slaves working the land.57 The 
Roman army was regularly accompanied by a sizable number of slave traders and procurers who 
transported and sold the captives in markets back in Italy and overseas. The acquisition of slaves 
may not have been the primary motivating factor for the Romans to pursue an aggressive and 
                                                        
53 Gabba (1976) p. 9: “There was a progressive decline on the part of those who belonged to the middle 
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54 Spanish Campaign as unprofitable: Liv. Peri. 48. 
55 Boren (1992) p. 69. 
56 Agrestes as the major contributors to the Roman Army: Brunt (1971) pp. 253-4, Dillion (2005) p. 412. 
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expansionist foreign policy, but it was clearly a strong consideration and a welcome result.
58
 
They reportedly had taken 25,000 slaves from Agrigentum in 262; 13,000 from Panormus in 
254; 30,000 from Tarentum in 201; 8,000 from Africa in 204; 40,000 Galatians by Cn. Manlius 
Volso in 189; 40,000 from Sardinia in 174; 150,000 slaves from Epirus by Aemilius Paullus in 
167
59
; all the women and children of Corinth in 146; and another 50,000 from Carthage in 146, 
all of the Numantines in 134; almost 200,000 captives in Gaul in 102-101 by Marius; and 53,000 
Aduatuci, by Caesar in 57.
60
  Even if the numbers may be exaggerated, this list demonstrates that 
slaves were brought to Rome in large waves after military conquests, which meant that there 
were relatively regular influxes of inexpensive slave labor to the Roman economy.  
 The large slave population was utilized in more than agricultural labor. Harris argues that 
they were bought to work on orchards and pastures, but most notably in mines. Diodorus relates 
that tens of thousands of slaves were regularly purchased and set to work in the silver mines in 
Hispaniae until the deplorable and inhumane conditions or the ceaseless toil claimed their lives.
61
 
The fact that the Romans used tens of thousands of slaves in a relatively disposable fashion 
provides a clue towards the vast number of slaves working under Roman masters in the second 
century.  
The wealthy latifundia owner had access to big enough sums of money to purchase at 
cheap prices large numbers of slaves when they were available on the market, usually after a 
conquest. Dio Cassius states that Marius was elected to his consulship of 101 because he had 
brought an enormous number of inexpensive slaves to the Italian market following his one-sided 
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merely incidental result of war and expansion, or one little noticed by aristocratic landowners.” 
59 Dillion (2005) p.302; Agrigentum: Diod. 23.9; Panormus: Diod. 23.18; Tarentum: 27.16; Africa: Liv. 29.29; 
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victory over the Teutones in 102. Also Boren argues that during the instances following 
conquests when victorious generals returned to Italy with a large number of captives, as Paullus 
did in 167, slave prices temporarily dropped, perhaps dramatically, because of the increased 
supply.
62
 
Large numbers of unskilled slave labor was a significant advantage that middle and 
small-scale farmers would have had a difficult time competing with. Only the wealthy 
landowners could afford to lay out the capital for several hundred or a thousand slaves, along 
with the subsequent upkeep (food and shelter) on top of the costs of procuring land, tools, and 
seed. Although there was a significant expense upfront, a workforce of slaves was not subject to 
military conscription, and could be worked especially hard because of their relatively low value. 
As a result of the apparent preference of wealthy plantation owners for slaves rather than free 
laborers, the already growing population of impoverished and disenfranchised Romans found 
few opportunities for work in the countryside, and was pushed into the cities by unemployment 
and poverty.
63
  
 Contributing further to the plight of the small farmers was the regular importation of 
grain from provincial sources, most abundantly from Sicily, but also from North Africa and 
Spain.
64
 The Roman state had benefitted from provincial assets since its victory in the First Punic 
War (241), and had expanded its provinces steadily over the course of the next century and a 
half. Despite occasional slave uprisings in Sicily, which came late in the second century, that 
province had functioned as an excellent supplementary source of grain at Rome. Sicily was 
Rome’s breadbasket from the fall of Syracuse in 211 and throughout the Imperial period, even 
after Pompey, and later Caesar, subdued Egypt. In addition to Sicily, the North African coast and 
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Hispaniae both provided grain when they experienced surpluses; for example, in 121 the consul 
Fabius Maximus Allobrogicus sent grain shipments from Hispaniae.
65
  
The provincial exports of grain added to the grain supply at Rome which would have 
affected the demand for grain and thereby may have reduced the income that these Italian small 
farmers could earn. In doing so, the profit margin was yet again reduced for small-scale Italian 
farmers. The latifundia mitigated the effects of reduced profit margins by virtue of their higher 
production, or by simply shifting their production to luxury goods. Small-scale farmers, on the 
other hand, suffered from any reduction in the profit per measure because each bushel of grain 
made up a larger proportion of their total production than that of the latifundia.  
 Senatorial aristocrats had also invested their resources in more than simply large grain 
plantations. Many latifundia were not dedicated to grain production, but instead produced luxury 
goods like wine and oil by developing growing orchards or vines. Brunt argues that during this 
period there also was a large upswing in the number and size of cattle ranches in Italy, so much 
so that large herds of grazing cattle were encroaching on arable acreage, which further reduced 
labor opportunities in the countryside. Brunt argues that the increase in the number of these cattle 
ranches in the regions which traditionally provided Rome with Italian grain (in Campania and 
Etruria), and argues further that these large herds of cattle were more detrimental to agrarian 
employment than the increase in latifundia.
66
  
 For these reasons small-scale farmers were vulnerable to a vicious debt cycle, which 
encouraged individuals to sell their land and move to the city. The increasing size and number of 
latifundia and cattle ranches, in addition to provincial grain imports, created a positive feedback 
loop, which facilitated the erosion of Rome’s agrarian middle-class. Latifundia production and 
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provincial grain imports had increased the food supply at Rome, which, in turn, reduced 
employment opportunities for free laborers and the income opportunities for small private 
farmers, which was the main contributing factor that made small-scale farming in Italy 
unprofitable. This cycle facilitated the acquisition and consolidation of smaller parcels of 
privately owned land by wealthy landowners.
67
 
Through the acquisition of these lands, according to the ancient writers, the owners of the 
latifundia bought up large swaths of the Italian countryside and drove off many small-scale 
citizen-farmers from the land. These families were reduced in social status, and despite an initial 
income from the sale of their property, ultimately found themselves as poor laborers in the 
countryside or else they migrated to the city and lived as urban unemployed. Latifundia owners 
not only bought out many smallholders, but thereby reduced the number of citizens who owned 
property, and utilized large numbers of slaves rather than free laborers to work the land. 
 
Concentration of Power 
 Alongside the disintegration of Rome’s agrarian smallholders and increased 
socioeconomic disparity between the economic elite and the expanding class of unemployed, 
political power was concentrated among a small group of noble families.
68
 This concentration 
meant that the number of families, who regularly provided successful consular candidates to the 
senate, was proportionately reduced in the face of an increasing population, thereby restricting 
the circle of power even further. Several families came to dominate the highest offices in the 
Roman government, which added to the political unrest and agitation of the populares. And 
despite the decreasing number of families supplying senators, there were a number of noble 
                                                        
67 Brunt (1971) p.283. 
68 Mousourakis (2007) p.44. 
49 
 
 
families who had fallen on hard times and had become marginalized, such as Sulla’s family.69 
The senatorial faction strongly resisted the inclusion of novi homines among their ranks. This is 
not to say that the consulship was impermeable, but resistant. Both plebeian and patrician 
candidates regularly won the office, but during the second and first centuries there is a marked 
decrease in the number of families from which consular candidates were selected.  
An examination of the Roman consular list shows a significant bottleneck of patrician 
families during this period. In the century between 152 and 52,
70
 65% of the 200 consulships 
were held by members of 31 different patrician families (see Table 1 and Appendix III). These 
families represented recurring consulships within the century, omitting of course Cinna and 
Marius who represent an additional 12 consulships. These recurring consulships demonstrate a 
high degree of political influence and popularity among the voting body. The Caecilii Metelli, 
for example, frequented the office the most during this century, providing 15 consuls, which was 
more than double their nearest rivals.  
Candidates from established consular families held an almost insurmountable advantage 
over novi homines competitors, sometimes by virtue of their money, but more often by virtue of 
their name-recognition, pedigree, and longstanding military experience, which was vital to 
Roman politics. Because of the military functions that fell to high political officials, candidates 
needed to be competent field commanders. However, Roman law prohibited individuals from 
holding the consulship twice within a decade, and generally discouraged reelections altogether, 
although the law was not always enforced. This created a paradoxical situation: how does the 
state ensure quality of its consular generals every year without reelecting proven and competent 
commanders? One intuitive way to solve the problem was to elect consuls from families with a 
                                                        
69 Keaveney (1982) p.6. 
70 The period 152-52 was selected as a sample century because it ends with the first consulship of C. Julius 
Caesar and encompasses almost the entire Late Republican Period. 
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history of proven generals and so to avoid the election of individuals with non-elite or unproven 
backgrounds.  
The concentration of land reflected a consolidation of resources. By the time Gaius 
Gracchus became tribune, the Roman census recorded just under 400,000 citizens. Although, the 
population of Rome had been steadily increasing throughout the century, the number of senators 
was on the decline. The wealthy equestrians and rich senatorial aristocrats numbered less than a 
few thousand. The concentration of power was more than a purely economic development. The 
list of Roman consuls shows that in the second and first centuries there was a decline in the 
number of families who held the consulship.
71
  
From the middle of the second century to the middle of the first, roughly 30 families 
dominated the office of consul. Of course there were exceptions, rising and falling political stars, 
novi homines, and so on. As Mouritsen writes, “Certainly the preferences of the elite did not 
always prevail. Noble grandees could lose to less prominent opponents, and there are examples, 
which clearly demonstrate that the nobility was powerless to prevent the victory of a candidate 
who had gained wide popularity. Thus, in 148 Scipio Aemilianus was elected to the consulship 
before the prescribed minimum age and against the expressed wishes of the nobility. Marius too 
overcame noble opposition to his consular candidacy in 108. Later, in 105, he even regenerated 
the fear [of a northern invasion] and was elected in absentia within a decade of his first 
consulship.”72 As Mouristen points out, despite the concentration of power among the ruling 
elite, there was a growing power among the people, a political authority, which was fighting to 
                                                        
71 Census Data: Liv. Peri. 60.  
72 Mouritsen (2001) p.98; Marius elected in absentia: Plut. Mar. 11. 
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be heard and in certain circumstances was 
manifesting itself with elections of popular 
consuls; however, it is vital to point out that 
this was still the vast minority of instances. 
Many of the richest men in Rome 
were senators. Roman law and tradition, 
however, restricted senators, from engaging 
in commerce as businessmen or merchants. 
This practice limited senators to landowning 
as a source of income, which meant that 
many of those who had exceeded the 
restrictions on holding shares of the ager 
publicus were in fact senators. As an 
obvious result these senators, who therefore 
had a vested interest in the continuation of 
the expansion of the latifunidia, worked 
politically to defend their way of life.
73
  
                                                        
73 Boren (1992) p.66: “The governing classes of 
Rome, restricted by custom and sometimes law 
from certain types of trade and business activity, 
left engaging in wholesale and retail trade and 
commerce to others, or participated indirectly 
through relatives and trusted freedmen and 
slaves. Moneylending too was looked down on, 
though some rich nobles were indirectly involved 
in banking.” Harris (1979) p. 79: most of the 
regular income of the aristocracy came from 
landed estates. 
# of Cos Noble Families
15 Caecilii Metelli
7 Cornelii Lentuli
7 Calpurnii Pisones
6 Pompeii 
5 Cassii Longini
5 Cornelii Scipiones
5 Valerii Flacci
5 Licinii Crassi
5 Aemilii Lepidi
5 Claudii Pulchrae
5 Papirii Carbones
4 Aurelii Cottae
4 Postumii Albinii
4 Licinii Luculli
4 Fabii Maximi
4 Domiti Ahenobarbi
4 Julii Caesares
4 Octavii
3 Fulvii Flacci
3 Servilii Caepiones
3 Porcii Catones
2 Quincti Flaminii
2 Aemilii Scauri
2 Popillii Laenae
2 Livius Drusus
2 Atilii Serani
2 Valerii Messalae
2 Junii Silani
2 Perpernae
2 Aquillii
2 Manilii
 
 
Figure 3. 1: Table of Families who gained multiple 
consulships in the century lasting from 152-52
74
 
                                                        
74 This table was compiled using Broughton 
(1951) 
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Tiberius Gracchus  
 The senate had not acted to alleviate the socio-economic and demographic problems that 
plagued the state, which fueled civil discontent among the plebs urbana. In 134, Tiberius 
Sempronius Gracchus ran for the tribunate of 133. Gracchus was from a noble plebeian family; 
his father had been consul twice and celebrated two triumphs; and his mother was Cornelia, a 
patrician and daughter of Scipio Africanus Maior, the general credited with Rome’s victory in 
the Second Punic War. He was a talented politician and public speaker, and he was well liked by 
the people. These qualities made Tiberius that much more dangerous to the senatorial elite when 
it became clear that Tiberius was intent on rectifying the problems caused by the latifundia.
75
 
Ti. Gracchus realized the power of the tribunate, and he proposed controversial laws 
without approval of the senate. Gracchus further infuriated many senators by using his influence 
among the people to recall rival tribune M. Octavius, who was using the power of the veto to 
block Gracchus’ laws. The recall of Octavius was carried out on the grounds that he was acting 
in the interests of the optimates, and in doing so was working against the interests of the plebs. 
Octavius’ removal from office on these grounds inflamed Gracchus’ enemies in the senate.76  
 With the opposition removed from the people’s assembly, Ti. Gracchus then enacted his 
legislation unimpeded. He began with his agrarian law of 133, which was not only the most 
important and wide-spanning of his measures but also his most controversial. First, this measure 
reinstituted the old Roman statute which limited each citizen to 500 jugera, or about 300 acres, 
of public land, but did not limit in any way the use or acquisition of private lands. Second, it 
created a land commission of three men to travel around Italy to administer the redistribution of 
                                                        
75 Plut. TG. 4.1-5.4.  
76 Removal of Octavius: Plut. TG. 10.4-12.5, Liv. Peri , App. BC 1.11-13. 
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the ager publicus. The commission was made up of Ti. Gracchus, his younger brother Gaius, and 
his own father-in-law, Appius Claudius. The senate attempted to hinder their efforts, most 
notably by the decision to provide only 9 obols per diem, which was an insulting sum of 
money.
77
  
 In addition, Ti. Gracchus passed a law, which reduced the duration of military service; it 
was intended to reduce the stress on the military-eligible population, while simultaneously 
increasing the pool of citizens from which to draw soldiers, because his agrarian law aim at 
restoring the limit on holdings of the ager publicus and redistributing any excess holdings to the 
landless. His other measures had less to do with military and economic concerns than with 
reallocating political authority from the senate to the equites, that is, to plebeians of wealth. 
Gracchus established an appeals process which gave aggrieved citizens recourse against abusive 
magistrates. More importantly, he passed a law, which added to the jurors (iudices) a number of 
equites equal to the number of senators already serving as jurors, wresting the power over the 
courts from exclusively senatorial hands.
78
 
Tiberius’ land commission, in addition to his strong-arm tactics, scared many senators to 
such an extent that they contrived his death, after he announced his intention to run for a second 
successive term as tribune. Rather than pursuing the praetorship or an aedileship, he decided to 
run for a second tribunate because of its power and effectiveness in his hands. His decision 
threatened especially the personal interests of those senators who owned latifundia. Many 
wealthy individuals were enraged at the idea of being forced to give back land which they felt 
they had rightfully purchased, developed, and built on.
79
 In 132, Tiberius Gracchus and his 
supporters were attacked in the streets of Rome by a mob of senators and their friends and 
                                                        
77 Land Commission, per diem: Plut. TG. 13.1, 13.3. 
78 Lintott (1994) p. 69. 
79 App. BC 1.10.38-40. 
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servants. The ensuing mob violence cost Tiberius and many of his supporters their lives and 
threw the city into chaos. Many of those who attacked Tiberius did so because they either had 
lost, or stood to lose, their primary source of income through the land redistribution effort. 
 Many latifundia could be broken up or even disbanded at any given time, while an even 
larger number waited for the same to happen to them. Some big landowners may have desired 
vengeance, but others acted to prevent the coming of Tiberius’ land commission and reformation 
to their farms. However, after Tiberius’ death the senate had to act carefully so as to avoid the 
outbreak of civil war, and thus it allowed the continuation of the land commission, which now 
included Fulvius Flaccus, to replace the slain Gracchus. The people still desired land, and the rest 
of his legislation was safe by virtue of the public affection for him.
80
  
Tiberius also helped to create the equites as a self-actualized socio-political group. After 
129, the equites began to coalesce into a separate and influential socio-political group made up of 
landed gentry, businessmen, moneylenders, publicani, and intellectuals. Around the time of Sulla 
there were as many as 20,000 equites and only 600 senators, which left the senate dwarfed by 
comparison.
81
 DeBois describes the emergence of a broad middle class of equites, consisting of 
land-owners, merchants, scribes, intellectuals, and the middlemen of the powerful and the 
publicani, many of whom served as officers and centurions in the legions.
82
  The equites began 
to grow from this point forward, and with the help of men like Gaius Gracchus and Gaius 
Marius, their interests came to be well represented in Roman politics. 
 
 
 
                                                        
80 Murder of TG: App. BC. 1.14-17; Tiberius’ legislation continued: Lintott (1994) p. 73. 
81 App. BC. 1.100. 
82 DeBois (1987) p. 44. 
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Gaius Gracchus 
 Less than a decade later, Tiberius’ younger brother Gaius Gracchus was elected to the 
tribunate for 123. He, like his brother, had previously served as quaestor, in his case serving for 
almost two years in Sardinia starting in 126. Like his brother, Gaius also was a talented politician 
and orator, and like Tiberius, he found his political niche as a champion of the plebs urbana. As 
tribune, Gaius passed a long series of laws over the course of two consecutive terms in the office. 
His laws covered everything from administering courts to provisioning the army and to 
regulating the sale of grain. 
 By passing the lex ne de capite civis romani iniussu populi iudicetur (“the law that 
concerning the life of a citizen there be no trial without the order of the Roman people”) Gaius 
had initiated the investigations and legal prosecutions of the various murderers of Tiberius and 
his supporters. The law condemned to capital punishment any magistrate who had used capital 
punishment without the express authorization of the popular assembly. This law was applied 
retroactively to those magistrates who had presided over the trials and execution of many of 
Tiberius’ supporters, even compelling P. Popillius Laenas (cos. 132) to leave the city in self-
imposed exile.
83
 
 The lex militaris declared that the state provide clothing for soldiers at no cost and that no 
one younger than seventeen years old could be conscripted for military service. Gaius was 
inspired to pass the lex militaris by his experiences serving as quaestor in Sardinia, when his 
soldiers had needed cloaks at state expense to help them survive the winter. At that time, when 
Gaius had requested assistance from the state, the senate refused. His army, his commanding 
officer, his men and he were left in a dire situation. Grachhus’ military law helped to shift the 
                                                        
83 Plut. CG. 4.1- 4, 5.1-3, 6.1-5; Dillion (2005) passim for the names for C. Gracchus’ laws. 
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general responsibility of equipping soldiers away from the soldiers and their commanders and 
toward the public treasury.
84
 
 In yet another attempt to stabilize Roman military politics, Gaius passed the lex de 
provinciis consularibus, which required that all consular provincial assignments be decided by 
the senate prior to the election, rather than be assigned ad hoc depending on who won the 
election. This procedure was likely designed to make sure that whenever a popularis won a 
consular seat, the senate could not make lesser assignments to check the power of political 
opponents and ambitious upstarts. Gracchus, instead, set up the system so that the senate would 
be compelled to make these assignments in the interest of the state.
85
 
 C. Gracchus also renewed his brother’s project of redistributing the ager publicus. He 
created another commission under the authority of a new agrarian law, which pleased many of 
the plebs urbana at Rome who had been expecting the plots Tiberius had promised.
86
 Gaius also 
proposed to settle landless citizens in several colonies in Italy and to establish a new colony, 
Junonia, on the site of the ruins of Carthage. These measures were designed to establish large 
numbers of Roman citizens on the land, both in Italy and in the provinces. The beneficiaries were 
almost exclusively made up of the destitute and unemployed.
87
 
Gaius passed his grain law, lex frumentaria, which authorized the state to purchase grain 
at its own expense and at market price, and then store the grain in urban granaries to prevent 
dangerous food shortages at Rome, whether they were caused naturally or by speculators, who 
had stored the grain, pushing the demand and prices higher. Plutarch specifies that the law 
                                                        
84 Plut. CG. 5.1. 
85 Sall. BJ. 27.3; Cic. Pro. Cons. 3, 17. 
86 Plut. CG. 5.1; Liv. Per. 60. 
87 App. BC. 1.23.98; Plut. CG. 6.3; Junonia: App. BC 1.24.102-6, Liv. Per 60. 
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effectively reduced the price for the poor who purchased the grain at below-market prices.
88
 His 
grain laws also regulated the grain supply to prevent businesses from cutting grain, or hoarding 
the commodity in order to sell it in periods of drought or great need. These grain laws were 
intended to offset the inequalities of the Roman grain market, stabilizing supply and improving 
large-scale consumer confidence in what they purchased.
89
  
Tiberius had recognized the growing power and influence of the equites when he had 
assigned half of the seats of the iudices in Rome’s courts to them. Imitating and surpassing his 
brother, Gaius enacted laws aimed at increasing the power and influence of the equites.
90
 He 
expanded his brother’s measure regarding the courts with the lex Acilia repetendarum. This law 
gave the 300 senatorial seats on juries to the equestrian order, which then controlled the extortion 
courts. This rearrangement led to harsher sentencing for senators returning from their provinces 
after serving as governors, if they were accused of illegal or dubious financial conduct. These 
harsher punishments resulted from domestic tensions fuelled by social and political inequality 
and factionalism at Rome.
91
 
His lex de provincia Asiae granted jurisdiction over tax collection in the province of Asia 
to the publicani, who were equites contractors. Boren notes that publicani were responsible for 
much more than tax collection: “they supplied the armies, built ships for the navy, contracted 
with the censors to build roads, bridges, and other public structures. The wealthiest publicans 
were the ones who won the contracts to collect tributum from the provinces and customs duties 
                                                        
88 Plut. CG. 5.2; Liv. Per. 60. 
89 Boren (1992) pp.101-105. 
90 Debois (1987) p. 30; Plut CG. 5.3; Liv. Per. 60. 
91 App. BC 1.22.91. 
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at the major ports.”92 As state expenditure increased, the publicani benefited economically far 
more than any other group of Romans.
93
  
The state awarded contracts to the publicani with the highest bid. This amount became 
their tax collection quota for the region, and every ounce they collected beyond that was profit. 
These contracts were valuable, and this policy helped to gather support for Gracchus. However, 
the extreme conduct and brutal methods of the publicani in Asia strained Rome’s relation with 
the province for years to come and were a major contributing factor to the outbreak of the 
Mithridatic War in 88.
94
 
The most controversial piece of legislation that Gracchus and his ally Flaccus proposed 
was a bill to extend Roman citizenship to the people of Latium, and Latin rights to the rest of the 
Italian allies. The fear of extending full citizenship rights to everyone in Latium deeply disturbed 
those senators who opposed an expanded popular faction with the new citizens included among 
their ranks. Because of those concerns, in 122 the senate orchestrated the murders of both 
Flaccus and Gracchus.
95
 
 Gaius had enjoyed great popular support as the brother of the murdered Tiberius 
Gracchus. So when he was elected to the office of tribune he took full advantage of the growing 
anti-senatorial sentiment that had developed in the period following the murder of Tiberius and 
his supporters. This sentiment allowed him to push through a large quantity of reform legislation 
aimed at justifying his brother’s cause, resurrecting his policies, and limiting the power of the 
senate. However, when Gaius had proposed to enfranchise the Latins and give Latin rights to the 
Italian allies, he had gone too far. The senate organized a direct response, first attacking Flaccus 
                                                        
92 Boren (1992) p. 69. 
93 Harris (1979) p. 95; Boren (1992) p. 69. 
94 Publicani lex provincia asia: Outbreak of the Mithridatic War: Liv. Per. 78. 
95 App. BC 1.21.86, 23.99-101. 
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and Gracchus politically, by sponsoring rival tribunes who proposed even more radical measures 
in the assembly, many of which they never intended to follow through on. This opposition was 
organized only after sending Flaccus and Gracchus to oversee the establishment of the colony at 
the site of Carthage. In their absence Livius Drusus the Elder and Quinctus Fabius Maximus 
began to chip away at their support. The best example of their fraudulent promises was the one to 
establish a series of colonies across Italy. However, after Gracchus was killed, they immediately 
cancelled all colonies underway except Junonia.
96
  
 After Gaius and Flaccus returned, the senate sent them back to North Africa, saying that 
the boundary markers which they themselves had laid at the colony of Junonia were dragged 
away by wolves, a bad omen. The founders left Rome, and in their absence the senatorial 
opposition worked tirelessly to undercut their authority and influence by passing even more 
radical legislation to win over their supporters. The senate had little, if any, intention of 
following through with their promises. When Flaccus and Gaius returned the second time and 
seemed to be reestablishing their political power, the senate invoked the senatus consultum 
ultimum (hereafter referred to as SCU), and the consul Opimius gathered men together and killed 
both Flaccus and Gaius in the street. In the decade or so following the deaths of these statesmen 
and their supporters Roman politics were dominated by the senatorial faction, which dismantled 
the agrarian laws of the Gracchi and repealed many of the acts that their own optimate tribunes 
had proposed in 122, while Flaccus and Gracchus were at Carthage.
97
 
Rome’s relationship with its Italian allies (socii) was complex and increasingly stressful 
for the allies themselves. The socii were used as sources from which Rome could draw soldiers 
to fight in auxiliary divisions alongside its legions. These auxiliary divisions made up roughly 
                                                        
96 App. BC 1.14. 
97 App. BC 1.25-6; Plut. Mar. 14.3. 
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half of the Roman army.
98
 The allies were also required to pay taxes (tributum) to Rome. Roman 
citizens were exempted from paying tributum after the conquest of Macedonia in 167.
99
 The 
freedom of Roman citizens from paying tributum immediately added a strong financial incentive 
to the political incentives that went with Roman citizenship. Adding to the turmoil was the fact 
that during the second century the Romans had invested several towns and cities in Latium with 
full citizen rights (for example, Arpinum in 188). These new citizen settlements only generated 
the expectation that other socii too might receive full citizen rights. 
In the second half of the second century some Romans complained that non-Romans 
were illegally migrating to the city and falsely claiming to be citizens, which involved receiving 
benefits from grain subsidies, the right to vote, and freedom from tributum. In particular, 
conservative optimates feared losing power through the enfranchisement of the Italians who 
might further support mass enfranchisement laws. The tribune of 126 M. Junius Pennus proposed 
a law which expelled all non-Romans from the city, a bill which, from the optimate perspective, 
could not have come at a better time.
100
 
In 125 the consul Fulvius Flaccus, who had been a member of Tiberius’ land 
commission, proposed an extension of Roman citizenship either to all the Latins or to all Italian 
allies (the details are obscure).
101
 Unfortunately Appian is extremely brief in his discussion of the 
failed legislation.
102
 The senate struck down the bill and as a result the Latin town of Fregellae 
rose in revolt. Unfortunately for the Fregellans no other towns joined their uprising and Rome 
easily overcame them. Despite the defeat of the measure, and despite bloodshed in Latium, the 
issue of Roman citizenship for the Italians was far from dead. Three years later Gaius Gracchus 
                                                        
98 Socii: Roth (2004) p. 27. 
99 Roman tributum exemption after 167: Liv, 7.27.4. 
100 Law of Pennus: Cic. Brut 109. 
101 Law of Flaccus: App. B. Civ 1.21. 
102 App. BC. 1.21, Val. Max. 9.5.1. 
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as tribune proposed a similar measure, which would have made all Latins into Roman citizens 
and given Latin privileges to all Italian allies. Not only had the law failed to be enacted because 
of strong optimate opposition, but in 122 Flaccus and Gracchus were going to remain as tribunes 
for another year; and they had proposed the bill directly in the assembly rather than in the senate, 
as Flaccus had done in 125. 
The senatorial faction was alarmed that Gracchus, with Flaccus, sought to circumvent 
their authority altogether, an aggressive political maneuver which provoked quick action by the 
optimates. The consul of 122, Opimius, invoked the SCU and, along with a mob of supporters, 
brought about the deaths of both Gracchus and Flaccus and buried the issue until the 90’s.103  
 
Italian Allies and Growing Frustration with Rome 
The deaths of Flaccus and Gracchus were disheartening for many of Rome’s Latin and 
Italian allies who were becoming desperate for civic inclusion. Many of Rome’s Italian 
neighbors had been subjects of the city for centuries and had never been granted full-citizenship 
at Rome. Although these people shared a common culture, religion, language, and mode of 
government with the Romans, they were unable to seek political office in the capital. 
Nevertheless, each muncipium, an autonomous Italian town with full or partial Roman 
citizenship, was responsible for providing soldiers either for the Roman auxilia or for the alae 
sociorum, the two allied divisions. Because of the political nature of military appointments and 
Roman imperium, generals and commanders were always Roman. So whenever there were high 
casualty rates and regular military defeats, such as during the Pyrrhic War, Second Punic War, or 
the Spanish Wars, the socii were especially frustrated.  
                                                        
103 Deaths of Gracchus and Flaccus in 121: App. BC. 1.25-6. 
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As a result, many came to desire an equal share of the developing empire they fought for 
and helped to maintain politically, socially, and economically. The routine denial of citizenship 
by the Roman senate angered many socii. Further contributing to the frustration of the socii were 
the agrarian bills of 133 and 123, which divided the Romans politically and were generally hated 
among the wealthiest allies, who were compelled to surrender portions of their land for Roman 
settlement because it was legally considered part of the ager publicus.
104
  
After 121, there is no report of any attempt to enfranchise the Italian socii as a whole 
until 91 when Livius Drusus, a wildly popular optimate tribune of the plebs, proposed to the 
assembly a measure to extend full Roman citizenship to all of Rome’s Italian allies. The senate 
reacted with the same strong-handed politics as it had before and managed the death of Drusus, 
again through an SCU followed by civic violence. The allies had been on the verge of rebellion 
prior to Livius’ death. In 95 the lex Licinia Mucia was passed which again expelled all foreigners 
from the city, with the aim of limiting voter and citizenship fraud, which enraged many of those 
who were hoping for enfranchisement. Livius’ measure in 91 was designed to forestall the unrest 
of the allies.
105
 
The actual expulsion of foreigners from the city showed that little political progress had 
been made and that the Roman aristocracy was too xenophobic and conservative to extend the 
citizenship. The cycle of hope and disappointment enraged Rome’s allies. So, when four years 
later their champion Drusus was assassinated for his enfranchisement bill, war broke out from 
sheer desperation, and this time it was not with a single town but with virtually the entire 
peninsula of Italy below the Po. Roman populares like Flaccus and Gracchus, and even the 
optimate Drusus, had attempted to use their popularity with the people to pass bills to 
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enfranchise the Italian allies. The politician responsible for orchestrating the enfranchisement of 
the allies stood to gain an enormous population of loyal supporters, and thus to strengthen his 
faction, which exacerbated political resistance and political turmoil in Rome.  
 The political friction between the Italian allies and the Roman aristocracy is important to 
this discussion because enfranchisement and anti-foreigner policy were dominant issues during 
the lifetime of Gaius Marius. Moreover, Marius himself had origins in Latium outside of Rome, 
which probably molded his policies and political perspective to some degree. When Marius had 
begun his political career as tribune for 119, he did so in this environment of political unrest after 
the optimates had twice resorted to civic violence under the SCU in dealing with serious political 
opposition. However, Marius himself had enfranchised some Italian soldiers fighting under his 
command who he believed exhibited talent and bravery on the battlefield. The fact that Marius 
did not support any sweeping measures resolving the issues with the Italian allies may reflect 
either his reluctance to undertake radically controversial measures or his genuine lack of interest 
in larger political issues. Considering the fate of C. Gracchus, Flaccus, and Livius Drusus the 
Elder, the issue of citizenship for the allies was likely untouchable in Roman politics in Marius’ 
years of consecutive consulships.  
 
 
 
   
 
 
 
 
Chapter IV: 
 Roman Military Expansion from 2
nd
 Punic until 100BC 
 
 
 
 
 
 
The third century BC witnessed Rome thrust into the role of imperial hegemon of the 
western Mediterranean. Rome had previously rebuffed the invasion of the Greek king Pyrrhus 
demonstrating the resilience and military capabilities of the Roman state. Rome’s victory over 
Carthage in the First Punic War had yielded the city’s first provinces: Sicily and later Corsica-
Sardinia; its victory over Carthage in the Second Punic War saw Rome’s primary military and 
commercial rival in the Western Mediterranean shattered. The invasions of Pyrrhus and Hannibal 
revealed that the conquest of the Italian peninsula would require an enormous force and regular 
Green: 218 BC Rome’s territory at the outbreak of the Second Punic War 
Red: Rome’s territory at 100 BC 
*Original taken from UNC http//.ancientworldmapingcenter, augmented by M. 
Gambino 
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access to reinforcements, and even still it would be a tall order. Although both the Carthaginians 
and the Greeks had won battles in Italy, some of which were massive defeats for the Romans 
(Heraclea, Lake Trasimene, and Cannae), the Romans proved to be victorious in both wars. 
The Roman victories in Italy against Epirus and Carthage showed to their rivals that their 
position in Italy was secure. Almost all of the third century’s most famous battles were fought in 
Italy until the second half of the second Punic War, when Scipio Africanus had campaigned 
successfully in Carthaginian territory. After the battle of Zama in 202, the war came to a 
favorable conclusion for the Romans, revealing the benefits of fighting wars abroad rather than 
at home, and they still had the manpower in Italy to keep the city safe from attack. As a result, 
the second century was a period of frequent foreign conquests, expanding the state’s territorial 
control. They fought in Cisalpine and Transalpine Gaul against a variety of Gallic peoples: the 
Boii, Insubres, Allobroges, and Arverni; in Hispaniae against the Celtiberi and Lusitani; against 
Philip V of Macedon, the Spartans, and Thracians in the Balkan region; against the Ligurians in 
northern Italy; in Africa against the Numidians and Carthaginians. There is also a long list of 
wars against rebels and invaders fought in order to maintain control over their provinces: 
Aristonicus in Asia, two slave revolts in Sicily, Jugurtha in Africa, and Germanic Teutones, 
Ambrones, and Cimbri in the north, along with several wars in Hispaniae centered around 
Numantia, and in Gaul, both at Mediolanum (Milan) and in the Narbonese region. 
 During the first half of the second century, Rome also became militarily entrenched in the 
affairs of the East for the first time. Several Greek armies fought against Rome in a series of 
successive wars, but were victorious in none. The Romans fought against Philip V of Macedon 
in the Second Macedonian War, Perseus in the Third Macedonian War, Antiochus in the Syrian 
War, and finally and decisively against the Achaean League. Throughout this long series of 
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conflicts Rome’s original policy to leave the Greeks to their own devices as long as they agreed 
to peaceful and friendly terms had begun to change as Rome began to consolidate its hold over 
Greece by the time of the fourth Macedonian War (149- 148). The Roman aristocracy had come 
to adopt a foreign policy of territorial expansion and not of defensive conquests as some have 
argued.
106
 So, the final push to take Macedonia and Achaea was conducted under the leadership 
of Q. Caecilius Metellus Macedonicus, who defeated Greek armies at Alpheus River, Scarphea, 
and Chaeronea.
107
 The Romans concluded the Achaean War with the consul Mummius’ sack of 
Corinth in 146 and the subsequent reorganization of the region into the province of Achaea and 
Macedonia, bringing Roman administrative presence to the eastern Mediterranean.
108
 
 The Romans had also spread their influence north of the Po valley into Cisalpine and 
Transalpine Gaul, as well as northeast into Galatia (189) and Thrace (188), and at the same time, 
further into the Aegean region as a whole. Shortly after Cn. Manlius Volso conquered Galatia 
and Thrace in the early 180’s Roman generals campaigned in Gaul in the north and others fought 
against the Celtiberian and Lusitanian tribes on the Iberian Peninsula. Throughout the rest of the 
second century, Rome’s armies pushed further and further from Italy, conquering territory and 
adding provinces. Conquest had earned the Romans abundant spoils: more markets, more tribute 
from conquered peoples, and more slaves present in the capital. Although, as Rome’s dominion 
grew beyond the Italian peninsula, the very nature of Rome’s chief political offices changed, as 
well as the commitment of the people in the form of harsher service in the army for longer 
periods of time and further from home. Rome had been developing an empire but not an imperial 
form of government. 
                                                        
106 Harris (1979) p. 105. 
107 Alpheus River: Florus 1.32; Scarphea: Paus. 7.15; Chaeronea: Liv. Per. 7.15. 
108 Mummius sacks Corinth: Paus 7.16; Liv. Per. 52. 
67 
 
 
 
 Rome sent armies east into Asia Minor after king Attalus III had posthumously 
bequeathed the kingdom of Pergamum to the Roman people in 133 to expand and solidify their 
presence in the region. The bequest of this province gave the Romans a vital foothold in Asia 
Minor without having to launch a major seaborne invasion from the Mediterranean or cross the 
Hellespont with a large land army. Importantly, it forced Rome to establish a military presence in 
their new province or see it fall into the hands of other rulers, bringing shame and dishonor to 
Rome and making the Romans appear weak to their enemies. In 130, the consul Publius Licinius 
Crassus led an army to Asia to put down a revolt led by Aristonicus who had not accepted the 
will of Attalus III. Crassus arrived in Pergamum and immediately received aid from the 
surrounding regions: Pontus, Bithynia, and Cappadocia, among others. Crassus and his entire 
consular army were defeated and destroyed near the town of Foca. Fortunately for the Romans, 
the senate had deployed reinforcements, which arrived almost immediately after Crassus’ defeat 
and destroyed Aristonicus, avenging Crassus, and restoring order to the province.
109
 
 
Roman Military and Foreign Policy Blunders, Missteps, and Mistakes  
Celtiberian Spain 
 As Rome’s conquests and fighting in Hispaniae persisted throughout the second century, 
the conflict became a major sore spot for many Romans, especially those who were called to 
serve in those campaigns. Spain continued to remain a major military problem from one decade 
into the next, defying lasting peace. Throughout the Hannibalic War, Rome sent two legions to 
the region annually, and in the years 210-206, they sent four, showing the importance of holding 
the Iberian Peninsula as a crossing point into Europe from North Africa.
110
 After the conclusion 
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of the Second Punic War Rome came into conflict with the Celtiberi, Lusitani, Oretani, and 
Vaccaei in the 190’s. Fighting persisted in Hispaniae until the consul Tiberius Sempronius 
Gracchus, father of the famous Ti. Gracchus assassinated in 132, took charge of the war there. 
The consul campaigned until he established a positive position and signed a peace treaty with the 
Celtiberians in 179. The Gracchan treaty stabilized the region until 153, when the Senate 
reopened the conflict and sent Quintus Fabius Nobilior as consul to Hispaniae with an army, and 
reopened the conflict.
111
 
A long series of missteps by Roman commanders, and on several occasions by the senate, 
made the conquest of the Iberian Peninsula a long and protracted process because of the fierce 
resistance it nurtured from the native tribes. Rome’s involvement in the Iberian Peninsula began 
in the years leading up to the outbreak of the Second Punic War. Hannibal Barca of Carthage and 
the Romans were contending over Saguntum, which caused Rome’s military interest in the 
Iberian Peninsula as a territory. Hannibal’s consequent invasion of Italy and the subsequent 
North African campaign at the end of the invasion deflected Rome’s non-military interest in 
Hispaniae, but Roman expansion commenced after their victory at Zama in 202. Rome rapidly 
consolidated its hold over many portions of Hispaniae, although their control proved to be 
tenuous and somewhat fleeting.
112
  
 After years of Roman rule in Hispaniae several native tribes revolted. The consul Fulvius 
Flaccus had been sent by Rome to put down these insurrections. He fought and won a major 
pitched battle of which we know few details. Flaccus was succeeded in command by the consul 
Tiberius Sempronius Gracchus. The elder Ti. Gracchus led his forces against a 20,000 man 
Celtiberian army, which had been harassing several cities and towns still friendly with Rome. He 
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routed the Celtiberian army, relieving Rome’s allies, and then pressed the attack against several 
other rebellious regions. His campaign culminated with the capture of Complega and the 
surrounding countryside, lands which he divided among the Roman poor, which may have 
helped to inspire his son’s controversial agrarian law of 133.113  
From a position of power, after taking Complega and defeating the Celtiberians in the 
field, Gracchus negotiated individual treaties with many of the native tribes of Hispaniae. The 
Gracchan treaties bound the natives with oaths of loyalty and friendship to Rome and required 
them to pay tribute and furnish soldiers on demand. Not only were these agreements accepted by 
many of the local people as an alternative to continued Roman aggression, which is shown by the 
period of relative peace that followed, but they were also praised back at Rome. Gracchus was 
granted a triumph in 175 for his actions, and this treatment will stand in stark contrast to that of 
later commanders in the province.
114
 
In 153 the senate sent another consul, Fulvius Nobilior, to the region to put down another 
Celtiberian revolt, which had broken out when the Senate attempted to enforce the stipulations of 
the Gracchan agreements in several Spanish communities. Arguments over the particulars led to 
war. Fulvius levied troops, assembling a force of 30,000 men, presumably six legions, which was 
joined by 300 horse and 10 elephants from the grandfather of Jugurtha, King Masinissa. The 
consul led his army against the city of Numantia, striking the first blow of the war. Unfortunately 
for him the attack ended in disaster. The elephants panicked at the wall and charged the Roman 
lines as they chased Celtiberians back into their city. The Romans lost 4,000 men and three 
elephants.
115
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In the wake of Fulvius’ failure, the senate sent out another consul, Claudius Marcellus, 
with a supplementary force to rectify the situation. Marcellus was able to gain the cooperation of 
many of the rebellious tribes, as well as to end the Numantine revolt. But the senate decided that 
the treaty did not properly reflect Roman honor and power, and preferred more punitive 
measures rather than a policy of reconciliation. So in the next year, 151, Marcellus was replaced 
with yet another consul, Licinius Lucullus, whose blood-thirsty and treacherous conduct while in 
Spain made negotiations with the Celtiberians nearly impossible.
116
 
 Lucullus’s campaign in 151 is noteworthy for a couple of reasons. First, during his 
preparations, the Roman levy was conducted by lot, because some soldiers had complained that 
they were continually selected for difficult and dangerous campaigns while others were 
continually passed over or selected for more glorious and profitable wars.
117
 Obviously the 
Spanish wars had already developed a notorious reputation among Romans as being a 
particularly terrible place to serve or as offering little opportunity for booty, or perhaps for both 
reasons. It also demonstrates that the Roman military-eligible classes were being exhausted in 
the process of Rome’s conquests. More importantly it shows that the complaints of these citizens 
were taken seriously enough to warrant action.
118
  
Second, Lucullus had subdued the people of Cauca, a Celtiberian people, who had never 
caused problems for the Romans or been targeted by the senate for military action. When he 
invaded their land, the representatives of Cauca came to him asking what they could do to 
appease him and stop the violence. He requested hostages, money, and the promise of furnishing 
troops for Rome. They agreed and did as they had agreed, but Lucullus ordered all the men of 
Cauca killed despite giving them his word to the contrary. Cauca was sacked, its men killed, and 
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the rest of the population was sold into slavery.
119
 Lucullus carried out these actions in hopes of 
raising the morale of his troops through the sacking of a city, in addition to helping the state and 
himself make a profit on the war through the sale of captive slaves. 
 So it should be no surprise that when he moved against Intercalia later in 151, where 
20,000 enemy infantry and 2,000 cavalry had fortified themselves, and asked them to negotiate, 
the people of Intercalia refused, citing his treachery to the people of Cauca. Lucullus then laid 
siege to the city, but the long siege was conducted in an area which the consul himself had 
previously laid waste. So before long both the Romans and the Spanish armies were faced with 
famine and poor health conditions, which continued to deteriorate until Lucullus’s legatus, P. 
Cornelius Scipio Aemilianus, after his legendary victory in single combat, was able to negotiate 
peaceful terms to end the war without any further bloodshed. The people of Intercalia agreed to 
provide Lucullus with 50 hostages, 10,000 cloaks, and some cattle, but they lacked gold and 
silver.
120
  
Despite this resolution, the Roman-Iberian relationship was dangerously strained after 
years of war, deceit, and brutality. Four years later in 147, the Celtiberians revolted yet again, 
this time under the leadership of a Lusitanian named Viriathus. The consuls for that year had 
been dedicated to the Achaean War in Greece and the Third Punic War in North Africa. As a 
result, the Roman response was led by a praetor named Marcus Vetilius, who led two legions to 
Tribola where he was defeated, losing more than 4000 men.
121
  
 Six years later, the war against Viriathus was intensified as the Romans were concluding 
their other wars against the Achaean League and Carthage. The senate sent Quintus Pompeius 
Aulus with 30,000 men into Numantine territory to put down the revolt; however, his forces 
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were so thoroughly harassed that he withdrew from enemy territory without accomplishing 
anything of any strategic value. Instead, Pompeius decided to attack Termantia because it 
appeared to be an easier target than Numantia; he misjudged the situation and failed to take the 
city, after which he fled from Termantian territory because of incessant harassment from their 
warriors, who used similar guerilla tactics to the Numantines. Pompeius, and Vetilius both 
demonstrated the weakness of the Roman state and fostered future rebellions because they failed 
to successfully dominate the region, and even worse were driven from Celtiberian lands.
122
  
 It was not until 134 that the Roman people reelected as consul Scipio Aemilianus, who 
had destroyed Carthage in 146 and helped resolve the Spanish war in 151, in order to take 
command in the Numantine War and end the Spanish problem once and for all. Appian claims 
that Scipio had to be elected contrary to law again because he was still too young to serve as 
consul. However, as Horace White points out, Scipio had been too young for the consulship in 
146, but by 134, twelve years later, he was 51 years old, nine years older than the minimum age. 
Thus, he was legally allowed to hold office because more than a decade had passed since his first 
consulship.
123
  
 In order to raise a supplementum for his Numantine campaign of 134, Scipio did not 
conduct a levy or dilectus, nor did he draft soldiers via lots, but rather he filled the ranks of his 
army by inspiring and enrolling volunteers. There were enough soldiers already in Spain, and he 
decided that it was unnecessary to levy any more troops from Rome. This decision was 
undoubtedly motivated by political considerations to avoid any backlash from the citizens who 
would have been called into service reluctantly, which is clearly reflected by Livy: “When the 
Spanish war had proceeded with little success for some time and so confounded the Roman state 
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that men could not be found who would even accept military tribunates or be willing to go as 
lieutenants…”124 His use of volunteers to fill the ranks of his supplementum in 134 (which 
inspired Gaius Gracchus, Caecilius Metellus, and Gaius Marius all to volunteer) foreshadowed, 
and may have influenced, Marius’ utilization of volunteers from the plebs urbana to fill his ranks 
in 107.  
 Once in Numantia, Scipio conducted a brutal campaign and eight month siege, 
culminating in the sack and destruction of the city and the complete reduction of its population to 
suicide and slavery. The destruction of Numantia earned Scipio a second cognomen, 
Numantinus, which was added after Africanus, making him one of a very few Romans with the 
high distinction of dual cognomens.
125
 The wars in Hispaniae defied speedy resolution, since the 
conflict was undoubtedly lengthened by the mismanagement of the Roman senate and of 
individual commanders. Violations of the Gracchan treaty, the senate’s decision not to accept the 
peace agreement worked out by Marcellus, and Lucullus’ decision to attack people who had not 
offended Rome were all major mistakes that undermined any fides the Romans had established 
there. This lack of trust, combined with the blood-thirsty senate and its commanders, led to 
continual violence in the form of revolts, rebellions, and insurrections. The Numantines became 
a regional beacon of anti-Roman resistance for almost a century, while at Rome the wars against 
the Numantines had gained an unsavory reputation for being hard fought and grueling because of 
the skill of the Celtiberian warriors and their relentless guerilla tactics. 
The wars in Hispaniae were problematic because Rome had desperately attempted to 
subdue the region without long-term success. Ironically the diplomatic solution was never taken 
seriously in Rome as anything other than a mechanism to buy time when other, larger, and more 
                                                        
124 Liv. Per. 48. 
125 Scipio Africanus the Younger’s second cognomen: App. Hisp. 98. 
74 
 
 
 
important Mediterranean conflicts like those at Carthage or in Greece occupied their attention 
and manpower. Roman military leadership had cost many thousands their lives, and its 
shortcoming were the primary cause for the length and severity of the wars in Hispaniae. These 
Roman missteps not only cost Roman lives but also the lives of a great many Italian allies. 
Furthermore, whenever Rome’s focus shifted from the Iberian Peninsula to other regions 
of the Mediterranean, the quality of the commanders sent to Hispaniae diminished significantly, 
as seen through the poor conduct of many of the praetors sent there. Under these circumstances, 
not even sending a consul there would guarantee any better conduct of the war. Consular armies 
were typically much larger than their praetorian counterparts, usually on the order of 3:1, but 
even consuls, despite their larger armies, commonly conducted the war with personal rather than 
strategic goals. As a result, abuses and missteps like those under Lucullus made negotiation and 
alliance drastically more difficult. The lack of a concrete plan to resolve the Spanish situation is 
symptomatic of the Roman military system. The traditional annual selection and replacement of 
military commanders had disrupted campaigns, shifted strategies and tactics constantly, and even 
facilitated competition between commanders to outperform one another in search of fama and 
gloria.
126
  
 
Servile Wars  
Since Rome had acquired Sicily as a province (241), the island functioned as a vitally 
important grain supplier to the city of Rome, and its large slave population warranted a praetor or 
propraetor governor every year.
127
 Even though they had recognized the need for proper 
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provincial administration and a military presence in the province, two massive slave uprisings 
erupted in Sicily during the late second century. 
Rome’s great expansion had brought the spoils of war, which in its most basic forms 
meant money and slaves. Over the course of the second century, they had brought hundreds of 
thousands, if not millions, of slaves into Italy to work mines and farms, and be public craftsmen, 
gladiators, and functionaries for an array of domestic or administrative duties. Most slaves were 
put to work on farms, cattle ranches, and the mines of the wealthiest Romans (see chapter III). 
Life in the mines was a particularly grueling prospect which Diodorus claims was not even 
preferable to death.
128
 
The large numbers of slaves working and living in appalling conditions brought about 
slave revolts which required large Roman armies to put them down. These wars were particularly 
hard-hitting for the Roman economy because they took the workers out of the fields and required 
even more men to fight them. Diodorus describes the First Servile War (135-131), when a large 
number of slaves in Sicily revolted because of harsh and abusive treatment at the hands of their 
masters, and were encouraged by their own large numbers. The slave forces, which swelled as 
high as 200,000, defeated the Romans in battle several times, remaining at large and in control of 
much of Sicily until the consul of 132 Rupilius successfully put down the revolt in 131.
129
 There 
was another slave revolt in Sicily at the end of the second century (104-100) which took more 
than four years to put down and restore order to the province. In 73, this time south of Rome 
around Capua and then up to Etruria, the famous Spartacus led an uprising of gladiators. Their 
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ranks swelled to more than 120,000 and even threatened the safety of Rome itself before being 
put down by Licinius Crassus in 71, with the unwanted help of Pompeius Magnus.
130
    
 Slave revolts were a serious concern among the Romans because of the large number of 
slaves living among them. Spartacus’ uprising not only disrupted the grain supply to Rome by 
engulfing Etruria and southern Italy in chaos, but also put the city in danger of being attacked by 
hostile forces. The uprisings in Sicily had diverted armies and commanders from Rome’s foreign 
campaigns to restore order. Sicily’s function as a breadbasket for Rome made it essential to 
maintain control of its territory because of its high concentrations of slave laborers. Likewise, the 
revolt of Spartacus drew large numbers of slave laborers in addition to the original gladiators, 
and his army of rebels threatened especially central and southern Italy. These revolts were the 
price of a too rapidly expanding slave population and generally abusive treatment towards slaves 
by their masters. 
 
Cimbri and Teutones 
In 113 the Teutonic and Cimbric migrations alarmed the senate, which sent the consul 
Papirius Carbo with a consular army to check their incursion into Gallic and Italian territories. 
Unfortunately, Carbo was vanquished by the Germanic forces in a battle of which the details 
have been lost to history.
131
 Five years later, in 108, the Roman senate officially denied the 
request of Cimbrian and Teutonic embassies to be settled on land controlled by Rome. In 
response the Romans sent Marcus Junius Silanus, as proconsul, against the Cimbri. His army 
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was defeated just as Carbo’s had been. Fear and apprehension grew in Rome after two consular 
armies were defeated by the Germanic and Celtic forces.
132
  
The senate then sent the consul Cnaeus Mallius Manilius and the proconsul Pubilius 
Servilius Caepio with a combined army of 80,000 men, which means that each commander had a 
force of eight Roman or allied legions (about 40,000 men each), and this was the largest 
dedicated use of manpower in a single military operation since the Second Punic War. The 
ensuing battle resulted in a massive and panic-inducing defeat of the Romans in 105. If the 
Roman figures can be trusted their defeat in Gaul had cost more than 80,000 soldiers, and 40,000 
camp followers lost their lives. Both Roman camps were taken, and the commanders only barely 
escaped with their lives.
133
 
This combined defeat was a profoundly significant event in Roman history. It scared the 
Roman people so much that on their return the generals were brought up on charges of treason in 
the quaestio, or court, which Saturninius had established. In this state of fear, the remaining 
consul Rutilius required that all men of Italy swear an oath not to leave the peninsula, in order to 
check any desire to flee. This precaution also aimed to ensure that Rome’s next commander 
would have the manpower in Italy to put up an effective defense.
134
 
The prosecution of Caepio, on whom the Romans placed the majority of the blame, 
resulted in a conviction. The Romans ascertained that Caepio acted out of jealousy of the current 
consul and commander, Manilius, and his primary authority in the campaign. The conviction 
nearly resulted in Caepio’s execution, but a friendly tribune interceded and, instead, the 
conviction ended in the confiscation of Caepio’s property and the stripping of his imperium; 
effectively he was exiled from Rome. The conviction of Caepio was the first time since the 
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legendary King Tarquinius the Younger that the Romans had punished a commander in this way, 
which demonstrates the degree of fear and anger the people felt because of another defeat at the 
hands of barbarians and the dangerous possibility of the city of Rome itself being attacked and 
sacked.
135
 
The defeats of Carbo, Silanus, Caepio, and Manilius had introduced a wave of terror and 
panic at Rome, which motivated the people and the senate to elect, contrary to law and custom, 
Gaius Marius to the consulship five times consecutively (104-100), even though he had been 
consul as recently as 107. The goal was to provide a victorious general to resolve the situation in 
the north and save Rome from otherwise certain destruction in the process. Marius was a good 
choice, having just proven himself in North Africa and earlier in Hispaniae. He was chosen 
rather than someone from a more established patrician family like the Caecilii Metelli, in part 
because the campaign for consulship of 107 had polarized Marius the popularis as the antagonist 
of the optimates. His allegations of corruption and weakness among the senatorial aristocracy 
must have hit a nerve with the people, who were also frustrated with the numerous failures 
against the Germans, and before that, frustrated with the aristocratic military leadership in 
Hispaniae, and now in North Africa, as evident from both Scipio’s and Marius’ second consular 
elections in 134 and 105 respectively. Scipio had been a popular choice, replacing a hardline 
optimate, Licinius Lucullus; Marius had found a similar niche and replaced the prominent Q. 
Caecilius Metellus.  
 Marius’ consulships from 104 to 100 not only reflect the Roman people’s decreased 
confidence in aristocratic consuls as commanders, but also a significant change in the elections 
of consuls. This change was neither procedural nor was it legal, but instead was an ideological 
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shift regarding which men were potential candidates. Prior to the failures of Carbo, Silanus, 
Caepio, and Manilius, the Roman people and aristocracy were satisfied with electing consuls 
without victorious military records. They chose consuls by virtue of the candidate’s 
achievements at lower offices such as praetor or legate, although even more important than a 
candidate’s personal qualifications were his family’s reputation.  
The Caecilii Metelli are the most poignant example of this phenomenon. As a family they 
had contributed 19 consuls since the beginning of the third century, 14 of whom held office in 
the century lasting from 152 to 52, double that of any other aristocratic family in the century. 
The reason that so many Caecilii Metelli became consuls was the family’s untarnished military 
record. Prior to the election of Q. Caecilius Metellus Numidicus in 109, his uncle Metellus 
Macedonicus (cos. 143), his father Metellus Calvus (cos. 142), and his cousins Metellus 
Caprarius (cos.113), Metellus Balearicus (cos. 123), Metellus Diadematus (cos. 117), and M. 
Caecilius Metellus (cos. 115), along with his brother Metellus Dalmaticus (cos. 119), all enjoyed 
successful military careers, all but one earned cognomina as rewards for their victorious consular 
campaigns, and most earned triumphs. They also went on to hold some of the most distinguished 
positions in the Roman state such as princeps senatus, pontifex maximus, augur, and censor. The 
martial talent and honor of the family paved the way for Q. Caecilius Metellus (later Numidicus) 
to rise to the consulship.  
The decade and a half since the Via Domitia was constructed had opened the areas north 
of the Alps to Rome and to a series of defeats. In 119, a Balkan tribe, the Scordisci, defeated 
Sextus Pompeius, the governor of Macedonia. In 113 Germanic tribesmen who entered Gaul in 
the previous year defeated a consular army under the command of Papirius Carbo. In 110 the 
army sent to deal with Jugurtha of Numidia surrendered, and in 109 the Cimbri who had defeated 
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Carbo defeated another consular army commanded by Junius Silanus. The consul Lucius Cassius 
was defeated by the Tigurini in 107, and in 105 Caepio was defeated at Arausio.
136
  
However, after the failures of 113, 108 and 105, combined with the unpopular and bloody 
wars in Hispaniae, the Romans began to change the way that they voted for consuls. Marius was 
elected in absentia, which was rare in its own right, but it also occurred just three years after he 
had held his first consulship, seven full years before the minimum of a decade’s interlude. The 
desire to avoid defeat in the field led the Romans not only to elect Marius for 104, but to do it 
again for an unprecedented four more consecutive terms. Marius had set the precedent, one 
which remained throughout the Late Republic, and which accompanied the rise of so many 
powerful commanders during the first century such as Pompey, Crassus, Caesar, and Lucullus.  
The expansion of Roman territories and increased frequency of foreign wars during the 
second century fostered a changing political and military environment at Rome. Errors of consuls 
and praetors in the field had cost many thousands of Romans, Italians, and provincials their lives 
in lost battles, misconducted negotiations, and poor strategic decisions. For a variety of reasons 
Marius was able to take full advantage of the atmosphere of discontent with aristocratic blunders 
and abuses, and the next chapter will situate Marius in this military and political context. 
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Chapter V: Biography of Gaius Marius 
 
 The biographer Plutarch describes Gaius Marius as being born in 157 to a poor family 
from a small village in Latium near Arpinum, which Rome had forcibly annexed during the 
fourth century, and to which it had not granted full Roman suffrage until 188. According to the 
modern consensus, Plutarch’s assertion that Marius came from the lowest possible 
socioeconomic origins is either an historical error or a purposeful attempt to portray Marius as a 
champion of the underprivileged. From the humblest origins to seven-time consul makes for a 
much better story, although it is very unlikely that during his youth Marius showed his promise 
for a distinguished military career. The earliest indication is that Marius was made a tribunus 
militaris by age 23, a position usually reserved for the children of senators and influential 
equestrians. His appointment as a military tribune at such a young age strongly suggests that 
Marius’ family was at least moderately wealthy in order for Marius to have had the opportunity 
to earn such an office. It is safe to say, however, that Marius’ family was not even close to as 
wealthy or influential as many of the senators, especially those who owned latifundia.  
As tribunus militaris Marius had entered into the military command structure, serving 
under P. Cornelius Scipio Aemilanus during his second consulship on the campaign against 
Numantia in 134. Plutarch does not mention Marius’ appointments as tribunus militaris or 
quaestor, but an inscription left by Marius, corroborated by Velleius Paterculus, claims that he 
held both offices.
137
 Most likely, Plutarch omitted them because he felt they were unimportant or 
insignificant.   
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The military tribunate was the young politician’s first step in his personal cursus 
honorum, generally to be followed by an appointment quaestor. If Marius had been quaestor at 
such a young age, it would have been noteworthy because the office of quaestor had an age 
requirement of thirty years. It would have been difficult, because it was contrary to law and 
custom for Marius to have earned a quaestorship before the age of thirty, and extremely 
impressive for a novus homo to canvass enough support for an election to quaestor in just a 
couple of years. All of that would have deserved special note in Plutarch’s work. The silence of 
the sources on this matter indicates that these beginning offices were not particularly noteworthy, 
and as such his career likely followed the regular Roman pattern and followed the normal 
traditions. So it is safe to say that Marius served as a quaestor between 127, when he turned 
thirty, and 119, when he served as tribunus plebis (ages 30-38).
138
 
Marius’ service under Scipio was important and formative, and presumably influenced 
his later military reforms. While serving under Scipio, Marius had earned the general’s 
admiration and respect. Praise from Scipio gave considerable political capital to Marius’ 
reputation. Fortunately for Marius, he also served during a time when there were important 
political events unfolding at Rome, most notably the rise and fall of Ti. Gracchus. Being from 
Arpinum, and sharing more in common with the poor as political outsiders, Marius might have 
joined with Gracchus, but apparently avoided that danger. There is little else to be said about 
Marius’ early career.   
 In 119 Marius was elected tribune of the plebs, a position of increasing power and 
authority especially after the careers of the Gracchi. As tribune, Marius proposed and passed the 
lex Maria tabelleria, a law which in effect increased the privacy of voters and reduced the ability 
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of candidates to solicit voters at the poll. In advocating this law, Marius came into direct 
confrontation with the Caecilii Metelli. He threatened the consul of 119, L. Caecilius Metellus 
Delmaticus, with arrest because he had spoken out in opposition against the law. Although 
Marius had assumed an aggressive stance against the senatorial elite and enacted a law designed 
to limit their influence with voters, he also vetoed an agrarian law, much like that of the Grachhi. 
His actions as a tribune did not make him a popularis radical, but instead suggested a more 
measured approach. His tribunate came only two years after Opimius, with the authority of the 
SCU, ordered the deaths of C. Gracchus and Fulvius Flaccus for their radicalism. Marius had 
learned from watching their downfall, and as a result throughout his entire political career, his 
actions were carefully measured.
139
  
 After his term as tribune Marius ran for the next logical office, aedile. He put his name 
forth for both aedile positions, the curule and the plebeian, and was unprecentedly defeated 
twice. Instead of running again for the aedileship, Marius aimed higher. And in 115, he was 
elected to the praetorship, which had higher military status. His lauded military career under 
Scipio may have given him an edge. His victory may also have owed something to the electoral 
bribery charges after this election, charges of which he was eventually acquitted. As a praetor, 
Marius became a senator and could expect to be granted a provincial governorship as propraetor 
on the conclusion of his term.
140
  
 Indeed, Marius was assigned a propraetorial governorship of Further Spain. No major 
problems are recorded for Marius’ governorship, nor were there any trials for extortion (res 
repetundae) afterwards. In fact, during his tenure as governor, his personal finances had been 
drained rather than his coffers filled. The fact that Marius did not profit as governor may reflect 
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the poor economic value of the province and the high cost of maintaining his forces in the area, 
reasons which made the Hispaniae unpopular for commanders and soldiers alike, or it may 
reflect Marius’ personal honesty.141  
 When Caecilius Metellus Numidicus was assigned the war against Jugurtha in North 
Africa, he took Gaius Marius as a legatus legionis, as well as Rutilius Rufus, a friend of Metellus 
and future rival of Marius. The selection of Marius as a legate shows that Metellus regarded him 
as an important talent and, presumably, an important addition to his clients, despite Marius’ 
rough treatment of Metellus’ cousin, L. Caecilius Metellus, over the lex Maria tabellaria in 119, 
although the Metelli had supported Marius for the tribunate. He broke the trust (fides) between 
client and patron again at the end of 108, almost two years into his service as legatus in Africa, 
when he requested leave to return to Rome and run for the consulship. Sallust relates that 
Metellus first advised Marius to not reach beyond his station and, instead, to be patient and wait 
for Metellus’ son to be old enough so that they could run together (not an unheard of 
arrangement in this period).
142
  
If what Sallust relates reflects the truth, Metellus regarded Marius as a client and as such 
would see to his advancement in good time. Despite his humble origins, Marius no longer 
desired to remain as a client, but instead to rise to the consulship with his own clientele. So 
Marius took umbrage at the remark and left for Rome at the end of the year, only after harassing 
Metellus until the consul yielded and allowed Marius to take leave. In Marius’ defense, Metellus’ 
son, Q. Caecilius Metellus Pius, never held the consulship until 80, six years after Marius’ death! 
Marius barely made it back to Rome in time to participate in the consular election for 107. His 
                                                        
141 Spain unpopular for commanders and soldiers: App. Hisp. 54. 
142 Plut. Mar. 7, Epstein (1954) p. 36. 
85 
 
 
 
reputation had inflated significantly because of regular reports of his leadership in Africa, as well 
as from his previous service in Hispaniae under Scipio and his subsequent governorship. 
143
 
The general distrust and discontent among the plebs urbana towards the senatorial 
aristocracy contributed to Marius’ appeal as a consular candidate. There were battlefield losses 
and no relief from the same socioeconomic problems the Gracchi had faced. Marius positioned 
himself to take full advantage of the people’s frustrations. He focused his campaign on 
criticizing Metellus and his conduct of the war, and he asserted that he himself would be a better 
choice for the Jugurthine War. He promised a speedy resolution to the war, but did not promise 
territorial expansion or extravagant spoils. As Badian points out, Marius’ electoral agenda 
indicated that his primary concerns were aligned with the interests of the equites who were not as 
eager for expansion as the aristocracy, because the equites were still expanding economically 
into provinces which had been conquered earlier.
144
 Even more, Marius widened the scope of his 
criticisms, pointing out the aristocracy’s lavish lifestyles and their adoption of Greek customs at 
the expense of Roman austerity and piety. Marius demonstrated his political position in his 
speeches, reported by Sallust, and through his later deeds as consul, which show him as a 
conservative popularis.
145
  
In his brief political campaign Marius had not promised economic or social reform, but 
instead offered a return to traditional ideals and the creation of a counterforce to the growing 
power of the senatorial elite. Marius had considerable influence with the agrestes (the agrarian 
plebs) because of his military reputation, earned as a tribune under Scipio, as governor of Further 
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Spain, and as a legatus in North Africa. Remarkably, Marius’ conduct as a legate was widely 
known at Rome, even as the war was still unfolding.  
 “By doing all these things and thereby winning the hearts of the soldiers, Marius soon 
filled Africa, and soon filled Rome, with his name and fame, and men in the camp wrote to those 
at home that there would be no end or cessation of the war against the Barbarian unless they 
chose Caius Marius consul.”146 This reputation was the result of a sincere effort by Marius and 
his friends to spread by means of newsreaders or pamphlets the stories of his exploits. In doing 
so, Marius also set the stage for his return to Rome and future elections to the consulship.  
Marius’ political speeches, as reflected in Sallust’s account, show that he presented 
himself as an alternative to the senatorial aristocracy, who had become larger and larger targets 
for the animosity of the masses with allegations of corruption, mismanagement of military 
matters, economic inequality, and repeated acts of civil violence since 132. Presenting himself as 
a popularis and supporter of traditional Roman ideals, Marius canvassed the necessary support to 
win the consulship and with it the Jugurthine War. This self-representation may help to explain 
the support he received in the election for 107 from the agrestes, who did not regularly travel 
into the city to vote for consular candidates. The agrestes were fed up with the poor performance 
of senatorial commanders in the field and with the changing values of the senatorial nobility, 
which had shifted towards Hellenization, as Marius’ speech in Sallust shows. 
 To win the consulship of 107, Marius had set himself apart as a political antagonist to the 
established powers. Marius’ humble origins and anti-senatorial platform helped him garner 
support among the plebs, especially the agrestes. Moreover, his image was constantly enhanced 
with tales of his bravery and discipline in the field. Several anecdotes pertaining to Marius’ 
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conduct in Hispaniae and North Africa distinguish him from the senatorial aristocracy. In direct 
contrast to typical aristocratic behavior, Marius was said to have eaten “shared” bread with the 
soldiers, to have toiled alongside his men, to have not worn a hat despite being bald and 
deployed in the North, and to have trained on the Field of Mars (Campus Martius) well into his 
old age.
147
 Marius was also said not to have held convivia, or lavish feasts, unlike other 
commanders. These anecdotes in conjunction with his electoral speeches show that Marius was 
able to distinguish himself as an example of Roman virtus, while the aristocratic patricians had 
been more interested in the civility, luxury, and elitism of high Greek culture, striving towards 
the ideals of Greek aretê rather than Roman virtus.
148
 
As consul, Marius immediately began to levy a supplementum, a reinforcing army, meant 
to replenish ranks and possibly to reinforce the army already serving in North Africa. He opened 
up enrolment to volunteers from the capite censi, the poorest rank of Roman citizens, a move 
similar to Scipio’s voluntary levy of 134, in which Marius himself had volunteered. Although 
these actions are similar, Marius’ extension of the levy to men who had previously been 
excluded from military service was distinct and new at Rome, although there had been instances 
when in a moment of crisis the senate armed the proletarii and even the freedmen as well.
149
 
Marius’ enrollment of the capite censi permanently altered the overall practice of levying troops 
at Rome. The capite censi were excited for the opportunity to enlist and for a wide variety of 
reasons including economic incentives, social opportunities, and access to public office. The 
issues surrounding the enrollment of the capite censi are explored in greater detail in the 
following chapter.  
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 After raising an army, Marius relieved Caecilius Metellus of command. A little more than 
a year later, Marius had ended the Jurgurthine War. But first the large number of raw recruits in 
his armies had required that Marius spend several months training and conditioning his new 
soldiers with forced marches and the labors of fortification prior to deploying them in operations 
against critical targets. He acclimated them to the realities of war and honed their martial abilities 
with minor operations like the taking of small forts and towns. Once his recruits were properly 
prepared, Marius made his way to Cirta (in modern day Algeria), the major city in the region. He 
had hoped that a siege of the city would result in the capitulation of Jugurtha or in control by the 
Romans.
150
  
 As Marius approached Cirta, the enemy sallied out to meet him. A major pitched battle 
was fought, which Marius won decisively. After taking Cirta, and after subsequent negotiations, 
Jugurtha was surrendered to one of Marius’ quaestors, Lucius Cornelius Sulla. The fact that 
Jugurtha was surrendered to Sulla, and not Marius, gave ammunition to Marius’ critics back 
home. They claimed that the war was won by the efforts of Metellus who started it, and Sulla, 
who finished it.
151
 The senate awarded Metellus the cognomen Numidicus, and openly praised 
Sulla for his part in the resolution of the war in an attempt to diminish the gloria and fama of 
Marius. Despite political opposition, however, Marius returned to Italy with his legions, 
celebrated his triumph over Jugurtha, and made ready for the war against the Teutones and 
Cimbri. After the triumphal celebrations were concluded, Marius departed for Cisalpine Gaul 
with most of his army.
152
  
Marius had not stayed long in Rome because, when he returned in 105, Caepio and 
Manilius had lost a major battle in the north against the Teutones and Cimbri, in which 
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putatively 80,000 Romans were slaughtered. This was the third large-scale battle lost north of the 
Alps (in 113,109, and 105), and the Roman death toll had become horrifying. Rome was under 
direct threat of an invasion force ranging from 300,000 to 400,000 which had cost the lives of 
tens of thousands of Romans and more than 60,000 socii.
153
 So panicked by the potential danger 
posed to Rome by the northerners, the people again elected Marius consul, but this time in 
absentia. This election to the consulship was too soon after his first consulship and also violated 
traditional practice by being in absentia. At this point the role of the consulship changed 
forever.
154
 
Necessity compelled the Romans to select the most experienced and successful 
commander if they hoped to defeat their enemies. Even the senatorial aristocracy did not object 
strongly, as long as they could avoid another disaster.
155
 Marius even brought over his soldiers 
from North Africa, after he dismissed those levied by Metellus because he did not trust their 
abilities, loyalties, or long service, which in any case did merit discharge. Marius chose the 
legions especially trained by gladiators acting under Rutilius Rufus. Presumably Rufus 
commanded the units with the greatest concentration of capite censi. Marius appreciated and 
prized well-trained soldiers and good discipline, something he witnessed close up in 134, when 
Scipio Aemilianus had instituted conditioning, toil, discipline, and modesty in the ranks. Much 
of what Marius later did in his own military reforms had been attempted, to some degree, by 
Scipio.
156
 Marius not only dismissed the propertied soldiers that Metellus had levied, but 
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replaced them with yet another levy of capite censi volunteers, thus establishing the practice as 
ordinary routine.
157
 
 When Marius assumed command of the Northern War, the Cimbri headed west towards 
Spain rather than southeastward across the Alps into Italy. They travelled as far as the ridges of 
the Pyrenees Mountains where the Celtiberi turned them back. After ravaging southern Gaul, 
they made their way back to the Rhone and Italy to reunite with the Teutones and Allobroges. 
The westward Cimbric expedition had lasted two years, time that Marius used industriously. He 
trained his men, maintained good forts in the Alpine region, and ordered his legions to construct 
the fossa Mariana, the Marian canal, at the mouth of the Rhone.
158
 Projects such as the fossa 
Mariana not only were splendid opportunities to put soldiers to work, improving their physique, 
discipline, and attitude while at the same time drastically improving his supply lines. Spending 
the time to train and condition soldiers, to implement new formations and tactics, to occupy and 
secure key defensive positions, and to improve the logistics, all helped to bring about the 
decisive victories at Aquae Sextiae (102) and Vercellae (101).
159 
 While he trained his men from 104 to 102, Marius was reelected to the consulship in 
order to retain his command in the Northern War, such reelection was highly irregular, especially 
since he had not engaged the enemy nor won any victories in these two years.
160
 His reelections 
were the result of a strong belief that if he was not consul then either he might not want to 
command the war or the optimate might attempt to elect one of their own in order to take the war 
away from Marius. There is some evidence suggesting that popular tribunes such as Saturninus 
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played a part in keeping Marius in power. So the desire for consistency in leadership, in addition 
to a strong effort by populares, kept Marius in power.
161
  
 In 102, when the Teutones and the Allobroges crossed into Cisalpine Gaul, Marius cut 
them off at Aquae Sextiae. Marius compelled the enemy to cross the river, at which point, he 
killed or enslaved as many as 150,000 of the enemy.
162
 After defeating the Teutones, Marius set 
about making preparations for the Cimbri. Dio credits Marius’ election in 101 to the favor that he 
had earned among the optimates because of the enormous number of inexpensive slaves he had 
made available for purchase in Italy. Cicero credits the aristocracy with acknowledging the need 
for a superior commander like Marius rather than recalling him because they disagreed with him 
personally or with his politics.
163
 Less than a year later, Marius intercepted the Cimbri, and 
although it was uncharacteristic of him and against common Roman military practice, he agreed 
in advance to meet the enemy at Vercellae. Marius sped to the battlefield and arranged his men 
so that they would benefit from both the location of the sun and the direction of the wind.
164
 He 
and his co-consul, Catulus, routed and slaughtered 120,000 Cimbri, and taking more than 60,000 
of the enemy into slavery. The most important legacy of the Northern War was that Marius had 
the opportunity to implement a series of important military reforms uninterrupted and 
unchallenged, and enough time passed that these reforms developed into policy and protocol.
165
 
For the year 100, Gaius Marius was elected to an additional consulship with the help of 
the tribune of the plebs, Saturninus. This consulship was extraordinary because it was more of a 
reward for defeating the northerners and saving the city than a means of assigning a general to a 
command. Saturninus was a radical tribune who had plans for Marius’ consulship. He had hoped 
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with the support of Marius, the now six-time consul, hero, and third founder of Rome, that he 
could enact revolutionary legislation and lead a coup to overthrow the senatorial aristocracy. 
Unfortunately, the attempted coup did not go as he had hoped. Marius was either unable or 
unwilling to help Saturninus and his friends once the coup had unfolded and the rebels were 
trapped on the Capitoline hill. In the face of a concerned citizenry and enraged senate, Marius 
was compelled to take the optimate course.
166
 
Marius was left holding the bag. He had been a political ally and fellow popularis with 
Saturninus. Saturninus had acted too rashly and radically when he occupied the Capitoline, 
which made Marius’ lending him political or military support untenable. Established and 
powerful, Marius now hoped to salvage his reputation by disassociating himself from 
Saturninus’ coup. The best way to do this was to fight against it. The senate invoked the SCU, 
and Marius and his colleague in the consulship, L. Valerius Flaccus, were compelled to murder 
Glaucia and Saturninus.
167
 Marius summoned some of his veterans from Picenum to help put 
down the insurrection, an important precedent for using veteran colonies. Furthermore, once 
Marius had ended the coup, he placed Glaucia and Saturninus in custody within the Curia. He 
then went to the senate in order to plead for Saturninus’ life, but his request was ignored, and 
Saturninus and his associates were killed by a mob inside the Curia still wearing the insignia of 
their offices.
168
   
Following this event Plutarch relates that Marius was cast into political oblivion. He was 
compelled to leave for the East on a diplomatic expedition. Almost nothing is mentioned about 
Marius until the outbreak of the Social War a decade later. The coup of Satuninus had rapidly 
eroded Marius’ support among the populares, who believed he should have intervened on behalf 
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of the tribune, and not the optimates, who disliked his close association with Saturninus and his 
history of popular actions. He was the man for whom the radical tribune was working, so he 
separated himself from the hardline populares by abandoning Saturninus and by bringing about 
the end of the coup. The optimates regarded Marius harshly because of his attempted defense of 
Saturninus, their previous association, and Marius’ entire previous career. Left without any real 
basis of political support, the six-time consul and savior of Rome left on self-imposed exile to 
the East.
169
  
 A decade later, the outbreak of the Social War gave Marius the opportunity to return to 
public life. Rome’s Italic allies had been incited to war in 91, and the Roman senate evoked the 
SCU to sanction the murder of Livius Drusus, the optimate tribune who had proposed that the 
Romans extend citizenship to the socii. For almost a half-century the senate had rejected this 
idea, and they still did. Many of the allies had believed that Drusus was going to succeed, so 
when he was murdered instead, war broke out.  
The Italians organized themselves into an Italian Federation, which conducted the war 
against Rome. The Italian federation was led by the Samnites in the south and the Marsi in the 
north; both groups were renowned for their martial ability. The Italian army numbered more than 
100,000 men and possessed some of the more talented commanders in the empire. Rome in 
response immediately raised an army of 100,000 men themselves, about 20 additional legions, 
calling upon veterans, new recruits, the rich, and the poor. Rome also was in need of talented 
commanders and as a result gave armies to almost every single competent military commander 
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still alive. It can be argued that the enormous demand for soldiers for the Roman army during the 
Social War cemented Marius’ reforms into practice because of their efficacy at doing just that.170 
 Marius’ conduct as a commander in this war has come under scrutiny and criticism from 
modern historians. The truth is, we do not have much evidence for his command during the 
Social War aside from Appian’s account of the battle of Tolenus River. For the Social War, 
Marius was made a legatus of the consul Rutilius Lupus, and commanded half a consular legion 
in the north against the Marsi and their allies. At Tolenus River, Rutilius and Marius led their 
armies across the river at two separate locations. Rutilius and his forces were ambushed while 
they crossed. They were soundly defeated, losing the consul and more than 8000 Romans. 
Marius, who crossed without much resistance, came to reinforce the consul, but rather than 
directly engaging the enemy, he occupied and commandeered the enemy camp. The Italians 
panicked when saw that their camp, all their provisions, personal belongings, and loot had fallen 
into the hands of the Romans. Battle ensued again, but this time the Romans, under Marius, 
defeated the enemy, inflicting 8000 casualties and holding their camp. Not long after the battle of 
Tolenus River, Marius was given command over the entire consular army after the death of the 
consul, and he and Sulla are said to have ended the war against the Marsi. He then retired from 
his command, claiming to be too sickly to command further.
171
  
 After the end of the Social War, at least in the Marsian theater in northern Italy, Marius’ 
long-time rival, Lucius Cornelius Sulla, was elected consul for 88. The senate had granted him 
the war against Mithridates in Greece and Asia. This war was seen as very profitable with a low 
risk of defeat. As such it was a highly desirable command for generals and service for soldiers. 
Despite being in poor health during the Social War, Marius used the influence of a tribune of the 
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plebs, Sulpicius. Sulpicius passed the leges Sulpiciae through the assembly, which stripped the 
command against Mithridates from Sulla and bestowed it on Marius through a special 
commission.
172
   
This was a bold and brazen act against the senatorial class, as well as Sulla personally, 
who despite having long been a decorated war hero, had only just been elected consul, while 
Marius already had held that office six times. Additionally, Sulla had not been given primary 
command of an important war as of yet either. His superior performance on behalf of Rome 
during the Social War as a legate had helped to foster the belief that it was his right by custom, 
tradition, and honor to lead the war against Mithridates. Even more important to Sulla’s decision-
making was the fact that during the passage of the Sulpician laws civil violence broke out in 
Rome, claiming the life of Sulla’s son and causing Sulla himself to flee to Marius’ house.173  
 After being run out of town, having his son murdered, and having his command stripped, 
Sulla decided to strike back. Sulla was no Caecilius Metellus. Sulla made his way to Capua, 
where his army was camped. When he arrived he spoke to his six legions about his dishonor and 
told them that Marius did not intend to use them for the war against Mithridates, but would raise 
new legions and choose his veterans for service. Sulla’s legions were angry over the 
mistreatment of their commander and feared that they would lose their opportunity to plunder the 
East, and so in 88, six legions marched on Rome with Sulla, beginning in earnest the first Roman 
civil war.
174
  
Ironically, the First Civil War (Marians and Sullans) provides little relevant information 
about Marius or any effect he may have had that could have led directly to the outbreak of the 
Second Civil War (Caesar and Pompey), because he simply did not live very long into the 
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period. Sulla took the city in a battle at the gates against Marius and his supporters. Sulpicius 
was killed, and Sulla and his men purged the city of known Marians. Marius and his son escaped 
into the countryside until Sulla made his way east to fight Mithridates. Once Sulla was gone, 
Marius returned to the city, at the head of a ragtag army. The consul Cinna had engaged in open 
warfare against his colleague Octavius. On his return Marius threw his lot in with Cinna, and 
they together took back Rome. Once in possession of the city, Marius and his bodyguard of 
freedmen soldiers cleansed the city of any political rivals.
175
 Marius was made co-consul with 
Cinna in 87. Marius served for less than two weeks during his seventh consulship before he died, 
leaving the civil war to be fought in his name by men who identified themselves as Marians for 
years to come.
176
 
It seems that Marius, in his old age and desperate circumstances, let his ambition or 
desire for vengeance drive him into alliances with troublesome younger men like Cinna, Carbo, 
and Sulpicius. After Sulla’s first march on Rome in 88, it is clear that populares politicians used 
Marius as a lightning rod to bring Marian veterans to fight against optimate-supported Sullans. 
Marius was famous and accomplished, and he inspired diehard loyalty among his former 
supporters and veterans. It appears that in his final years, Marius was not in control of the events 
around him and was unduly exploited by new politicians who wanted to use his name, 
supporters, and military assets.  
 
Marius’ Military Strategy 
 Frontinus, Appian, and Plutarch show that Marius’ genius was his understanding of 
strategy in war. Rome’s commanders had often suffered from the problem of short-sighted 
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strategies because of their desire to conclude wars quickly before their command was exhausted. 
It was the way that the Romans allotted imperium, never letting one man hold it, like a king, for 
too long. This restriction facilitated hasty decisions in the field. Marius’ campaigns against 
Jugurtha, the Teutones and Allobroges, and the Cimbri all were concluded in a single decisive 
battle, after training his forces, optimizing the logistics, and dictating the site and conditions of 
battles as shown at Cirta (106), Aquae Sextiae (102), and Vercellae (101). 
 Plutarch provides an account of Marius’ stalking the Teutones until the battle of Aquae 
Sextiae: 
But when the Barbarians had passed by and were going on their way, Marius also broke 
camp and followed close upon them, always halting nearby and at their very side, but 
strongly fortifying his camps and keeping strong positions in his front, so that he could 
pass the night in safety. Thus the two armies went on until they came to the place called 
Aquae Sextiae, from which they had to march only a short distance and they would be in 
the Alps. For this reason, indeed, Marius made preparations to give battle here, and he 
occupied for his camp a position that was strong, but poorly supplied with water, 
wishing, as they say, by this circumstance also to incite his soldiers to fight.
177
  
Plutarch’s account shows Marius as a pragmatic and relently commander, who restrained his 
soldiers until the optimal opportunity presented itself. 
 However, Marius’ performance as a commander during the Social War a decade later has 
brought the general considerable criticisms from some scholars, modern and ancient alike, who 
argue that at age sixty-nine he was too old and infirm to command competently in 88. Yet there 
was a conspicuous lack of military failures in his career, and he had shown real skill snatching 
                                                        
177 Plut. Mar. 18.2. 
98 
 
 
 
victories at the battle of Tolenus River (90), at which the consul Rutilius Lupus was killed along 
with 8000 of his men. These criticisms reflect a general misunderstanding of his actions and of 
the requirements of the war.
178
  
 Marius had assessed the military situation in Italy and, as a result, had adopted a strategy 
in the Social War similar to that used during the Second Punic War. He concluded that pitched 
battles, if lost, would do far more harm than the benefits victories would bring. A major Roman 
defeat early in the war would lower confidence in Rome’s power and encourage its remaining 
Italian allies to revolt or switch-sides, just as Capua had done during Hannibal’s invasion of 
Italy; whereas an early Roman victory might do little more than dissuade other peoples from 
joining the dissidents.
179
 
 Marius was simply pursuing a policy of not losing the war, and dragging out the struggle 
would encourage certain populations in Italy to remain loyal, capitulate, or negotiate terms. He is 
criticized as remaining too aloof in the field and not readily seeking battle, but he understood 
that, not the winner of the battle, but the winner of the war was the real victor. That is why he 
generated a strategy based on training his men to secure positions and logistical support and be in 
battle-ready condition.  
 As a general Marius exhibited patience and vision similar to that of Q. Fabius Maximus, 
the great delayer. Roman commanders had often sought quick and decisive battles against their 
foes in order to win gloria and fama before their term of office expired. On every occasion, 
however, Marius demonstrated a single-minded dedication to the war’s wider strategic goals 
rather than risk defeat in pursuit of speedy victory. Marius regularly maintained his advantageous 
positions in the face of taunting and challenge. He engaged in battle when he felt his forces had 
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significant advantage either in position, training, logistics, or tactics. Marius demonstrated his 
vision by refusing to pursue the Teutones and the Cimbri into Gaul and Hispaniae, but instead 
decided that his best course of action was to dedicate his time, without guarantee of renewed 
consulships, to training and conditioning his soldiers. 
 Marius may have been capable of defeating the northerners in Gaul or Hispaniae, 
achieving a speedier and more impressive victory, but he also would have made his army 
vulnerable to ambush, dual engagement, or being outflanked by both northern armies at once. 
Not only would it have cost numerous Roman lives but it would have left Rome exposed and 
defenseless against invaders, northerners or otherwise. 
  
Conclusion  
A close study of Marius’ political and military considerations reveal the man as a brilliant 
military strategist and field commander, who deserved the praise which many later Romans gave 
him, and he was a surprisingly astute and aware politician for the most part. He walked a fine 
line maintaining the support of the plebs urbana and possible physical violence by the optimates, 
who had shown their bite in both 132 and 121 and again in 100. Marius, however, did make 
several obvious miscalculations which cost him dearly, but, to his credit, he recovered from them 
and died while holding the highest office in Rome for the seventh time, however ingloriously. 
The man’s true legacy, though, lay with his military reforms. Unlike most of the political reforms 
of the period, Marius’ military reforms were left untouched throughout the civil wars and even 
resisted being repealed by Sulla or any other optimate.
180
 The simple truth is Marius’ military 
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reforms worked in a very pragmatic sense, but in the end they also created social and political 
difficulties in the Roman world. In the next chapter I examine what those reforms were. 
 
 
 
 
Chapter VI: Marian Military Reforms 
 
 
 Gaius Marius had consistently demonstrated his talent as a shrewd general, and even 
more as a great military reformer. He was an innovator in a time when Rome had experienced 
much social and military progress and change. It is unclear which changes can specifically be 
attributed to Marius and which ones cannot be. Furthermore, it is important to understand his 
reforms within their proper context and in relation to innovative Roman commanders of the past. 
Earlier commanders paved the way for Marius and, in some cases, actually enacted earlier on 
less developed versions of some of his reforms before him. Admittedly, these generals did so on 
ad hoc basis and not as regular practice. However, whether by virtue of continuous consulships 
or his successes on the battlefield or simply the efficacy of the reforms themselves, Marius’ 
practices became standard operating procedure for commanders of his generation and of all that 
followed. His example affected the armies of Sulla, Pompey, Crassus, Caesar, Lepidus, Mark 
Antony, Octavian, and countless others. It can be argued that his practices also provided these 
commanders with the power that enabled them to wage civil war. 
Specifically, Marius is credited with the enlistment of the capite censi, the elimination of 
much of the baggage train, the dissolution of army ordines among the infantry, and the 
reorganization of Rome’s legions into cohortal formations. Additionally, he is often credited with 
the creation a virtually professional army, because he established training regimes, made a 
structural alteration to the Roman javelin, and set the gilded eagle, or aquila, as the only Roman 
legionary standard. Some scholars and textbooks have also attributed to Marius some reforms for 
which there is little or no strong historical or literary evidence, such as altering oaths of 
allegiance so that soldiers swore their loyalty to their commander and not the state. This chapter 
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will explore each of the best supported and most influential of Marius’ reforms individually and 
cumulatively.  
 
The Enrolment of the Capite Censi  
Political and Social Environment 
As discussed in greater detail in Chapter III, by the end of the second century Rome was 
notably suffering from a decline in the numbers of citizens who were eligible for military 
service, mostly as a result of growing disparities in real wealth and personal resources, which 
greatly favored the senatorial aristocracy. The senate needed to fill the ranks of the army, and the 
plebs urbana desired better opportunities for work, but the means had to be agreeable to all 
parties or else risk violent repercussions. Both Tiberius and Gaius Gracchus were murdered 
along with many of their friends, allies, and associates because they had threatened the status 
quo on the ager publicus with their land commissions. Two decades later, Marius operated in a 
tense environment where his brazen rhetoric was tolerated so long as legislative changes did not 
disrupt the flow of income for the wealthiest Romans, specifically in the operations of their 
latifundia.   
Marius’ enlistment of the capite censi provided the mechanism to increase its forces in 
the field at the same time as it combated growing unemployment and unrest among the plebs 
urbana. By leaving the latifundia alone, there would be virtually no negative consequences for 
the senatorial elite. All that needed to be sacrificed were the physical distinctions between the old 
socio-economic ordines and their association with the army, which would have little or no effect 
on the lives and wealth of the richest Romans. On the other hand, both urban and agrarian poor 
could now volunteer for military service and earn a relatively stable income, gain entry into the 
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political arena, and have the added benefits of any spoils of war such as slaves, loot, monetary 
bonuses, and even land grants at the end of their terms of service. 
When Marius was elected consul for 107, he was confronted with a scenario similar to 
the one his former commander, Scipio Africanus Aemilianus, faced during the siege of Numantia 
in 134. In both cases the wars were unpopular among the people and even less popular for those 
citizens who might be chosen to fight in them. Marius risked significant political backlash if he 
had conscripted a large number of citizens for his supplementum in 107. The war against 
Jugurtha was unpopular and unpromising because the region had recently been combed over 
during the Third Punic War (149-146 BC), when Roman soldiers sacked and destroyed Carthage. 
North Africa had lacked sufficient time to fully recover economically, and thus, it did not offer 
the prospect of loot and booty. For many, there was little incentive to go to North Africa and 
fight a difficult war with low chance of profit or glory.
181
  
 
Reasons to raise a supplementum 
Although it was politically risky, many reasons made it vital for Marius to raise an army 
before assuming command over the forces in Numidia. Marius, like all consuls, was entitled to 
levy a supplementum to reinforce or replace those soldiers already deployed in the province. In 
broad terms the supplementum was important for several reasons: first, it allowed new consuls 
either to increase to replenish the ranks of the legions in the province, which often had taken 
casualties from warfare, disease, or desertion. Secondly, it allowed soldiers, who had served for 
extended periods of time and were desirous and deserving, to receive discharges as fresh troops 
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filled their positions. Third, and perhaps most importantly, especially for a politically 
controversial general such as Marius, it provided the new consul with a core group of soldiers 
that he himself had levied and were, theoretically, loyal to him. This was even more important 
when the new consul was a political enemy of the man he was replacing, as in the case of Marius 
and Metellus.  
 It was vital that Marius raise his own army prior to assuming command in Numidia, even 
though he previously had been a legatus, commanding many of the soldiers serving under 
Metellus. Marius could not have been sure that some, or all, of Metellus’ soldiers had not turned 
against him after he departed for Rome to run in the consular election for 107 and, in all 
likelihood, secure his succession to high command in Numidia. The armies in Numidia required 
reinforcements after more than two years in the field under guerilla attack with the attendant 
losses as at Vaga (106). A supplementum of loyal and fresh soldiers also put Marius in a position 
to require new training and other practices.
182
 
 
Marius’ Enlistment of 107 
Amid general displeasure with the war against Jugurtha, Marius hastened back to Rome 
in 108 to stand for election. His ambitious and viciously contentious political campaign against 
the senatorial aristocracy, most directly Caecilius Metellus, had earned him the fervent support 
of the plebs urbana, and as a result he was easily elected as a consul for 107. Immediately, 
Marius levied a supplementum. However, rather than levying soldiers exclusively from the 
propertied citizens as usual, Marius opened enrollment to all citizen volunteers, even to the 
propertyless capite censi. He had, for the first time, allowed men without any property or land to 
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enlist in the legions, violating the centuries-long restriction of the army to the landowning 
classes.   
The enrollment of the capite censi had many long-reaching effects for the people and 
army of Rome, but most importantly it revitalized the Roman army which had begun to stagnate 
with the decline of the Roman middle-classes. Marius appears not to have had political or social 
aims, but rather wanted simply to fill up the ranks of his legions. His sights were on not angering 
potential voters and on not pushing too hard against the senatorial aristocracy, as the Gracchi and 
their supporters had done in 133 and 121.
183
  
 
Precedents  
Marius’ decision to enroll the capite censi apparently was not his first inclination. Before 
enrolling propertyless citizens, he had attempted to rally volunteers from veterans, the Italian 
allies, and provincials. However, few volunteers responded. As a result, Marius relied on the 
plebeian support which had led to his first consulship. Although Marius was permitted to levy 
legions, he found himself in an increasingly common problematic position: he needed to raise an 
army, but few qualified citizens were available. In addition, the unpopular war promised hard 
fighting and insubstantial spoils. Rather than risk unpopularity among the plebs and equites by 
conscription, Marius decided, as Licinius Lucullus in 151 or Scipio Aemilianus in 134, to 
innovate in the dilectus. Instead of drafting by lots, encouraging propertied volunteers, Marius 
opened enrollment as regular legionaries to even Rome’s poorest citizens, the capite censi. 
Marius had found a large reservoir of willing men to fight in the army, but enrolling these men 
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was only the first step. If his plan was going to work, Marius needed to overcome several 
obstacles in its execution.
184
 
 
Execution of the Policy  
The greatest hurdle Marius had to overcome in enlisting large numbers of landless and 
unemployed citizens was to find a way to arm and equip them, a costly expense. The pre-Marian 
manipular legion required its soldiers to provide for their own arms and armor, like the hoplite 
citizen-soldiers of Greece. So if Marius enrolled men without property, who paid for their gear? 
Scholars have attempted to answer this question for years, many proposing that Marius evoked 
the military law of Gaius Gracchus to compel the senate to pay the bill, and that this was simply 
a natural progression of the state’s expanding expenditures.185  
This explanation does not suffice; the truth appears to be more complex. Marius had 
several factors working to his advantage in 107, which helped him to arm and supply his capite 
censi. First off, scholars who have concluded that all male citizens purchased the arms and 
armament that they could afford before heading off to war appear to misunderstand the nature of 
the Roman army. Instead, evidence suggests that soldiers were not expected to buy all their 
entire legionary kit outright prior to going to war, but rather that they were given the gear with 
the obligation to repay the state treasury for its costs. Publicani provided the equipment, the state 
bought it and gave it to soldiers, and then a quaestor collected the payments.
186 
The property 
requirements of the specific census were a means of assessing an individual’s ability to repay a 
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loan, and individuals of the higher census classes may have been eligible for more or better gear 
than their poorer counterparts.
187
  
Each individual soldier needed to own his gear, and not simply rent or borrow it from a 
state armory, so that veterans could be battle-ready for emergency call-ups after their discharge. 
In the Early and Middle Republican periods, it also was essential for Roman soldiers to maintain 
their gear in times of peace because they could be summoned for immediate service in an 
emergency. Over a period of about twenty years, Romans were required to serve around six 
years, although not necessarily consecutively. Since propertied male citizens were required for 
immediate service, they needed to own their equipment or be forced to repurchase the same gear 
several times in their adult lives.
188
  
Roman soldiers had two main options, either to pay for their gear outright or to repay 
loans through payroll deductions, which ancient sources record in both the Republican and Early 
Imperial periods. Polybius states outright that the cost of additional arms and equipment was 
deducted from the soldiers’ pay at the time of the Second Punic War; and during the Imperial 
period, Tacitus records that legionaries from the time of Trajan complained about having to 
repay the state through payroll deductions for the cost of their armor and weapons. If the practice 
existed in both the preceding and subsequent periods, then logistically it should also be the 
method employed throughout the Middle and Late Republican periods as well.
189
   
Arming Marius’ supplementum may have been more risky than costly. If this was the 
case, then the state assumed the responsibility of providing a larger number of kits to individuals 
through cash loans. The soldiers’ kits of the Marian legion were more complete than those of 
preceding armies because of these loans, which helped to eliminate the distinctions between the 
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ordines. The capite censi that swelled Marius’ ranks after 107 lacked valuable property and 
contracted larger loans without any significant collateral. It made little sense to provide an array 
of different kits for different economic groups, especially since the state recouped the cost of 
most of these kits through payroll deductions by a quaestor. The state assumed the risk that many 
of these soldiers might die (before they repaid their loans). 
Three factors combined to help in arming Marius’ legionaries drafted from the poorest 
classes. First, the army and state already had the mechanisms in place to provide arms and 
equipment to any soldier through the system of loans described above. There was nothing new 
about the state distributing arms and armament to soldiers without direct upfront compensation. 
Second, the lex militaris of Gaius Gracchus had increased the state’s obligations to fund portions 
of the soldiers’ kits, mostly clothing, that is, the tunics and cloaks. However, the surviving 
references imply that only the soldier’s cloak, the sagum, was included in this law.190 It has been 
argued that this law may have been extended to include armor and weapons, which would have 
eliminated the problem.
191
 However, there is no certainty that Gracchus’ law went beyond the 
sagum as described in the ancient texts. If it had, there should have been a wider recognition of 
that impact in the sources. 
Third, Marius as a former legatus of Caecilius Metellus knew that the general had 
collected a supply of equipment and arms. In 109, when Metellus was preparing for the war in 
Numidia, Sallust relates that he brought together a large surplus of arms, armor, equipment, and 
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provisions for the campaign.
192
 As a legate, Marius was well aware of this fact and may have 
planned on accessing this surplus of equipment for his own army of capite censi. This equipment 
was likely the property of the legal commander which would have been Marius in 107, and that 
consideration made it much easier to fully arm his legions.
193
 
 
Discipline and Training 
Recruiting soldiers from the capite censi had another side-effect. These soldiers, more 
than the usual conscripts, required extensive training before they were battle-effective. The 
young men recruited from the capite censi had previously been ineligible for military service and 
as a result had little to no martial experience or training relative to those who were brought up 
with the expectation of military service. The capite censi recruits needed to be trained to fight 
with gladius and scutum, to move in units, to throw a javelin, to set up camp properly, to forage, 
to march, and so on. These soldiers also needed to be physically conditioned like many other 
Roman armies in the past.
194
 Taking the time to train his new recruits was by no means a novel 
idea. Generals had regularly dedicated several months to the training and conditioning of even 
veteran armies in order to prepare them for an upcoming battle or siege.  
In order to best train his novice soldiers, Marius initially directed his army’s efforts 
towards the taking of small and vulnerable enemy assets, as mentioned in the previous chapter.  
He marched his army around the countryside and seized small forts and towns to acclimate his 
soldiers to the demands of war in the region.
195
 Undoubtedly, Marius was also gauging their 
capabilities as a force, so as not to overestimate them in battle. He attacked several forts and 
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small settlements in order to build their experience and confidence before he laid siege to Cirta in 
106. 
The practice of conditioning soldiers, however, through toilsome labor, forced marches, 
and drilling for periods of months was uncommon in the Middle Republic. Generals were not 
particularly keen on spending most of their annual command preparing their army, and it may 
have been less important since the soldiers of the manipular army typically trained their martial 
skills at home and throughout their childhood. In the Late Republic, commanders like C. Julius 
Caesar and Cn. Pompeius Magnus trained their soldiers in a manner similar to Marius.
196
 
While Rutilius Rufus was serving as legatus under Marius, he had employed gladiators to 
better train his soldiers to fight with swords and shields. It is reasonable to assume that Marius 
had taken command of the most experienced legions and left to Rufus the initial training of the 
more inexperienced legions with the new recruits. This basic training program ensured that the 
new soldiers acquired all the necessary fighting techniques. These drills were effective, 
developing the fighting skills of these new recruits, as apparent in their victory at Cirta.
197
 After 
the siege of Cirta, Marius had gained such advantage in Numidia that Jugurtha was surrendered 
to the Romans, ending the war in North Africa. After the war in North Africa, Marius received 
the command against the Teutones and Cimbri in Gaul. For this campaign, he chose the soldiers 
who had served under Rutilius Rufus, and dismissed those who had been levied by Metellus. 
Marius then enlisted additional men and led his force to the north of Italy. Marius’ clear 
preference for the soldiers that served under Rutilius Rufus shows that he desired well-trained 
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soldiers, and goes a long way to demonstrate the efficacy of both the training program and the 
drafting of capite censi.
198
 
 
Consequences 
 Marius’ plan had worked out exceedingly well. Sallust reports that these volunteers from 
the capite censi composed the majority of Marius’ army. Marius had appealed to a class, which 
was generally excluded from military service. In doing so, Marius effectively offered 
employment, the hope of loot, and a certain level of prestige to a group of people which had 
previous been denied such opportunities. As a result, Marius’ supplementary force swelled well 
beyond its legal limits, a fact that seems to have been ignored at the time.
199
 
Many scholars have argued that the enrollment of the capite censi simply continued a 
prolonged process of decreasing property requirements, especially for the lowest order of 
citizens, which took place over the course of centuries.  Matthew argues, however, that the 
perception of changing property requirements simply reflects of errors among the ancient 
sources.
200
 
 Marius’ enrollment of these capite censi was a vital step towards a fully-professionalized 
army. Marius had provided some unemployed citizens with opportunities for wages, spoils, and 
social advancement. Continued high unemployment and economic inequality gave Rome 
incentive to continue Marius’ policy into the future. Also, volunteers were motivated to serve for 
extended foreign campaigns, which enabled Marius to fight the war in Numidia at his own pace. 
Sulla and all subsequent commanders of the first century raised their legions from the proletarii, 
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and by the time of Caesar from provincials.
201
 Even if the Roman senate had desired to abandon 
Marius’ open enrollment and his subsequent reforms, any notion to do so was abandoned at the 
outbreak of the Social War, a conflict which required all of Rome’s military might to survive.  
Marius’ enrollment of the capite censi paved the way for the rest of his military reforms. 
He was now able to recruit far more effectively than previous generals had. Recruiting 
volunteers from the capite censi was a better mechanism for filling the ranks of the army as 
evident by the lack of any mention of a dilectus after Metellus’ conscription of 109. 
Inexperienced urban and rural poor required additional training and possibly new formations to 
ensure their quality, and possibly even their superiority. These soldiers were more willing to 
serve for extended periods of time, which also gave them ample opportunity to be trained.
202
 
By enrolling the capite censi Marius had provided future generals with a great tool. These 
soldiers from the urban and agrarian poor were more likely to act in their own self-interest and 
by extension on the interests of their commanders over that of the state. For example, in 88, 
when Sulla appealed to his men stationed in Capua to march with him on Rome, according to 
Appian, he had with him only a single officer, but six full legions of soldiers.
203
 The absence of 
other officers perhaps shows the discomfort of propertied individuals who shared a vested 
interest in the status quo at Rome. Capite censi soldiers were more interested in their future 
opportunity to go east and plunder Asia in the looming campaign against Mithridates than a 
potential civil war. David Potter argues that the soldiers from the proletarii were not agents for 
the best interests of their class: “The willingness to slaughter fellow peasants on land seized from 
Italian communities makes it plain that Sulla’s veterans cannot be seen as representatives of the 
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interests of a class other than that constituted by the soldiers of Sulla.”204 It is also unlikely that 
Julius Caesar could have convinced an army of propertied citizen-soldiers, as in the old 
manipular army, to cross the Rubicon, and perhaps even less likely that Octavian could have 
used citizen-soldiers of the old type to strong-arm the senate after the battle of Mutina (43) and 
the deaths of the consuls Hirtius and Pansa.
205
  
 
Influence on Consular Elections  
As discussed in chapter V, Marius’ election to the consulship of 107 resulted from his 
campaign and speeches which set him apart as a champion of the plebs urbana and an antagonist 
of the senatorial elite. Marius enlisted even the poorest citizens and set a precedent that changed 
Roman armies in the Late Republic and Empire. Beesley argues that, when the people elected 
Marius as consul and conferred on him the Jugurthine War, it set in motion the end of the 
Republic, as the professionalized army was created and the Marian faction was born. Beesely 
may have overreached by extending definite causation to events which were simply connected 
and interrelated. There is little doubt that Marius’ election in 107 was part of a long chain of 
events that led the Roman Republic into long periods of civil war and divisive partisanship, but it 
was by no means the only, or even the most important, factor. 
In 107, a novus homo from outside of Rome, had been elected to the consulship because 
of an inflammatory political campaign which promised results in a war that had cost Rome an 
army in 110, challenged on entrenched consular commander (Metellus) in Numidia, and lost 
Vaga with its entire Roman garrison in 108. The election for 107 was an important moment for 
Marius, but it was not nearly as radical and historically significant as his election for 104, which 
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was contrary to both law and custom. As previously discussed in Chapter III, the consulships 
traditionally went to members of tested and accomplished noble families, in the hope that their 
pedigree and upbringing would prove their own competence.  
In 104, immediately following his victory and triumph over Jugurtha, Marius had been 
elected to take command as consul in the war against the Teutones and Cimbri. He was the best 
apparent choice as a military commander with an already trained and outfitted force, a new and 
easier economic requirement for enlistees, and widespread popular support. Marius had shown 
himself to be superior to his rivals by making good on his promise to end the Jugurthine War. 
Also, because Marius had portrayed himself as a champion of the people, he had little trouble 
securing support from the assembly.
206
 As a novus homo, Marius also was politically removed 
from responsibility for the recent military disasters.  
After raising additional forces in Italy, Marius went north into Gaul to deal with the 
threats of the Teutones and Cimbri. Fortunately for Marius, the Cimbri had turned west through 
Gaul to the Iberian Penninsula instead of crossing into Italy. As a result, Marius was given two 
more years to prepare his forces for the fight ahead, while being reelected to consecutive 
consulships in the meanwhile. His four consulships of 104 to 101 were the product of a fear that 
that the senate might attempt to take the command from Marius and put Rome at risk. Marius 
was admired all the more because of Rome’s various failures in Gaul, in Hispaniae, and in 
Numidia. Most importantly, in the period from 104 through 101, and for a significant core of 
soldiers from 107 through 101, Marius had ample opportunity to implement all of his legionary 
reforms. 
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In 100, Marius had been elected to his sixth term as consul, which was unique because 
Marius was elected as a reward for past service rather than being marked out for a new 
campaign. He was not chosen to lead a foreign campaign, he did not raise an army, and it 
appears he might not even have left the city for any significant length of time. With the help of 
the tribune Saturninus, Marius had capitalized on the popularity and renown from his victories. 
Marius was lauded as Rome’s savior and its third founder after Romulus and Camillus as he 
celebrated his triumphs, flooding the city with spoils and slaves. The fact that the senate and 
people elected him consul for 100 indicates Marius’ popularity, which now had fundamentally 
changed the role of the consulship. 
. 
The Cohortal Legion Formation and Homogenization of the Infantry 
  Under the manipular army organization these soldiers should have been outfitted as 
velites, giving Marius a large surplus of light armed skirmishers without a core unit of heavy 
infantry. For several reasons which will be discussed in this section, Marius altered the formation 
and organization of the legion so that its size was increased, its units were larger, and there were 
no velites but instead there was a uniformly outfitted heavy infantry. 
The enrollment of the capite censi necessitated the restructuring of the legion and the 
dissolution of the traditional manipular ranks. Marius had enlisted large numbers of capite censi 
in both 107 and 104, which not only caused a disproportionate number of soldiers from the 
lowest census class, but also would have left the legions with a surplus of velites rather than 
soldiers. Marius could have sprinkled these men from the lower order across the various ordines, 
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outfitting some as velites, others as hastati, principes, or triarii, but instead he reorganized the 
legion so that all its soldiers could be used in the thick of battle.
207
  
Marius reorganized the legion so the smallest isolated unit in their battle formation was 
the 480-man cohort, instead of the 120-man maniple. It is clear that this change had occurred by 
the time of Julius Caesar’s army which is described as using a cohortal formation.208 The 
cohortal arrangement did not make use of differentiated infantry classes. Instead of velites, 
hastati, principes, and triarii, they were simply cohorts of heavy infantry, all outfitted in similar 
fashion. It appears that the last time that Marius used velites was at Muthul in 108, when he was 
serving as legatus under Metellus, and the last major battle before Marius assumed command in 
Numidia. Sallust does not mention velites at any later point in his work, which may indicate their 
absence. Although Matthew has taken expeditiis cohortis “swift” or “light cohorts” to indicate 
the presence of velites after Muthul, but that translation seems unlikely.
209
 Considering Sallust 
specifically used the term velites throughout his Bellum Jugurthinum, expedites cohortis must 
have been referring to something different. A basic translation of the term yields “swift cohorts” 
or “maniples” in English, which refers to soldiers who were not burdened with any excess gear, 
and were thus capable of moving more swiftly, although they were still outfitted as heavy 
infantry and not skirmishers.
210
     
The absence in Sallust’s account of the term velites after the battle of Muthul illuminates 
Marius’ desire to do away with the velites altogether. During the conflict, the velites were hit 
hardest by the hit-and-run guerilla tactics of the Numidian forces. He likely experienced similar 
tactics in Hispaniae earlier in his career. That is why Marius outfitted all his legionaries in the 
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same fashion and gave them javelins; he thus increased his fighting force without losing the 
advantages of javelin volleys.    
 Next, Marius changed the army’s basic battle formation. Scholars have postulated that 
Marius enacted structural changes like the cohortal formation when he assumed command in the 
Teutonic and Cimbric Wars in 104, because he would have needed several years to retrain his 
armies. Matthew also argues that in preparation against the loose and fluid tactics of the Germans 
and Gauls, Marius wanted to consolidate his units into the new formation.
211
 However, he does 
not take into account Marius’ efforts to strengthen his Numidian legions against guerilla tactics 
and cavalry harassment. The argument that it required several years for Marius to implement a 
cohortal organization neglects the fact that the cohortal organization was arguably an easier 
formation to teach an army of new recruits because of its fewer groups, divisions, and gaps. 
Also, Marius’ success in the Jugurthine War suggests that his soldiers performed and fought 
well, which may not have been the case if he was still using a manipular legionary organization 
with large numbers of untrained capite censi. By restructuring the legions into a cohortal 
organization, Marius greatly increased the fighting power of the army. 
  
Cohortal Legion drawn up in a tries acies, or “triple line” 
Figure 6.1 
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The pre-Marian legion was typically 4200 men strong, made up of ten cohorts each of 
420 men. 1200 of the 4200 men in the legion, were light-armed skirmishers, velites, who had 
been effective in causing disorder among the enemy lines prior to the engagement of the lines, 
but played very little part in the rest of the conflict. The main body of 3000 heavy infantry took 
the brunt of the ensuing melees. 
After Marius’ restructuring, the legion was a body of soldiers 4800 strong, still divided 
into ten cohorts, but each cohort was made up of six centuries of 80 men making them 480 men 
strong. The post-Marian cohorts were made up of uniformly outfitted soldiers (no separate 
ordines), a change which increased the number of heavy infantry from 3000 to 4800 men, a full 
60% stronger than the manipular legion. Moreover, the cohortal legion’s missile capabilities 
were not inferior to the manipular legion, because all 4800 men was also outfitted with multiple 
javelins, heavy and light.
212
 The post-Marian legionary battle formation were 10 cohorts drawn 
up in the three lines. The new cohortal organization implemented a new battle formation to take 
advantage of these changes to the legion. The cohortal legion arranged in the 4-3-3 (see figure 
6.1) formation maintained many of the advantages of the manipular arrangement, with the 
staggered battle line, while strengthening the cohesion and fighting capabilities of each unit (for 
more see Chapter II).
213
 Later generals, like Julius Caesar, adopted this formation. Caesar 
deployed his legions in three lines in almost every major battle he fought in Gaul.
214
 
The Marian legion was deployed in a much wider arrangement than the deep formation of 
its manipular counterpart. The deeper manipular formation was needed to facilitate, if necessary, 
the first battle line falling behind the second, and the second falling behind the third. Individual 
                                                        
212 Keppie (1984) p. 66. 
213 Keppie (1984) p. 64. 
214 Caesar BG 1.24-5; 1.41; 1.49; 1.83; 4.14. 
119 
 
 
 
maniples probably were not drawn up any less than four ranks deep, more likely six or eight like 
hoplite phalanxes of the past. Roman commanders after Marius regularly altered the depth of 
their formation in order to resist cavalry charges or particular stresses. They also spread their 
troops out, by reducing the number of ranks from six or eight to as low as three or four.
215
 The 
ability to flank and spread out opponents was advantageous so long as it did not come at expense 
of the line’s stability. 
120-men maniples in the pre-Marian legion were relatively isolated on the battlefield, 
making them subject to being surrounded and then routed, especially the lightly armed velites 
who fought in front of the first line in the manipular army. By consolidating the maniples into 
cohorts creating a 480 men group, Marius had increased security of the formation and 
encouraged unit cohesion. Marian cohorts were a single unit, without any sizable gaps between 
maniples. This arrangement had a significant psychological effect on those within the cohort, 
reducing the compulsion to flee and the feeling of panic once the melee began. In the pre-Marian 
legion, maniples were facing the enemy on both flanks and their front. In a group of 120 men, 
presumably drawn up 15 across and 8 deep, it would have been much easier for men in the 
maniple to feel enough enemy pressure that they felt compelled to break and flee. Also, as 
mentioned above, the manipular formation promoted falling back behind the lines to the rear. 
The Marian legion had preserved the three line formation, making it possible for cohorts to fall 
back behind their comrades before reentering the fray, but with the larger cohortal groups this 
tactic occurred less frequently. 
As the army advanced, it was easier for units drawn up in depth to maintain order than in 
shallower and wider formations.
216
 The pre-Marian legion was significantly narrower across its 
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fronts than its cohortal successor. It was 19 maniples wide, considering that each of the ten 
cohorts was one maniple wide and each cohort had a maniple-sized gap between them. If 
maniples were 15 by 8 the legion would be 285 men-wide or if they were arranged 20 by 6, then 
they would be 380 men-wide. The cohortal legion was arranged with 7 cohorts across, each 
either as 60 by 8 or 80 by 6, making the legion 420 or 560 men-wide. That is a 147% increase in 
width, no matter the arrangement, not only without sacrificing any line strength, but even 
strengthening it. 
 
Consequences 
Through his restructuring of the legion, Marius had eliminated many of the class 
distinctions and seniority issues in the army. There were no longer separate hastati, principes, 
triarii, or velites. The remaining distinctions were those between centurions and the general 
infantry, those among the centurions themselves according to cohort and rank, and those among 
officers according to their office. This change was done, not because Marius had hoped to 
destroy class division in the military, but to accommodate the large number of capite censi that 
now populated the army. This change united the infantry as a single body. As discussed above, 
Marius did not use these men as velites, and in arming them Marius set a new standard for the 
entire legion. 
During the period from 104 to 102, Marius spread his reforms to a large number of 
legions and commanders, as he was preparing for the eventual arrival of the Teutones and 
Cimbri. What is clear is that by the time of the Social War (91-88), the Roman army was making 
full use of Marius’ enrollment norms and the army’s cohortal formation. At the opening of the 
Social War, Rome fielded as many as 100,000 men at arms at a time when the citizen population 
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of Rome was no more than 400,000.
217
 Rome reached this number by drawing on its poorest 
classes, which made up the vast majority of the population. The post-Marian, cohortal legion, 
remained the basic legionary formation for centuries to come. The armies of the Late Republic 
and Empire used large numbers of these legions to maintain security and stability throughout the 
ancient world. 
 
“Marius’ Mules” and Discipline 
Marius, like many generals before him, was concerned with streamlining the army and 
the baggage train. It was desirable for armies to be as logistically independent as possible while 
operating in the field. Roman commanders had improvised temporary measures whenever the 
legions’ discipline or physical conditioning was lacking. These temporary measures typically 
banned servants or slaves from carrying their master’s gear, or reduced the size of the baggage 
train by banning some or all camp followers. With the camp followers sent away, soldiers were 
forced to be more self-reliant. Marius went a step further and made these previous measures 
permanent policy of his legions. Furthermore, Marius’ reforms were adopted into regular 
practice, becoming later Roman commanders’ standard operating procedure. 
The ancient sources credit Marius with the implementation of the crossed sticks that 
legionaries used to carry their entire kit, including shield, armor, weapons, rations, and any other 
equipment, like cooking utensils, tents, entrenching tools, and so on, while they marched. 
Soldiers now maintained their strength and fitness by carrying their entire kits on the march, 
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which was a considerable weight. Making soldiers carry all their gear helped to make the legions 
more autonomous and less dependent on supply lines and baggage trains.
218
 
Marius put his soldiers to work because hard work and toil taught discipline and 
developed strength. As discussed earlier, he avoided luxuries himself, and he also was said to 
have spent the time between 104 and 102 not only drilling and training his men, but marching 
them and having them build fortifications and do other labors. Plutarch describes Marius’ 
measures as “practicing the men in all kinds of running and in long marches and compelling 
them to carry their own baggage and to prepare their own food.”219    
 “Marius’ Mules” came to describe the soldiers who served under the commander 
because of the load they carried and the hard work they performed. Plutarch provides an 
alternative which even he found an unconvincing explanation: 
Hence, in after times, men who were fond of toil and did whatever was enjoined upon 
them contentedly and without a murmur, were called Marian mules. Some, however, 
think that this name had a different origin. Namely, when Scipio was besieging Numantia, 
he wished to inspect not only the arms and the horses, but also the mules and the 
waggons, that every man might have them in readiness and good order. Marius, 
accordingly, brought out for inspection both a horse that had been most excellently taken 
care of by him, and a mule that for health, docility, and strength far surpassed all the 
rest. The commanding officer was naturally well pleased with the beasts of Marius and 
often spoke about them, so that in time those who wanted to bestow facetious praise on a 
persevering, patient, laborious man would call him a Marian mule.
220
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Keppie posits that the term “Marius’ Mules” came as a clever observation of the overburdened 
and lumbering legionaries who were now packed down with gear and of their likeness to beasts 
of burden.
221
  
Marius reformed the legion so that it was more independent and had a small entourage of 
camp followers, a smaller and less burdened supply train, and better conditioned soldiers. 
Vegetius, writing in the Late Empire, dictates that soldiers should be made to march with at least 
60 pounds of gear, in order to keep the army disciplined and fit. Vegetius’ mention of Marius’ 
practice shows the long-term effects of “Marius’ Mules” in both the republic and the empire.222 
 
Earlier Measures by Roman commanders 
Roman commanders prior to Marius implemented alterations or reforms to their army’s 
policy or conduct, especially regarding the baggage train and the camp followers. During the 
second Punic War, Scipio Africanus trained his soldier on a several day cycle involving running 
in armor, sword drills, cleaning equipment, and rest.
223
 Later his kinsmen Scipio Aemilanus 
ejected all the camp followers and required his men to carry their own equipment on the march 
in Hispaniae in preparation for his siege of Numantia. In the Middle Republic it was more 
common for well-off soldiers to have servants or slaves attending them on campaign, but once 
Marius made the majority of the legion unpropertied capite censi, this practice ceased. Even 
Caecilius Metellus had instituted similar measures during his command against Jurgurtha. He 
ejected the camp followers: merchants, servants, prostitutes, and diviners and fortune tellers.
224
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Consequences  
Frankly, there is very little to differentiate the earlier measures taken by Scipio or 
Metellus from those of Marius, except that Marius’ reform was not temporary. Marius’ 
innovation became standard. After Marius, the shift towards more disciplined, mobile, and 
independent legions continued.
225
 About fifty years later, Marius’ nephew by marriage, Julius 
Caesar, trained and conditioned his legions for forced marches and battlefield mobility. The 
marching pace of his soldiers allowed Caesar to advance far ahead of his column to fortify 
important positions and make ready for battle, as he had done with six legions against the Nervi 
at the Sambre River in 58, when he advanced a full seven miles ahead of his column and fortified 
a suitable location for them.
226
 This advanced unit moved swiftly, even while carrying 
construction tools. The speed of his legions and their independence from the baggage train 
enabled Caesar to survive after being cut off from their supply-train at the beginning of the 
Alesian campaign in 53.
227
 
 
Aquila 
 Pliny the Elder credits Marius with the introduction of the gilded eagle, or aquila, as the 
legionary standard. He dates this to 104, as Marius began his preparations for the campaigns 
against the Teutones and Cimbri. Pliny also mentions that the pre-Marian legion had used four 
other animal totems as standards prior to this innovation, but afterwards the eagle gradually 
prevailed. Scholars have surmised that the other four animal standards were used by the four 
consular legions. Standards give an important reference point on the battlefield and provide a 
means of visual communication between officers and the legion as a whole.  
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 The eagle superseded all other standards and came to represent the legion itself. Matthew 
argues that the eagle inspired an esprit de corps and points out that the unitary symbol of the 
eagle may have represented Marius’ new homogenized legion. The aquila inspired confidence 
and morale, perhaps encouraging the men with the idea that Jupiter Optimus Maximus was on 
their side. The opposite was also true, that the loss of the eagle brought great dishonor and was a 
terrible omen. 
As Matthew points out, there is little textual evidence supporting the symbolic 
significance of these standards. However, from later on Caesar gives two examples in his 
account of the Gallic War. During the first invasion of Britain in 55, none of Caesar’s men 
wanted to get off the ships for fear of the enemy on the beach. But one of Caesar’s aquiliferi, 
standard-bearers, motivated his comrades by disembarking first, which prompted the others to 
follow him or risk losing the eagle. 
228
 A year later in 54, one of Caesar’s aquiliferi threw the 
standard over the ramparts of their own camp to keep it from enemy hands, during their fight to 
the death to save the camp.
 229
   
 
The Pilum Adjustments 
 Marius is also credited with adapting the construction of the pilum in such a way that the 
spearhead and shaft bent at a right angle on hitting the ground or any solid object. First, the bent 
javelins were unusable and could not be thrown back. Secondly, after the javelin pierced a shield, 
its bent shape made the shield very difficult to hold and handle. According to Keppie, who 
provides archaeological examples of pila from the area around Numantia in the late second and 
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early first centuries, the iron heads of the heavy pilum had the double sockets described in 
Plutarch’s account, and thus such pila existed in Marius’ day.230  
 Plutarch reported that Marius had retrofitted the javelins on the eve of the battle of the 
battle against the Cimbri at Vercellae in 101:  
And it is said that it was in preparation for this battle that Marius introduced an 
innovation in the structure of the javelin. Up to this time, it seems, that part of the shaft 
which was let into the iron head was fastened there by two iron nails; but now, leaving 
one of these as it was, Marius removed the other, and put in its place a wooden pin that 
could easily be broken. His design was that the javelin, after striking the enemy's shield, 
should not stand straight out, but that the wooden peg should break, thus allowing the 
shaft to bend in the iron head and trail along the ground, being held fast by the twist at 
the point of the weapon.
231
  
Matthew argues that retrofitting some tens of thousands of javelins on the eve of a battle 
would have been nearly impossible. Rather, adapting the pilum had to have occurred during the 
months prior to the battle.
232
 The javelins appear to have been a factor in the defeating the 
Cimbri at Vercellae, although the exact impact is unknown. Closely associated with the adjusted 
javelins is another important effect: Roman missile volleys now became more lethal because the 
weapons could not be re-used by the enemy after they had thrown their own. 
 
Veterans  
Land Grants (Coloniae Militares) 
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 The “veteran phenomenon,” as Gabba dubbed it, refers to the situation in the first century 
when commanders began to use extra-constitutional powers to win favor with their own 
veterans.
233
 It was only after Marius that veterans were viewed both as an all-important group to 
be satisfied and that they were seen as a useful for generals in new ways.
234
 Marius had regularly 
reenrolled his veterans, which created a group of men bound together closely by serving under 
the same commander for several years. With the help of Saturninus, Marius settled a large 
number of his veterans in military colonies, first in North Africa under the authority of the lex 
Appuleia of 103, and in Italy before 100.
235
 These veterans received land grants in overseas 
colonies whether they were socii or Roman citizens.
236
 
“The impetus for this new kind of colonization [military colonies] had been initially 
given by Marius’ army reform… [to men] he had enrolled for a set period in his army and had 
then discharged, he sought to assuage their land hunger with the help of this temporary political 
ally, L. Appuleius Saturninus. But Saturninus’ agrarian law in l03 concerned itself chiefly with 
viritane distribution.”237 Marius himself was not personally responsible for any formal colony for 
civilian citizens except for Mariana on Corsica, although he was indirectly responsible for a large 
number of military colonies. Either under the leadership of Saturninus, as Salmon argues, or 
simply with his help, Marius settled most of his veterans, both Italian and Roman, in overseas 
and domestic coloniae militares. In doing so, Marius acquired a large retinue of clients both in 
Italy and Africa. Salmon further argues that if Marius did not realize the significance of this 
colonization effort, Sulla certainly did. “At the first opportunity [Sulla] improved on Marius with 
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the characteristic thoroughness, to reward his soldiers, to punish his opponents, and to ensure the 
continuation of his own system of government.”238 
 Prior to Marius, veterans were not significant assets for commanders in either a military 
or political capacity, especially because generals rarely had held consecutive consular commands 
where the ability to enroll veterans begins to matter. When Marius enrolled the capite censi and 
began to professionalize the army structure, generals were pleased with the same soldiers for 
longer periods than one or two years. Marius had commanded the same soldiers for as long as six 
consecutive years in some cases and thereby his success was intimately connected with the 
economic and social advancement of his veterans. His men not only received portions of the 
booty and slaves taken from the Cimbri and Teutones, but also obtained land grants in veterans’ 
colonies in Italy and North Africa, which propelled many of them into the middle census-classes.  
 Marius had also made it a point to reenroll his veterans, something alluded to in Sulla’s 
address to his soldiers at Capua in 88. Sulla threatened that Marius would use his own veterans 
for the campaign against Mithridates instead of them. The soldiers responded by marching on 
Rome with Sulla. Marius’ veterans had also proven their loyalty in 100, when they were called 
from Picenum to put down the coup of Saturninus.
239
 As consul, Marius used his imperium, to 
summon his nearby veterans to the city. (This is something that Sulla, Caesar, and Augustus later 
emulated with their own military colonies spread across Italy and the provinces). Sulla is said to 
have settled his veterans on the land around the city in an attempt to protect Rome from a 
popularis uprising.  
It is also important that after Sulla had taken Rome and exiled Marius, Marius had fled to 
North Africa to raise an army from his veterans. (The practice of raising forces from settled 
                                                        
238 Salmon (1970) p. 129. 
239 Coup of Saturninus: Plut. Mar 35; Sulla’s speech at Capua: App. BC 1.57. 
129 
 
 
 
veterans was later conspicuously imitated by Octavian).
240
 Broughton argued, “The most direct 
evidence for the Marian colonization consists of a passage of Aurelius Victor and of the 
appearance in the third century A.D. of the cognomen Mariana in the official titles of Thibaris 
and of Uchi Maius.”241 
Marius was beginning to spread out his supporters somewhat widely in the Roman world 
through a relatively aggressive colonization effort. He was given special privileges, to settle 
veteran Romans and Latins in colonies. Cicero even reports that the Latin veterans in these 
colonies became new Roman citizens without the express permission of the senate. In his Pro 
Balbo, Cicero lists numerous special grants made to proconsuls as rewards for service, but none 
before Marius.
242
 
Veteran colonies, in Italy and abroad, offered their former commanders established 
pockets of loyal political and military support. As a result Roman commanders could recall their 
veterans to arms in times of need. The earliest example when Marius put down the coup of 
Saturninus with his veterans from Picenum. Sulla later settled as many as 80,000 veterans, not 
only his own but some Marian veterans as well, in a series of colonies on lands immediately 
surrounding Rome, to protect for himself and Rome against rivals, and enemy partisans.
243
 
However, in the execution of this policy, Sulla spared the lands of the wealthy Roman 
landowners, so long as they were not expressly hostile to him and his cause.
244
 Land grants for 
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veterans, created problematic expectations for Sulla and opportunities for Sulla and later 
Pompey.
245
  
The “veteran phenomenon” enabled Sulla to fight against the Marians after 88 in addition 
to providing loyal Marian supporters and manpower, which fueled the wars between Marius, 
Cinna, and Sulla and the Sertorian War.
246
 Even, Marius’ son, Marius, at an unusually young age 
became consul after his father’s death. During his consulship, Marius received many soldiers 
who “had already completed their term of service as set by law hastened of their own accord to 
join the young man [Marius].”247 
Marius had created an expectation that commanders would take care of their veterans 
with retirement bonuses, possible future opportunities to join new campaigns, and settlement in 
colonies on land grants. By linking the success of Roman generals directly to their soldiers, 
Marius created a system in which soldiers fought for the reputation, the gloria and fama, of their 
commander because of the tangible rewards they might receive.
248
 An underappreciated or 
unpopular commander could be the difference between success and failure in claiming retirement 
benefits. Land grants for veterans became a political problem for Sulla and Pompey. For 
example, in 60, when Pompey returned from the East, the current consuls, L. Afranius and 
Metellus Celer, denied him the authority to provide land grants, and refused to ratify his colonial 
settlements.
249
 Authority for land grants contributed to the volatile conditions that faced men like 
Pompey the Great, Crassus, Caesar, Lepidus, and others.
250
 
 
                                                        
245 Adams (2007) p. 204. 
246 Alston (2007) p. 184, Sall. B. Cat. 16.4, 28.4-Marian colonists were crucial in the restoration of the Marian 
faction after Sulla’s march on Rome.  
247 Diod. 38.12. 
248 Phang (2008) p. 23. 
249 Dio Cassius Roman History 37.49.1-50.6. 
250 Adams (2007) p.204. 
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Enfranchisements 
 Marius used his fame and reputation to provide his veterans with more than land grants. 
Sherwin-White observes: “The special privilege given to Marius of creating a certain number of 
new citizens in his colonial foundations, whether these were Roman or, as is more probable, 
Latin colonies, shows how the Romans sought to compensate the Latins for their lost 
privileges.”251 Marius had appropriated the right to grant full citizenship to Latins or other 
Italians in his colonies. As Sherwin-White, following Cicero, points out, there were no instances 
prior to Marius of any general, consul or otherwise, enfranchising allies without the authority of 
a law specifically designed to do so.
252
  
Most notably, Marius enfranchised two cohorts of Umbrian infantry after the Cimbric 
War. Shortly after Marius, Pompeius Strabo enfranchised a squadron of Spanish cavalrymen 
during the Social War, which is significant because he enfranchised provincials and not Italians. 
Regardless of Marius’ rationale, he did give citizenship to groups of Italian soldiers, which in 
turn helped to re-ignite the desire of the auxiliaries and socii for enfranchisement. When several 
years later in 89, Pompeius Strabo repeated the practice with provincials, it highlighted and made 
political allies with this potential reward for service. Many private commanders adopted the 
practice, and it eventually evolved into the imperial institution of granting citizenship to veterans 
after a 25-year term of service.
253
  
Marius’ enfranchisement of Italians may reveal the politician’s feelings towards the mass 
enfranchisement of the socii that some had agitated for. In Marius’ lifetime every tribune who 
had attempted to pass such a measure was stopped either legally or through civil violence: 
                                                        
251 Sherwin-White (1956) p.112; Cic. Pro Balbo 48. 
252 Sherwin-White (1956) p.292; Cic. Pro Balbo 55: Rome regularly enfranchised the priestesses of Ceres, who they 
recruited from southern Italy, but for each instance they needed to pass a new law.  
253 Rankov (2007) p. 5; Sherwin-White (1956) p.294; For Marius see, Cic. Pro Balbo 46, Val. Max 5.2.8, Plut. Mar 
28. 
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Fulvius Flaccus and Livius Drusus both lost their lives, the entire town of Fregellae was 
destroyed, in hopes of enfranchisement at Rome. The socii had been treated as Rome’s subjects 
for centuries and were required to provide money and men to its army. Marius rewarded his most 
venerated Italian allies with the reward which they desired most, citizenship. Marius might have 
simply felt that they deserved it or less likely, as an outsider himself, he might have sympathized 
with their cause.  
 By the time that Pompey, Crassus, and Caesar were leading their armies, the practice of 
raising legions had shifted toward large levies of provincials, not Romans or Italians, and these 
soldiers expected to be rewarded for loyal service with citizenship and land grants. However, the 
senate failed to grant the authority to consuls to enfranchise veterans or provide land grants 
without its approval or that of the assembly. 
 The fact that the senate had compelled Pompey to seek an unconventional solution to win 
the concessions that his men demanded, shows that the senate, in particular, was hesitant about 
any general accumulating too much power and wealth too easily. Pompey had proved himself to 
be a supporter of Sulla and the optimates. He started his early military career commanding forces 
in Southern Italy for Sulla, and then fighting against Marians in Spain, and his middle career 
helping Crassus put down Spartacus and ridding the Mediterranean of pirates. 
 
The Sullan Aftermath 
 Sulla is a transitional figure between Marius and those who came later. In this 
section, I discusss and highlight key Marian policies that are reflected in what Sulla did. He had 
both served under and fought against Marius in their nearly 20-year-long antagonistic 
relationship. He was a praetor when Marius took the first steps toward formalizing –and 
133 
 
 
 
professionalizing—the cohortal legion. Sulla served under Marius again when the Teutones and 
Cimbri threatened Rome. He benefitted from Marius’ generalship, as Marius benefitted from his. 
As legatus in the Social War Sulla was the equal of Marius and they cooperated against the 
Marsi and brought operations in that theater to a close. However, Sulla garnered more praise in 
Rome, because the much older Marius withdrew early retirement from the campaign left Sulla in 
the spotlight. Subsequently, in 88, when Marius had superseded Sulla’s consular command in the 
Mithridatic War, Sulla benefitted from the personal loyalty of his own enlisted capite censi to 
take Rome. The attack on the capital shows how much the soldiers’ loyalty had shifted from the 
state to their own commanders.  
Sulla marched on Rome in 88 with an army of six legions which were stationed at Capua. 
His army was composed mostly of capite censi soldiers, who were motivated by their desire and 
their personal loyalty to Sulla. No Roman commander had marched against the city since the 
legendary Coriolanus in the early fifth century. After Sulla, however, several Roman 
commanders did just that, including Marius, Sulla a second time, and Lepidus.
254
 When Sulla 
returned to Italy in 86, he found Rome in the hands of Marians who had retaken the city and 
killed many of Sulla’s friends and supporters. After marching on the city again, at the end of 82, 
Sulla made himself dictator with unlimited power and proscribed hundreds of citizens, whose 
confiscated property he used for his own purposes, including land allotment for veterans.
255
  
 In restoring the senate to its traditional number of 300, and then expanding it to 600 by 
including equites and veterans, he both ensured that a majority was loyal to him and gave 
political duties to at least some of his veterans as a direct consequence of Marius’ military 
reforms. Sulla reinforced the cursus honorum by law, making the office of quaestor a 
                                                        
254 Revolt of Lepidus (78-77) App. BC. 1.107. 
255 Plut. Sulla 33.1-2; Liv Per. 89. 
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prerequisite for the praetorship, and the praetorship a prerequisite for the consulship. He applied 
legal age and term limitations to these offices, perhaps to forestall abuses of the system. Sulla 
limited the scope of the imperium proconsulare and propraetore, thereby restricting the authority 
of provincial governors. These actions all reinforced his own political and military authority.
256
 
Sulla had made changes to almost every facet of Roman political life, but maintained 
every single one of Marius’ reforms and precedents, and then established them as standard 
practices. In the years following the Social War, Marius’ measures that helped to professionalize 
the army were further reinforced.
257
 The following generations of generals were instructed, not 
only by the example of Marius who saved the city, but also Sulla who saved the republic.  
Sulla’s proscription was a profitable endeavor that brought him a large sum of money, 
property, and land, which he used, among other things, to placate as many soldiers as he could. 
According to Brunt’s estimates, Sulla doled out allotments to some 80,000 veterans, not only his 
own men, but also large numbers of Marian soldiers who had opposed him in the civil war and 
now posed a continuing threat. According to Appian, he distributed land to a full 23 legions, far 
more that he had personally commanded. He needed this to please his own men, but also to 
ingratiate himself with the large number of other veterans who might otherwise be used against 
him.
258
  
 Even though many of Sulla’s precedents were inapplicable to many commanders, and 
were ignored by others, he had laid the framework for the occupation of Rome and the methods 
of how to hold the city successfully after a civil war, and through it all he left the military 
reforms of Marius intact.  
 
                                                        
256 App. BC. 1.100; Vell. Pat. 2.32.2. 
257 Adams (2007) p. 204. 
258 App. BC. 1.100.469-70: Debois (1987) p. 44. 
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Concluding Observation 
The Marian military reforms changed the army from a semi-professional citizen militia 
into a more professionalized army made up of extensively trained recruits who served for longer 
consecutive terms and were personally bound to their commanders. In this way these reforms 
created an army which could be used against other Roman commanders or the city itself. 
Military eligibility was no longer exclusive to landowners, and the capite censi had new 
opportunities for spoils and social and political advancement.  
Marius’ reforms were not completely novel, but the practices that he introduced he also 
cause to be established as standard operating procedure. He implemented these reforms in a time 
of crisis, and subsequently the extraordinary military careers of both Marius and Sulla acted to 
preserve his measures and to move the army far down the road of professionalization. What I 
have shown in this thesis is the larger economic, social, and political context which formed the 
background and provided the incubator in which Marius’ reforms were generated and developed. 
Once Marius crystalized his ideas and put them in place, the stage was set for Sulla and the new 
kind of military action that would seal the fate of the Republic. 
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APPENDIX I: Marian Consequences in the Late Republic 
 
The role of the legatus had also been transformed during the second century. Legates 
were used to settle provinces, and as secondary commanders, serving under a consul or 
proconsul. In 67 the lex Gabinia would redefine the office of legatus: no longer would the 
legatus be a private individual sent by the state to assist a magistrate, but instead would be a 
personal deputy to his commander.
259
 This transition towards deputy legates was already under 
way in Marius’ time. The deputy legatus was used more and more, giving additional 
opportunities and enabling militarily-inclined politicians like Marius and Sulla, and later 
Pompey, to increase their glory and fame and acquire great wealth. After the Social War, elected 
consuls sometimes brought on outbreaks in civil violence, like Octavius and Cinna in 88, or 
Lepidus and Catulus in 78. In an era when civic violence was a distinct possibility, loyal legati 
were at a premium, which underlines the transition towards increased power and autonomy for 
individual commanders.  
With his attempt to steal Sulla’s command in the Mithridatic War, Marius used the 
popular assembly and strong-arm tactics by Sulpicius and Glaucia to take command. Although 
his attempt ultimately failed and was a catalyst for Sulla’s march on Rome and the outbreak of 
the First Civil War. Marius’ use of a special commission was an important precedent. In the 
following generation, Pompey was treated with apprehension and fear because the senate desired 
to make full use of his martial talents, but wanted to avoid empowering a single individual too 
much, as had happened with Marius and Sulla. So, they resorted to granting Pompey imperium 
through special commission. 
                                                        
259 lex Gabinia of 67, the legati were no longer private persons from the senate, but officially appointed 
deputies of the commanding magistrate, and it was from their midst that the commanders of the legions came 
to be chosen. Pompey took 25 legates with him to the East, 15 of whom he had selected himself.   
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Pompey, Crassus, and even Caesar all benefitted from special commissions. Despite his 
youth and not having held the consulship, Pompey was given imperium proconsulare to 
prosecute the war against Sertorius.
260
 Later Pompey was assigned by special commission to the 
war against the pirates, although by then he had held the consulship. The lex Gabinia of 67 
vastly enlarged his anit-pirate command far beyond what was customary or legal.
261
 Then he 
took command in the Parthian War by the authority of a special commission, the lex Manilia, 
passed by the tribune Manilius in 66.
262
 And during the twilight of his career, the senate gave 
him a special commission to bring grain to Rome, which he also used to bring Egypt into the 
Roman sphere.
263
 Perhaps the most significant example of a special commission granting a 
dangerous amount of power was the senate’s decision, under Cicero’s prodding to send the 19-
year-old Octavian Caesar, less than a year after his adoptive father’s murder, with an army he 
raised himself, to assist the consuls Hirtius and Pansa against Antony at Mutina. Unfortunately, 
both consuls died in the battle and left Octavian in a position to negotiate with both his army and 
his victory for an appointed consulship, which led to the problematic triumvirate with Antony 
and Lepidus, and eventually led to the end of the Republic.
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Appendix: II: The Legionary Eagle Standard during the Principate 
Famous events in the principate of Augustus illustrate the symbolic importance of the 
legionary standard, Augustus made it a point to recover the standards lost in 53, 38, and 36 (one 
by Crassus, two by Antony). Tiberius actually negotiated their return though Augustus 
represented it in his Res Gestae,
265
 and Augustus featured the surrender on the breastplate of his 
statue from Prima Porta. In 2 BC the recovered standards were later displayed publically in the 
newly completed temple of Mars Ultor in the forum Augusti. Augustus was restoring Rome’s lost 
honor. For Augustus, the eagle standard had become a central symbol for both the legion and the 
empire.
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265 Augustus, Res Gestae 5. 
266 Suet. Aug. 21-23. 
267 “For a full discussion of the recovered standards and their public display, see Romer (1978) pp. 191-96.” 
Close up of the 
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the handing over of the 
Standards lost to the 
Parthians. 
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 It was Augustus who completed the process of professionalization of the army, a process 
which Marius had left unfinished. Marius had set precedents which opened enrolment to all 
citizens, established the practice of providing land grants to veterans, altered and regimented 
certain army practices, and even unified the Rome’s legions under the symbol of the eagle. 
However, as discussed above, the Marian reforms fell short of an comprehensive overhaul of the 
army and left much of the responsibility for obtaining these things for soldiers up to individual 
generals, which contributed greatly to the events surrounding and permeating the civil wars.  
 Augustus on the other hand, consolidated military control under himself, making the 
emperor the commander-in-chief of the entire Roman military structure. He established a 
military treasury to ensure that the army was paid and that its veterans received land grants upon 
retirement. The army under Augustus also regularized the practice of recruiting among 
provincials, with the promise of citizenship upon completion of their tours of duty. Finally, 
Augustus created a Praetorian Guard stationed at the city. In taking these final steps, the army 
under Augustus was no longer a source of major political instability. With these new practices, 
the legions were generally satisfied, which eliminated the major incentives for following an 
ambitious into yet another civil war. 
 
 
 
Appendix III: The Caecilii Metelli of the Late Second and Early First 
Centuries. 
 In this listing, I follow Broughton’s Magistrates of the Roman Republic 
I. Q. Caecilius Metellus Macedonicus (cos. 143) 
 Praetor in 148; propraetor from 147-6; consul in 143; proconsular governor of Nearer 
Spain in 142; Augur from 141 until his death in 115: and Censor in 131. Brother of L. Caecilius 
Metellus Calvus (II), and father of Balearicus (III), Diadematus (IV), M. Caecilius Metellus (V), 
and Caprarius (VI). 
II. L. Caecilius Metellus Calvus (cos. 142) 
Praetor in 145; consul 142; legatus in 140 and 136. Brother to Q. Caecilius Metellus 
Macedonicus (I) and father of Numidicus (VII) and Dalamaticus (VIII). 
III. Q. Caecilius Metellus Balearicus (cos. 123) 
Praetor in 126, consul in 115; proconsul in 122; censor in 102. Son of (I), and brother to 
(IV, V, and VI) 
IV. Caecilius Metellus Diadematus (cos. 117) 
Praetor in 123; consul in 117; proconsul in 116; censor in 115 (he expelled 32 senators) 
Son of (I), and brother to (III, V, and VI) 
V. M. Caecilius Metellus (cos.115) 
Praetor in 118; consul in 115; proconsul in Sardinia from 114-112, celebrated triumph 
over Sardinia in 111.  Son of (I), and brother to (III, IV and VI). 
VI. C. Caecilius Metellus Caprarius (cos.113) 
Praetor in 117; consul in 113, proconsul in Thrace in 112; celebrated a triumph over Thrace 
in 111; Censor in 102. Son of (I), and brother to (III, IV, and V) 
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VII. L. Caecilius Metellus Delmaticus (cos. 119) 
Consul in 119; censor in 115; and pontifex maximus. Son of Calvus (II) and brother to 
Numidicus (VIII) 
VIII. Q. Caecilius Metellus Numidicus (cos. 109) 
Augur in 115; praetor in 112; propraetor in 111; consul in 109; proconsul in Numidia in 
108; celebrated a triumph over Numidia in 106; censor in 102. Son of Calvus (II) and brother to 
Delmaticus (VII) 
IX. Q. Caecilius Metellus Nepos (cos. 98) 
Praetor in 101; consul in 98. Son of Balearicus (III), father of Celer (XIV) and Nepos 
Iunior (XIII). 
X. Q. Caecilius Metellus Pius (cos. 80)  
Praetor in 98; propraetor (or proconsularis) from 88-82 under Sulla; pontifex in 89, 
pontifex maximus in 81; consul in 80. Son of Numidicus (VIII) and cousin to Creticus (XI) 
XI. Q. Caecilius Metellus Creticus (cos. 69) 
Praetor in 74; pontifex 73; consul 69; proconsul in Crete from 68 to 64; celebrated a 
triumph over Crete in 62; legate in 60; pontifex maximus in 57. Son of Caprarius (VI), cousin of 
Pius (X) and L. Caecilius Metellus (XII) 
XII. L. Caecilius Metellus (cos. 68) 
Praetor in 71; propraetor in Sicily in 70; consul in 68. Son of Delmaticus (VII) 
XIII. Q. Caecilius Metellus Celer (cos. 60) 
Tribune of the plebs in 90; aedile in 88; legate in 66; praetor in 63; consul in 60. Son of 
Nepos (XIII) 
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XIV. Q. Caecilius Metellus Nepos Iunior (cos. 57) 
Tribune of the plebs in 62; praetor in 60; consul in 57; governor of Nearer Spain in 56. 
Son of Nepos (IX) and brother of Celer (XIII) 
XV. Q. Caecilius Metellus Pius Scipio Nascia (cos. 52) 
Praetor in 55; consul in 52; proconsul 49 (Asia) to 48 (Greece). Adopted son of Pius (X) 
 
